Agents: opt-in configured-model merge for non-native providers

* fix(channels): default allowFrom to id-only; add dangerous name opt-in

* docs(security): align channel allowFrom docs with id-only default

.gitattributes

@@ -1 +1,3 @@
 * text=auto eol=lf
+CLAUDE.md -text
+src/gateway/server-methods/CLAUDE.md -text

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ body:
     attributes:
       label: Summary
       description: One-sentence statement of what is broken.
-      placeholder: After upgrading to 2026.2.13, Telegram thread replies fail with "reply target not found".
+      placeholder: After upgrading to <version>, <channel> behavior regressed from <prior version>.
     validations:
       required: true
   - type: textarea
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ body:
     attributes:
       label: OpenClaw version
       description: Exact version/build tested.
-      placeholder: 2026.2.13
+      placeholder: <version such as 2026.2.17>
     validations:
       required: true
   - type: input
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ body:
         - Frequency (always/intermittent/edge case)
         - Consequence (missed messages, failed onboarding, extra cost, etc.)
       placeholder: |
-        Affected: Telegram group users on 2026.2.13
+        Affected: Telegram group users on <version>
         Severity: High (blocks replies)
         Frequency: 100% repro
         Consequence: Agents cannot respond in threads
@@ -92,4 +92,4 @@ body:
     attributes:
       label: Additional information
       description: Add any context that helps triage but does not fit above.
-      placeholder: Regression started after upgrade from 2026.2.12; temporary workaround is restarting gateway every 30m.
+      placeholder: Regression started after upgrade from <previous-version>; temporary workaround is ...

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ blank_issues_enabled: false
 contact_links:
   - name: Onboarding
     url: https://discord.gg/clawd
-    about: New to OpenClaw? Join Discord for setup guidance from Krill in \#help.
+    about: "New to OpenClaw? Join Discord for setup guidance in #help."
   - name: Support
     url: https://discord.gg/clawd
-    about: Get help from Krill and the community on Discord in \#help.
+    about: "Get help from the OpenClaw community on Discord in #help."

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ body:
     attributes:
       label: Problem to solve
       description: What user pain this solves and why current behavior is insufficient.
-      placeholder: Teams cannot distinguish agent personas in mixed channels, causing misrouted follow-ups.
+      placeholder: Agents cannot distinguish persona context in mixed channels, causing misrouted follow-ups.
     validations:
       required: true
   - type: textarea

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -259,7 +259,6 @@ jobs:
       - name: Check types and lint and oxfmt
         run: pnpm check
 
-
   # Report-only dead-code scans. Runs after scope detection and stores machine-readable
   # results as artifacts for later triage before we enable hard gates.
   # Temporarily disabled in CI while we process initial findings.
@@ -299,7 +298,7 @@ jobs:
           name: dead-code-${{ matrix.tool }}-${{ github.run_id }}
           path: .artifacts/deadcode
 
-  # Validate docs (spellcheck, format, lint, broken links) only when docs files changed.
+  # Validate docs (format, lint, broken links) only when docs files changed.
   check-docs:
     needs: [docs-scope]
     if: needs.docs-scope.outputs.docs_changed == 'true'
@@ -318,10 +317,9 @@ jobs:
       - name: Check docs
         run: pnpm check:docs
 
-      - name: Spellcheck docs
-        run: pnpm docs:spellcheck
-
-  secrets:
+  skills-python:
+    needs: [docs-scope, changed-scope]
+    if: needs.docs-scope.outputs.docs_only != 'true' && (github.event_name == 'push' || needs.changed-scope.outputs.run_node == 'true')
     runs-on: blacksmith-16vcpu-ubuntu-2404
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
@@ -334,10 +332,39 @@ jobs:
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
-      - name: Install detect-secrets
+      - name: Install Python tooling
         run: |
           python -m pip install --upgrade pip
-          python -m pip install detect-secrets==1.5.0
+          python -m pip install pytest ruff pyyaml
+
+      - name: Lint Python skill scripts
+        run: python -m ruff check skills
+
+      - name: Test skill Python scripts
+        run: python -m pytest -q skills
+
+  secrets:
+    runs-on: blacksmith-16vcpu-ubuntu-2404
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          submodules: false
+
+      - name: Setup Node environment
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-node-env
+        with:
+          install-bun: "false"
+
+      - name: Setup Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+
+      - name: Install pre-commit
+        run: |
+          python -m pip install --upgrade pip
+          python -m pip install pre-commit detect-secrets==1.5.0
 
       - name: Detect secrets
         run: |
@@ -346,6 +373,30 @@ jobs:
             exit 1
           fi
 
+      - name: Detect committed private keys
+        run: pre-commit run --all-files detect-private-key
+
+      - name: Audit changed GitHub workflows with zizmor
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+
+          if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "push" ]; then
+            BASE="${{ github.event.before }}"
+          else
+            BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
+          fi
+
+          mapfile -t workflow_files < <(git diff --name-only "$BASE" HEAD -- '.github/workflows/*.yml' '.github/workflows/*.yaml')
+          if [ "${#workflow_files[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
+            echo "No workflow changes detected; skipping zizmor."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+
+          pre-commit run zizmor --files "${workflow_files[@]}"
+
+      - name: Audit production dependencies
+        run: pre-commit run --all-files pnpm-audit-prod
+
   checks-windows:
     needs: [docs-scope, changed-scope, build-artifacts, check]
     if: needs.docs-scope.outputs.docs_only != 'true' && (github.event_name == 'push' || needs.changed-scope.outputs.run_node == 'true')

.gitignore

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ __pycache__/
 ui/src/ui/__screenshots__/
 ui/playwright-report/
 ui/test-results/
+packages/dashboard-next/.next/
+packages/dashboard-next/out/
 
 # Mise configuration files
 mise.toml
@@ -96,6 +98,19 @@ package-lock.json
 .agents/
 .agents
 .agent/
+skills-lock.json
 
 # Local iOS signing overrides
 apps/ios/LocalSigning.xcconfig
+# Generated protocol schema (produced via pnpm protocol:gen)
+dist/protocol.schema.json
+.ant-colony/
+
+# Eclipse
+**/.project
+**/.classpath
+**/.settings/
+**/.gradle/
+
+# Synthing
+**/.stfolder/

.npmrc

@@ -1 +1 @@
-allow-build-scripts=@whiskeysockets/baileys,sharp,esbuild,protobufjs,fs-ext,node-pty,@lydell/node-pty,@matrix-org/matrix-sdk-crypto-nodejs
+# pnpm build-script allowlist lives in package.json -> pnpm.onlyBuiltDependencies.

.oxfmtrc.jsonc

@@ -11,12 +11,14 @@
   "ignorePatterns": [
     "apps/",
     "assets/",
+    "CLAUDE.md",
     "docker-compose.yml",
     "dist/",
     "docs/_layouts/",
     "node_modules/",
     "patches/",
     "pnpm-lock.yaml/",
+    "src/gateway/server-methods/CLAUDE.md",
     "src/auto-reply/reply/export-html/",
     "Swabble/",
     "vendor/",

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ repos:
       - id: check-added-large-files
         args: [--maxkb=500]
       - id: check-merge-conflict
+      - id: detect-private-key
+        exclude: '(^|/)(\.secrets\.baseline$|\.detect-secrets\.cfg$|\.pre-commit-config\.yaml$|apps/ios/fastlane/Fastfile$|.*\.test\.ts$)'
 
   # Secret detection (same as CI)
   - repo: https://github.com/Yelp/detect-secrets
@@ -45,7 +47,6 @@ repos:
           - '=== "string"'
           - --exclude-lines
           - 'typeof remote\?\.password === "string"'
-
   # Shell script linting
   - repo: https://github.com/koalaman/shellcheck-precommit
     rev: v0.11.0
@@ -69,9 +70,34 @@ repos:
         args: [--persona=regular, --min-severity=medium, --min-confidence=medium]
         exclude: "^(vendor/|Swabble/)"
 
+  # Python checks for skills scripts
+  - repo: https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff-pre-commit
+    rev: v0.14.1
+    hooks:
+      - id: ruff
+        files: "^skills/.*\\.py$"
+        args: [--config, pyproject.toml]
+
+  - repo: local
+    hooks:
+      - id: skills-python-tests
+        name: skills python tests
+        entry: pytest -q skills
+        language: python
+        additional_dependencies: [pytest>=8, <9]
+        pass_filenames: false
+        files: "^skills/.*\\.py$"
+
   # Project checks (same commands as CI)
   - repo: local
     hooks:
+      # pnpm audit --prod --audit-level=high
+      - id: pnpm-audit-prod
+        name: pnpm-audit-prod
+        entry: pnpm audit --prod --audit-level=high
+        language: system
+        pass_filenames: false
+
       # oxlint --type-aware src test
       - id: oxlint
         name: oxlint

AGENTS.md

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 
 - Repo: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw
 - GitHub issues/comments/PR comments: use literal multiline strings or `-F - <<'EOF'` (or $'...') for real newlines; never embed "\\n".
+- GitHub comment footgun: never use `gh issue/pr comment -b "..."` when body contains backticks or shell chars. Always use single-quoted heredoc (`-F - <<'EOF'`) so no command substitution/escaping corruption.
+- GitHub linking footgun: don’t wrap issue/PR refs like `#24643` in backticks when you want auto-linking. Use plain `#24643` (optionally add full URL).
+- Security advisory analysis: before triage/severity decisions, read `SECURITY.md` to align with OpenClaw's trust model and design boundaries.
 
 ## Project Structure & Module Organization
 
@@ -91,6 +94,7 @@
 - Naming: match source names with `*.test.ts`; e2e in `*.e2e.test.ts`.
 - Run `pnpm test` (or `pnpm test:coverage`) before pushing when you touch logic.
 - Do not set test workers above 16; tried already.
+- If local Vitest runs cause memory pressure (common on non-Mac-Studio hosts), use `OPENCLAW_TEST_PROFILE=low OPENCLAW_TEST_SERIAL_GATEWAY=1 pnpm test` for land/gate runs.
 - Live tests (real keys): `CLAWDBOT_LIVE_TEST=1 pnpm test:live` (OpenClaw-only) or `LIVE=1 pnpm test:live` (includes provider live tests). Docker: `pnpm test:docker:live-models`, `pnpm test:docker:live-gateway`. Onboarding Docker E2E: `pnpm test:docker:onboard`.
 - Full kit + what’s covered: `docs/testing.md`.
 - Changelog: user-facing changes only; no internal/meta notes (version alignment, appcast reminders, release process).
@@ -116,6 +120,15 @@
 - If `git branch -d/-D <branch>` is policy-blocked, delete the local ref directly: `git update-ref -d refs/heads/<branch>`.
 - Bulk PR close/reopen safety: if a close action would affect more than 5 PRs, first ask for explicit user confirmation with the exact PR count and target scope/query.
 
+## GitHub Search (`gh`)
+
+- Prefer targeted keyword search before proposing new work or duplicating fixes.
+- Use `--repo openclaw/openclaw` + `--match title,body` first; add `--match comments` when triaging follow-up threads.
+- PRs: `gh search prs --repo openclaw/openclaw --match title,body --limit 50 -- "auto-update"`
+- Issues: `gh search issues --repo openclaw/openclaw --match title,body --limit 50 -- "auto-update"`
+- Structured output example:
+  `gh search issues --repo openclaw/openclaw --match title,body --limit 50 --json number,title,state,url,updatedAt -- "auto update" --jq '.[] | "\(.number) | \(.state) | \(.title) | \(.url)"'`
+
 ## Security & Configuration Tips
 
 - Web provider stores creds at `~/.openclaw/credentials/`; rerun `openclaw login` if logged out.
@@ -134,6 +147,7 @@
   `gh pr list -R "$fork" --state open` (must be empty)
 - Description newline footgun: write Markdown via heredoc to `/tmp/ghsa.desc.md` (no `"\\n"` strings)
 - Build patch JSON via jq: `jq -n --rawfile desc /tmp/ghsa.desc.md '{summary,severity,description:$desc,vulnerabilities:[...]}' > /tmp/ghsa.patch.json`
+- GHSA API footgun: cannot set `severity` and `cvss_vector_string` in the same PATCH; do separate calls.
 - Patch + publish: `gh api -X PATCH /repos/openclaw/openclaw/security-advisories/<GHSA> --input /tmp/ghsa.patch.json` (publish = include `"state":"published"`; no `/publish` endpoint)
 - If publish fails (HTTP 422): missing `severity`/`description`/`vulnerabilities[]`, or private fork has open PRs
 - Verify: re-fetch; ensure `state=published`, `published_at` set; `jq -r .description | rg '\\\\n'` returns nothing

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,128 +2,474 @@
 
 Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
-## 2026.2.20 (Unreleased)
-
-### Changes
-
-- Docs: fix FAQ typos and add documentation spellcheck automation with a custom codespell dictionary/ignore list, including CI coverage. (#22457) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: add dead-code scans to CI via Knip/ts-prune/ts-unused-exports and report unused dependencies/exports in non-blocking checks. (#22468) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: move `@larksuiteoapi/node-sdk` out of root `package.json` and keep it scoped to `extensions/feishu` where it is used. (#22471) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: remove unused root dependency `signal-utils` from core manifest after confirming it was only used by extension-only paths. (#22471) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: remove unused root devDependency `ollama` now that native Ollama support uses local HTTP transport code paths only. (#22471) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: remove unused root devDependencies `@lit/context` and `@lit-labs/signals` flagged as unused by Knip dead-code reports. (#22471) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: remove unused root dependency `lit` that is now scoped to `ui/` package dependencies. (#22471) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: remove unused root dependencies `long` and `rolldown`; keep A2UI bundling functional by falling back to `pnpm dlx rolldown` when the binary is not locally installed. (#22481) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: fix A2UI bundle resolution for removed root `lit` deps by resolving `lit`, `@lit/context`, `@lit-labs/signals`, and `signal-utils` from UI workspace dependencies in `rolldown.config.mjs` during bundling. (#22481) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: simplify `canvas-a2ui` bundling script by removing temporary vendored `node_modules` symlink logic now that `ui` workspace dependencies are explicit. (#22481) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: remove unused `@microsoft/agents-hosting-express` and `@microsoft/agents-hosting-extensions-teams` from `extensions/msteams` because current code only uses `@microsoft/agents-hosting`. Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Dev tooling: remove unused plugin-local `openclaw` devDependencies from `extensions/open-prose`, `extensions/lobster`, and `extensions/llm-task` after removing this dependency from build-time requirements. (#22482) Thanks @vincentkoc.
-- Agents/Subagents: default subagent spawn depth now uses shared `maxSpawnDepth=2`, enabling depth-1 orchestrator spawning by default while keeping depth policy checks consistent across spawn and prompt paths. (#22223) Thanks @tyler6204.
-- Channels/CLI: add per-account/channel `defaultTo` outbound routing fallback so `openclaw agent --deliver` can send without explicit `--reply-to` when a default target is configured. (#16985) Thanks @KirillShchetinin.
-- iOS/Chat: clean chat UI noise by stripping inbound untrusted metadata/timestamp prefixes, formatting tool outputs into concise summaries/errors, compacting the composer while typing, and supporting tap-to-dismiss keyboard in chat view. (#22122) thanks @mbelinky.
-- iOS/Watch: bridge mirrored watch prompt notification actions into iOS quick-reply handling, including queued action handoff until app model initialization. (#22123) thanks @mbelinky.
-- iOS/Tests: cover IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback in manual TLS policy tests for connect validation paths. (#22045) Thanks @mbelinky.
-- iOS/Gateway: stabilize background wake and reconnect behavior with background reconnect suppression/lease windows, BGAppRefresh wake fallback, location wake hook throttling, and APNs wake retry+nudge instrumentation. (#21226) thanks @mbelinky.
-- Auto-reply/UI: add model fallback lifecycle visibility in verbose logs, /status active-model context with fallback reason, and cohesive WebUI fallback indicators. (#20704) Thanks @joshavant.
-- Discord/Streaming: add stream preview mode for live draft replies with partial/block options and configurable chunking. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow. Inspiration @neoagentic-ship-it.
-- Discord: add configurable ephemeral defaults for slash-command responses. (#16563) Thanks @wei.
-- Discord/Telegram: add configurable lifecycle status reactions for queued/thinking/tool/done/error phases with a shared controller and emoji/timing overrides. Thanks @wolly-tundracube and @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Discord/Voice: add voice channel join/leave/status via `/vc`, plus auto-join configuration for realtime voice conversations. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Discord: support updating forum `available_tags` via channel edit actions for forum tag management. (#12070) Thanks @xiaoyaner0201.
-- Channels: allow per-channel model overrides via `channels.modelByChannel` and note them in /status. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Discord: include channel topics in trusted inbound metadata on new sessions. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Docs/Discord: document forum channel thread creation flows and component limits. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+## Unreleased
 
 ### Fixes
 
+- Config/Kilo Gateway: Kilo provider flow now surfaces an updated list of models. (#24921) thanks @gumadeiras.
+- Security/Config writes: block reserved prototype keys in account-id normalization and route account config resolution through own-key lookups, hardening `/allowlist` and account-scoped config paths against prototype-chain pollution.
+- Security/Exec: harden `safeBins` long-option validation by rejecting unknown/ambiguous GNU long-option abbreviations and denying sort filesystem-dependent flags (`--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`), closing safe-bin denylist bypasses. Thanks @jiseoung.
+- Security/Channels: unify dangerous name-matching policy checks (`dangerouslyAllowNameMatching`) across core and extension channels, share mutable-allowlist detectors between `openclaw doctor` and `openclaw security audit`, and scan all configured accounts (not only the default account) in channel security audit findings.
+
+## 2026.2.23 (Unreleased)
+
+### Changes
+
+- Providers/Kilo Gateway: add first-class `kilocode` provider support (auth, onboarding, implicit provider detection, model defaults, transcript/cache-ttl handling, and docs), with default model `kilocode/anthropic/claude-opus-4.6`. (#20212) Thanks @jrf0110 and @markijbema.
+- Providers/Vercel AI Gateway: accept Claude shorthand model refs (`vercel-ai-gateway/claude-*`) by normalizing to canonical Anthropic-routed model ids. (#23985) Thanks @sallyom, @markbooch, and @vincentkoc.
+- Docs/Prompt caching: add a dedicated prompt-caching reference covering `cacheRetention`, per-agent `params` merge precedence, Bedrock/OpenRouter behavior, and cache-ttl + heartbeat tuning. Thanks @svenssonaxel.
+- Gateway/HTTP security headers: add optional `gateway.http.securityHeaders.strictTransportSecurity` support to emit `Strict-Transport-Security` for direct HTTPS deployments, with runtime wiring, validation, tests, and hardening docs.
+- Sessions/Cron: harden session maintenance with `openclaw sessions cleanup`, per-agent store targeting, disk-budget controls (`session.maintenance.maxDiskBytes` / `highWaterBytes`), and safer transcript/archive cleanup + run-log retention behavior. (#24753) thanks @gumadeiras.
+
+### Breaking
+
+### Fixes
+
+- Security/Config: redact sensitive-looking dynamic catchall keys in `config.get` snapshots (for example `env.*` and `skills.entries.*.env.*`) and preserve round-trip restore behavior for those redacted sentinels. Thanks @merc1305.
+- Tests/Vitest: tier local parallel worker defaults by host memory, keep gateway serial by default on non-high-memory hosts, and document a low-profile fallback command for memory-constrained land/gate runs to prevent local OOMs. (#24719) Thanks @ngutman.
+- Agents/Context pruning: extend `cache-ttl` eligibility to Moonshot/Kimi and ZAI/GLM providers (including OpenRouter model refs), so `contextPruning.mode: "cache-ttl"` is no longer silently skipped for those sessions. (#24497) Thanks @lailoo.
+- Tools/web_search: add `provider: "kimi"` (Moonshot) support with key/config schema wiring and a corrected two-step `$web_search` tool flow that echoes tool results before final synthesis, including citation extraction from search results. (#16616, #18822) Thanks @adshine.
+- Media understanding/Video: add a native Moonshot video provider and include Moonshot in auto video key detection, plus refactor video execution to honor `entry/config/provider` baseUrl+header precedence (matching audio behavior). (#12063) Thanks @xiaoyaner0201.
+- Doctor/Memory: query gateway-side default-agent memory embedding readiness during `openclaw doctor` (instead of inferring from generic gateway health), and warn when the gateway memory probe is unavailable or not ready while keeping `openclaw configure` remediation guidance. (#22327) thanks @therk.
+- Sessions/Store: canonicalize inbound mixed-case session keys for metadata and route updates, and migrate legacy case-variant entries to a single lowercase key to prevent duplicate sessions and missing TUI/WebUI history. (#9561) Thanks @hillghost86.
+- Telegram/Reactions: soft-fail reaction action errors (policy/token/emoji/API), accept snake_case `message_id`, and fallback to inbound message-id context when explicit `messageId` is omitted so DM reactions stay stable without regeneration loops. (#20236, #21001) Thanks @PeterShanxin and @vincentkoc.
+- Telegram/Polling: scope persisted polling offsets to bot identity and reuse a single awaited runner-stop path on abort/retry, preventing cross-token offset bleed and overlapping pollers during restart/error recovery. (#10850, #11347) Thanks @talhaorak, @anooprdawar, and @vincentkoc.
+- Telegram/Reasoning: when `/reasoning off` is active, suppress reasoning-only delivery segments and block raw fallback resend of suppressed `Reasoning:`/`<think>` text, preventing internal reasoning leakage in legacy sessions while preserving answer delivery. (#24626, #24518)
+- Agents/Reasoning: when model-default thinking is active (for example `thinking=low`), keep auto-reasoning disabled unless explicitly enabled, preventing `Reasoning:` thinking-block leakage in channel replies. (#24335, #24290) thanks @Kay-051.
+- Agents/Reasoning: avoid classifying provider reasoning-required errors as context overflows so these failures no longer trigger compaction-style overflow recovery. (#24593) Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Agents/Models: codify `agents.defaults.model` / `agents.defaults.imageModel` config-boundary input as `string | {primary,fallbacks}`, split explicit vs effective model resolution, and fix `models status --agent` source attribution so defaults-inherited agents are labeled as `defaults` while runtime selection still honors defaults fallback. (#24210) thanks @bianbiandashen.
+- Agents/Compaction: pass `agentDir` into manual `/compact` command runs so compaction auth/profile resolution stays scoped to the active agent. (#24133) thanks @Glucksberg.
+- Agents/Compaction: pass model metadata through the embedded runtime so safeguard summarization can run when `ctx.model` is unavailable, avoiding repeated `"Summary unavailable due to context limits"` fallback summaries. (#3479) Thanks @battman21, @hanxiao and @vincentkoc.
+- Agents/Compaction: cancel safeguard compaction when summary generation cannot run (missing model/API key or summarization failure), preserving history instead of truncating to fallback `"Summary unavailable"` text. (#10711) Thanks @DukeDeSouth and @vincentkoc.
+- Agents/Config: support per-agent `params` overrides merged on top of model defaults (including `cacheRetention`) so mixed-traffic agents can tune cache behavior independently. (#17470, #17112) Thanks @rrenamed.
+- Agents/Bootstrap: cache bootstrap file snapshots per session key and clear them on session reset/delete, reducing prompt-cache invalidations from in-session `AGENTS.md`/`MEMORY.md` writes. (#22220) Thanks @anisoptera.
+- Agents/Tools: make `session_status` read transcript-derived usage mid-turn and tail-read session logs for cache-aware context reporting without full-log scans. (#22387) Thanks @1ucian.
+- Agents/Overflow: detect additional provider context-overflow error shapes (including `input length` + `max_tokens` exceed-context variants) so failures route through compaction/recovery paths instead of leaking raw provider errors to users. (#9951) Thanks @echoVic and @Glucksberg.
+- Agents/Overflow: add Chinese context-overflow pattern detection in `isContextOverflowError` so localized provider errors route through overflow recovery paths. (#22855) Thanks @Clawborn.
+- Agents/Failover: treat HTTP 502/503/504 errors as failover-eligible transient timeouts so fallback chains can switch providers/models during upstream outages instead of retrying the same failing target. (#20999) Thanks @taw0002 and @vincentkoc.
+- Auto-reply/Inbound metadata: hide direct-chat `message_id`/`message_id_full` and sender metadata only from normalized chat type (not sender-id sentinels), preserving group metadata visibility and preventing sender-id spoofed direct-mode classification. (#24373) thanks @jd316.
+- Auto-reply/Inbound metadata: move dynamic inbound `flags` (reply/forward/thread/history) from system metadata to user-context conversation info, preventing turn-by-turn prompt-cache invalidation from flag toggles. (#21785) Thanks @aidiffuser.
+- Auto-reply/Sessions: remove auth-key labels from `/new` and `/reset` confirmation messages so session reset notices never expose API key prefixes or env-key labels in chat output. (#24384, #24409) Thanks @Clawborn.
+- Slack/Group policy: move Slack account `groupPolicy` defaulting to provider-level schema defaults so multi-account configs inherit top-level `channels.slack.groupPolicy` instead of silently overriding inheritance with per-account `allowlist`. (#17579) Thanks @ZetiMente.
+- Providers/Anthropic: skip `context-1m-*` beta injection for OAuth/subscription tokens (`sk-ant-oat-*`) while preserving OAuth-required betas, avoiding Anthropic 401 auth failures when `params.context1m` is enabled. (#10647, #20354) Thanks @ClumsyWizardHands and @dcruver.
+- Providers/DashScope: mark DashScope-compatible `openai-completions` endpoints as `supportsDeveloperRole=false` so OpenClaw sends `system` instead of unsupported `developer` role on Qwen/DashScope APIs. (#19130) Thanks @Putzhuawa and @vincentkoc.
+- Providers/Bedrock: disable prompt-cache retention for non-Anthropic Bedrock models so Nova/Mistral requests do not send unsupported cache metadata. (#20866) Thanks @pierreeurope.
+- Providers/Bedrock: apply Anthropic-Claude cacheRetention defaults and runtime pass-through for `amazon-bedrock/*anthropic.claude*` model refs, while keeping non-Anthropic Bedrock models excluded. (#22303) Thanks @snese.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: remove conflicting top-level `reasoning_effort` when injecting nested `reasoning.effort`, preventing OpenRouter 400 payload-validation failures for reasoning models. (#24120) thanks @tenequm.
+- Providers/Groq: avoid classifying Groq TPM limit errors as context overflow so throttling paths no longer trigger overflow recovery logic. (#16176) Thanks @dddabtc.
+- Gateway/WS: close repeated post-handshake `unauthorized role:*` request floods per connection and sample duplicate rejection logs, preventing a single misbehaving client from degrading gateway responsiveness. (#20168) Thanks @acy103, @vibecodooor, and @vincentkoc.
+- Gateway/Restart: treat child listener PIDs as owned by the service runtime PID during restart health checks to avoid false stale-process kills and restart timeouts on launchd/systemd. (#24696) Thanks @gumadeiras.
+- Config/Write: apply `unsetPaths` with immutable path-copy updates so config writes never mutate caller-provided objects, and harden `openclaw config get/set/unset` path traversal by rejecting prototype-key segments and inherited-property traversal. (#24134) thanks @frankekn.
+- Security/Exec: detect obfuscated commands before exec allowlist decisions and require explicit approval for obfuscation patterns. (#8592) Thanks @CornBrother0x and @vincentkoc.
+- Security/ACP: harden ACP client permission auto-approval to require trusted core tool IDs, ignore untrusted `toolCall.kind` hints, and scope `read` auto-approval to the active working directory so unknown tool names and out-of-scope file reads always prompt. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
+- Security/Skills: escape user-controlled prompt, filename, and output-path values in `openai-image-gen` HTML gallery generation to prevent stored XSS in generated `index.html` output. (#12538) Thanks @CornBrother0x.
+- Security/Skills: harden `skill-creator` packaging by skipping symlink entries and rejecting files whose resolved paths escape the selected skill root. (#24260, #16959) Thanks @CornBrother0x and @vincentkoc.
+- Security/OTEL: redact sensitive values (API keys, tokens, credential fields) from diagnostics-otel log bodies, log attributes, and error/reason span fields before OTLP export. (#12542) Thanks @brandonwise.
+- Security/CI: add pre-commit security hook coverage for private-key detection and production dependency auditing, and enforce those checks in CI alongside baseline secret scanning. Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Skills/Python: harden skill script packaging and validation edge cases (self-including `.skill` outputs, CRLF frontmatter parsing, strict `--days` validation, and safer image file loading), with expanded Python regression coverage. Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Skills/Python: add CI + pre-commit linting (`ruff`) and pytest discovery coverage for Python scripts/tests under `skills/`, including package test execution from repo root. Thanks @vincentkoc.
+
+## 2026.2.22
+
+### Changes
+
+- Control UI/Agents: make the Tools panel data-driven from runtime `tools.catalog`, add per-tool provenance labels (`core` / `plugin:<id>` + optional marker), and keep a static fallback list when the runtime catalog is unavailable.
+- Web Search/Gemini: add grounded Gemini provider support with provider auto-detection and config/docs updates. (#13075, #13074) Thanks @akoscz.
+- Control UI/Cron: add full web cron edit parity (including clone and richer validation/help text), plus all-jobs run history with pagination/search/sort/multi-filter controls and improved cron page layout for cleaner scheduling and failure triage workflows.
+- Provider/Mistral: add support for the Mistral provider, including memory embeddings and voice support. (#23845) Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Update/Core: add an optional built-in auto-updater for package installs (`update.auto.*`), default-off, with stable rollout delay+jitter and beta hourly cadence.
+- CLI/Update: add `openclaw update --dry-run` to preview channel/tag/target/restart actions without mutating config, installing, syncing plugins, or restarting.
+- Config/UI: add tag-aware settings filtering and broaden config labels/help copy so fields are easier to discover and understand in the dashboard config screen.
+- Channels/Synology Chat: add a native Synology Chat channel plugin with webhook ingress, direct-message routing, outbound send/media support, per-account config, and DM policy controls. (#23012)
+- iOS/Talk: prefetch TTS segments and suppress expected speech-cancellation errors for smoother talk playback. (#22833) Thanks @ngutman.
+- Memory/FTS: add Spanish and Portuguese stop-word filtering for query expansion in FTS-only search mode, improving conversational recall for both languages. Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Memory/FTS: add Japanese-aware query expansion tokenization and stop-word filtering (including mixed-script terms like ASCII + katakana) for FTS-only search mode. Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Memory/FTS: add Korean stop-word filtering and particle-aware keyword extraction (including mixed Korean/English stems) for query expansion in FTS-only search mode. (#18899) Thanks @ruypang.
+- Memory/FTS: add Arabic stop-word filtering for query expansion in FTS-only search mode to reduce conversational filler in Arabic memory searches. Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Discord/Allowlist: canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs and split resolution flow for clearer fail-closed behavior.
+- Channels/Config: unify channel preview streaming config handling with a shared resolver and canonical migration path.
+- Gateway/Auth: unify call/probe/status/auth credential-source precedence on shared resolver helpers, with table-driven parity coverage across gateway entrypoints.
+- Gateway/Auth: refactor gateway credential resolution and websocket auth handshake paths to use shared typed auth contexts, including explicit `auth.deviceToken` support in connect frames and tests.
+- Skills: remove bundled `food-order` skill from this repo; manage/install it from ClawHub instead.
+- Docs/Subagents: make thread-bound session guidance channel-first instead of Discord-specific, and list thread-supporting channels explicitly. (#23589) Thanks @osolmaz.
+
+### Breaking
+
+- **BREAKING:** removed Google Antigravity provider support and the bundled `google-antigravity-auth` plugin. Existing `google-antigravity/*` model/profile configs no longer work; migrate to `google-gemini-cli` or other supported providers.
+- **BREAKING:** tool-failure replies now hide raw error details by default. OpenClaw still sends a failure summary, but detailed error suffixes (for example provider/runtime messages and local path fragments) now require `/verbose on` or `/verbose full`.
+- **BREAKING:** CLI local onboarding now sets `session.dmScope` to `per-channel-peer` by default for new/implicit DM scope configuration. If you depend on shared DM continuity across senders, explicitly set `session.dmScope` to `main`. (#23468) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- **BREAKING:** unify channel preview-streaming config to `channels.<channel>.streaming` with enum values `off | partial | block | progress`, and move Slack native stream toggle to `channels.slack.nativeStreaming`. Legacy keys (`streamMode`, Slack boolean `streaming`) are still read and migrated by `openclaw doctor --fix`, but canonical saved config/docs now use the unified names.
+- **BREAKING:** remove legacy Gateway device-auth signature `v1`. Device-auth clients must now sign `v2` payloads with the per-connection `connect.challenge` nonce and send `device.nonce`; nonce-less connects are rejected.
+
+### Fixes
+
+- Sessions/Resilience: ignore invalid persisted `sessionFile` metadata and fall back to the derived safe transcript path instead of aborting session resolution for handlers and tooling. (#16061) Thanks @haoyifan and @vincentkoc.
+- Sessions/Paths: resolve symlinked state-dir aliases during transcript-path validation while preserving safe cross-agent/state-root compatibility for valid `agents/<id>/sessions/**` paths. (#18593) Thanks @EpaL and @vincentkoc.
+- Agents/Compaction: count auto-compactions only after a non-retry `auto_compaction_end`, keeping session `compactionCount` aligned to completed compactions.
+- Security/CLI: redact sensitive values in `openclaw config get` output before printing config paths, preventing credential leakage to terminal output/history. (#13683) Thanks @SleuthCo.
+- Agents/Moonshot: force `supportsDeveloperRole=false` for Moonshot-compatible `openai-completions` models (provider `moonshot` and Moonshot base URLs), so initial runs no longer send unsupported `developer` roles that trigger `ROLE_UNSPECIFIED` errors. (#21060, #22194) Thanks @ShengFuC.
+- Agents/Kimi: classify Moonshot `Your request exceeded model token limit` failures as context overflows so auto-compaction and user-facing overflow recovery trigger correctly instead of surfacing raw invalid-request errors. (#9562) Thanks @danilofalcao.
+- Providers/Moonshot: mark Kimi K2.5 as image-capable in implicit + onboarding model definitions, and refresh stale explicit provider capability fields (`input`/`reasoning`/context limits) from implicit catalogs so existing configs pick up Moonshot vision support without manual model rewrites. (#13135, #4459) Thanks @manikv12.
+- Agents/Transcript: enable consecutive-user turn merging for strict non-OpenAI `openai-completions` providers (for example Moonshot/Kimi), reducing `roles must alternate` ordering failures on OpenAI-compatible endpoints while preserving current OpenRouter/Opencode behavior. (#7693)
+- Install/Discord Voice: make `@discordjs/opus` an optional dependency so `openclaw` install/update no longer hard-fails when native Opus builds fail, while keeping `opusscript` as the runtime fallback decoder for Discord voice flows. (#23737, #23733, #23703) Thanks @jeadland, @Sheetaa, and @Breakyman.
+- Docker/Setup: precreate `$OPENCLAW_CONFIG_DIR/identity` during `docker-setup.sh` so CLI commands that need device identity (for example `devices list`) avoid `EACCES ... /home/node/.openclaw/identity` failures on restrictive bind mounts. (#23948) Thanks @ackson-beep.
+- Exec/Background: stop applying the default exec timeout to background sessions (`background: true` or explicit `yieldMs`) when no explicit timeout is set, so long-running background jobs are no longer terminated at the default timeout boundary. (#23303)
+- Slack/Threading: sessions: keep parent-session forking and thread-history context active beyond first turn by removing first-turn-only gates in session init, thread-history fetch, and reply prompt context injection. (#23843, #23090) Thanks @vincentkoc and @Taskle.
+- Slack/Threading: respect `replyToMode` when Slack auto-populates top-level `thread_ts`, and ignore inline `replyToId` directive tags when `replyToMode` is `off` so thread forcing stays disabled unless explicitly configured. (#23839, #23320, #23513) Thanks @vincentkoc and @dorukardahan.
+- Slack/Extension: forward `message read` `threadId` to `readMessages` and use delivery-context `threadId` as outbound `thread_ts` fallback so extension replies/reads stay in the correct Slack thread. (#22216, #22485, #23836) Thanks @vincentkoc, @lan17 and @dorukardahan.
+- Slack/Upload: resolve bare user IDs (U-prefix) to DM channel IDs via `conversations.open` before calling `files.uploadV2`, which rejects non-channel IDs. `chat.postMessage` tolerates user IDs directly, but `files.uploadV2` → `completeUploadExternal` validates `channel_id` against `^[CGDZ][A-Z0-9]{8,}$`, causing `invalid_arguments` when agents reply with media to DM conversations.
+- Webchat/Chat: apply assistant `final` payload messages directly to chat state so sent turns render without waiting for a full history refresh cycle. (#14928) Thanks @BradGroux.
+- Webchat/Chat: for out-of-band final events (for example tool-call side runs), append provided final assistant payloads directly instead of forcing a transient history reset. (#11139) Thanks @AkshayNavle.
+- Webchat/Performance: reload `chat.history` after final events only when the final payload lacks a renderable assistant message, avoiding expensive full-history refreshes on normal turns. (#20588) Thanks @amzzzzzzz.
+- Webchat/Sessions: preserve external session routing metadata when internal `chat.send` turns run under `webchat`, so explicit channel-keyed sessions (for example Telegram) no longer get rewritten to `webchat` and misroute follow-up delivery. (#23258) Thanks @binary64.
+- Webchat/Sessions: preserve existing session `label` across `/new` and `/reset` rollovers so reset sessions remain discoverable in session history lists. (#23755) Thanks @ThunderStormer.
+- Gateway/Chat UI: strip inline reply/audio directive tags from non-streaming final webchat broadcasts (including `chat.inject`) while preserving empty-string message content when tags are the entire reply. (#23298) Thanks @SidQin-cyber.
+- Chat/UI: strip inline reply/audio directive tags (`[[reply_to_current]]`, `[[reply_to:<id>]]`, `[[audio_as_voice]]`) from displayed chat history, live chat event output, and session preview snippets so control tags no longer leak into user-visible surfaces.
+- Gateway/Chat UI: sanitize non-streaming final `chat.send`/`chat.inject` payload text with the same envelope/untrusted-context stripping used by `chat.history`, preventing `<<<EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT...>>>` wrapper markup from rendering in Control UI chat. (#24012) Thanks @mittelaltergouda.
+- Telegram/Media: send a user-facing Telegram reply when media download fails (non-size errors) instead of silently dropping the message.
+- Telegram/Webhook: keep webhook monitors alive until gateway abort signals fire, preventing false channel exits and immediate webhook auto-restart loops.
+- Telegram/Polling: retry recoverable setup-time network failures in monitor startup and await runner teardown before retry to avoid overlapping polling sessions.
+- Telegram/Polling: clear Telegram webhooks (`deleteWebhook`) before starting long-poll `getUpdates`, including retry handling for transient cleanup failures.
+- Telegram/Webhook: add `channels.telegram.webhookPort` config support and pass it through plugin startup wiring to the monitor listener.
+- Browser/Extension Relay: refactor the MV3 worker to preserve debugger attachments across relay drops, auto-reconnect with bounded backoff+jitter, persist and rehydrate attached tab state via `chrome.storage.session`, recover from `target_closed` navigation detaches, guard stale socket handlers, enforce per-tab operation locks and per-request timeouts, and add lifecycle keepalive/badge refresh hooks (`alarms`, `webNavigation`). (#15099, #6175, #8468, #9807)
+- Browser/Relay: treat extension websocket as connected only when `OPEN`, allow reconnect when a stale `CLOSING/CLOSED` extension socket lingers, and guard stale socket message/close handlers so late events cannot clear active relay state; includes regression coverage for live-duplicate `409` rejection and immediate reconnect-after-close races. (#15099, #18698, #20688)
+- Browser/Remote CDP: extend stale-target recovery so `ensureTabAvailable()` now reuses the sole available tab for remote CDP profiles (same behavior as extension profiles) while preserving strict `tab not found` errors when multiple tabs exist; includes remote-profile regression tests. (#15989)
+- Gateway/Pairing: treat `operator.admin` as satisfying other `operator.*` scope checks during device-auth verification so local CLI/TUI sessions stop entering pairing-required loops for pairing/approval-scoped commands. (#22062, #22193, #21191) Thanks @Botaccess, @jhartshorn, and @ctbritt.
+- Gateway/Pairing: auto-approve loopback `scope-upgrade` pairing requests (including device-token reconnects) so local clients do not disconnect on pairing-required scope elevation. (#23708) Thanks @widingmarcus-cyber.
+- Gateway/Scopes: include `operator.read` and `operator.write` in default operator connect scope bundles across CLI, Control UI, and macOS clients so write-scoped announce/sub-agent follow-up calls no longer hit `pairing required` disconnects on loopback gateways. (#22582) thanks @YuzuruS.
+- Gateway/Pairing: treat operator.admin pairing tokens as satisfying operator.write requests so legacy devices stop looping through scope-upgrade prompts introduced in 2026.2.19. (#23125, #23006) Thanks @vignesh07.
+- Gateway/Restart: fix restart-loop edge cases by keeping `openclaw.mjs -> dist/entry.js` bootstrap detection explicit, reacquiring the gateway lock for in-process restart fallback paths, and tightening restart-loop regression coverage. (#23416) Thanks @jeffwnli.
+- Gateway/Lock: use optional gateway-port reachability as a primary stale-lock liveness signal (and wire gateway run-loop lock acquisition to the resolved port), reducing false "already running" lockouts after unclean exits. (#23760) Thanks @Operative-001.
+- Delivery/Queue: quarantine queue entries immediately on known permanent delivery errors (for example invalid recipients or missing conversation references) by moving them to `failed/` instead of retrying on every restart. (#23794) Thanks @aldoeliacim.
+- Cron/Status: split execution outcome (`lastRunStatus`) from delivery outcome (`lastDeliveryStatus`) in persisted cron state, finished events, and run history so failed/unknown announcement delivery is visible without conflating it with run errors.
+- Cron/Delivery: route text-only announce jobs with explicit thread/topic targets through direct outbound delivery so forum/thread destinations do not get dropped by intermediary announce turns. (#23841) Thanks @AndrewArto.
 - Cron: honor `cron.maxConcurrentRuns` in the timer loop so due jobs can execute up to the configured parallelism instead of always running serially. (#11595) Thanks @Takhoffman.
+- Cron/Run: enforce the same per-job timeout guard for manual `cron.run` executions as timer-driven runs, including abort propagation for isolated agent jobs, so forced runs cannot wedge indefinitely. (#23704) Thanks @tkuehnl.
+- Cron/Run: persist the manual-run `runningAtMs` marker before releasing the cron lock so overlapping timer ticks cannot start the same job concurrently.
+- Cron/Startup: enforce per-job timeout guards for startup catch-up replay runs so missed isolated jobs cannot hang indefinitely during gateway boot recovery.
+- Cron/Main session: honor abort/timeout signals while retrying `wakeMode=now` heartbeat contention loops so main-target cron runs stop promptly instead of waiting through the full busy-retry window.
+- Cron/Schedule: for `every` jobs, prefer `lastRunAtMs + everyMs` when still in the future after restarts, then fall back to anchor scheduling for catch-up windows, so NEXT timing matches the last successful cadence. (#22895) Thanks @SidQin-cyber.
+- Cron/Service: execute manual `cron.run` jobs outside the cron lock (while still persisting started/finished state atomically) so `cron.list` and `cron.status` remain responsive during long forced runs. (#23628) Thanks @dsgraves.
+- Cron/Timer: keep a watchdog recheck timer armed while `onTimer` is actively executing so the scheduler continues polling even if a due-run tick stalls for an extended period. (#23628) Thanks @dsgraves.
+- Cron/Run log: clean up settled per-path run-log write queue entries so long-running cron uptime does not retain stale promise bookkeeping in memory.
+- Cron/Run log: harden `cron.runs` run-log path resolution by rejecting path-separator `id`/`jobId` inputs and enforcing reads within the per-cron `runs/` directory.
+- Cron/Announce: when announce delivery target resolution fails (for example multiple configured channels with no explicit target), skip injecting fallback `Cron (error): ...` into the main session so runs fail cleanly without accidental last-route sends. (#24074)
+- Cron/Telegram: validate cron `delivery.to` with shared Telegram target parsing and resolve legacy `@username`/`t.me` targets to numeric IDs at send-time for deterministic delivery target writeback. (#21930) Thanks @kesor.
+- Telegram/Targets: normalize unprefixed topic-qualified targets through the shared parse/normalize path so valid `@channel:topic:<id>` and `<chatId>:topic:<id>` routes are recognized again. (#24166) Thanks @obviyus.
+- Cron/Isolation: force fresh session IDs for isolated cron runs so `sessionTarget="isolated"` executions never reuse prior run context. (#23470) Thanks @echoVic.
+- Plugins/Install: strip `workspace:*` devDependency entries from copied plugin manifests before `npm install --omit=dev`, preventing `EUNSUPPORTEDPROTOCOL` install failures for npm-published channel plugins (including Feishu and MS Teams).
+- Feishu/Plugins: restore bundled Feishu SDK availability for global installs and strip `openclaw: workspace:*` from plugin `devDependencies` during plugin-version sync so npm-installed Feishu plugins do not fail dependency install. (#23611, #23645, #23603)
+- Config/Channels: auto-enable built-in channels by writing `channels.<id>.enabled=true` (not `plugins.entries.<id>`), and stop adding built-ins to `plugins.allow`, preventing `plugins.entries.telegram: plugin not found` validation failures.
+- Config/Channels: when `plugins.allow` is active, auto-enable/enable flows now also allowlist configured built-in channels so `channels.<id>.enabled=true` cannot remain blocked by restrictive plugin allowlists.
+- Plugins/Discovery: ignore scanned extension backup/disabled directory patterns (for example `.backup-*`, `.bak`, `.disabled*`) and move updater backup directories under `.openclaw-install-backups`, preventing duplicate plugin-id collisions from archived copies.
+- Plugins/CLI: make `openclaw plugins enable` and plugin install/link flows update allowlists via shared plugin-enable policy so enabled plugins are not left disabled by allowlist mismatch. (#23190) Thanks @downwind7clawd-ctrl.
+- Security/Voice Call: harden media stream WebSocket handling against pre-auth idle-connection DoS by adding strict pre-start timeouts, pending/per-IP connection limits, and total connection caps for streaming endpoints. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.
+- Security/Sessions: redact sensitive token patterns from `sessions_history` tool output and surface `contentRedacted` metadata when masking occurs. (#16928) Thanks @aether-ai-agent.
+- Security/Exec: stop trusting `PATH`-derived directories for safe-bin allowlist checks, add explicit `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`, and pin safe-bin shell execution to resolved absolute executable paths to prevent binary-shadowing approval bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Elevated: match `tools.elevated.allowFrom` against sender identities only (not recipient `ctx.To`), closing a recipient-token bypass for `/elevated` authorization. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.
+- Security/Feishu: enforce ID-only allowlist matching for DM/group sender authorization, normalize Feishu ID prefixes during checks, and ignore mutable display names so display-name collisions cannot satisfy allowlist entries. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.
+- Security/Group policy: harden `channels.*.groups.*.toolsBySender` matching by requiring explicit sender-key types (`id:`, `e164:`, `username:`, `name:`), preventing cross-identifier collisions across mutable/display-name fields while keeping legacy untyped keys on a deprecated ID-only path. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.
+- Channels/Group policy: fail closed when `groupPolicy: "allowlist"` is set without explicit `groups`, honor account-level `groupPolicy` overrides, and enforce `groupPolicy: "disabled"` as a hard group block. (#22215) Thanks @etereo.
+- Telegram/Discord extensions: propagate trusted `mediaLocalRoots` through extension outbound `sendMedia` options so extension direct-send media paths honor agent-scoped local-media allowlists. (#20029, #21903, #23227)
+- Agents/Exec: honor explicit agent context when resolving `tools.exec` defaults for runs with opaque/non-agent session keys, so per-agent `host/security/ask` policies are applied consistently. (#11832)
+- CLI/Sessions: resolve implicit session-store path templates with the configured default agent ID so named-agent setups do not silently read/write stale `agent:main` session/auth stores. (#22685) Thanks @sene1337.
+- Doctor/Security: add an explicit warning that `approvals.exec.enabled=false` disables forwarding only, while enforcement remains driven by host-local `exec-approvals.json` policy. (#15047)
+- Sandbox/Docker: default sandbox container user to the workspace owner `uid:gid` when `agents.*.sandbox.docker.user` is unset, fixing non-root gateway file-tool permissions under capability-dropped containers. (#20979)
+- Plugins/Media sandbox: propagate trusted `mediaLocalRoots` through plugin action dispatch (including Discord/Telegram action adapters) so plugin send paths enforce the same agent-scoped local-media sandbox roots as core outbound sends. (#20258, #22718)
+- Agents/Workspace guard: map sandbox container-workdir file-tool paths (for example `/workspace/...` and `file:///workspace/...`) to host workspace roots before workspace-only validation, preventing false `Path escapes sandbox root` rejections for sandbox file tools. (#9560)
+- Gateway/Exec approvals: expire approval requests immediately when no approval-capable gateway clients are connected and no forwarding targets are available, avoiding delayed approvals after restarts/offline approver windows. (#22144)
+- Security/Exec approvals: when approving wrapper commands with allow-always in allowlist mode, persist inner executable paths for known dispatch wrappers (`env`, `nice`, `nohup`, `stdbuf`, `timeout`) and fail closed (no persisted entry) when wrapper unwrapping is not safe, preventing wrapper-path approval bypasses. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Node/macOS exec host: default headless macOS node `system.run` to local execution and only route through the companion app when `OPENCLAW_NODE_EXEC_HOST=app` is explicitly set, avoiding companion-app filesystem namespace mismatches during exec. (#23547)
+- Sandbox/Media: map container workspace paths (`/workspace/...` and `file:///workspace/...`) back to the host sandbox root for outbound media validation, preventing false deny errors for sandbox-generated local media. (#23083) Thanks @echo931.
+- Sandbox/Docker: apply custom bind mounts after workspace mounts and prioritize bind-source resolution on overlapping paths, so explicit workspace binds are no longer ignored. (#22669) Thanks @tasaankaeris.
+- Exec approvals/Forwarding: restore Discord text forwarding when component approvals are not configured, and carry request snapshots through resolve events so resolved notices still forward after cache misses/restarts. (#22988) Thanks @bubmiller.
+- Control UI/WebSocket: stop and clear the browser gateway client on UI teardown so remounts cannot leave orphan websocket clients that create duplicate active connections. (#23422) Thanks @floatinggball-design.
+- Control UI/WebSocket: send a stable per-tab `instanceId` in websocket connect frames so reconnect cycles keep a consistent client identity for diagnostics and presence tracking. (#23616) Thanks @zq58855371-ui.
+- Config/Memory: allow `"mistral"` in `agents.defaults.memorySearch.provider` and `agents.defaults.memorySearch.fallback` schema validation. (#14934) Thanks @ThomsenDrake.
+- Feishu/Commands: in group chats, command authorization now falls back to top-level `channels.feishu.allowFrom` when per-group `allowFrom` is not set, so `/command` no longer gets blocked by an unintended empty allowlist. (#23756)
+- Dev tooling: prevent `CLAUDE.md` symlink target regressions by excluding CLAUDE symlink sentinels from `oxfmt` and marking them `-text` in `.gitattributes`, so formatter/EOL normalization cannot reintroduce trailing-newline targets. Thanks @vincentkoc.
 - Agents/Compaction: restore embedded compaction safeguard/context-pruning extension loading in production by wiring bundled extension factories into the resource loader instead of runtime file-path resolution. (#22349) Thanks @Glucksberg.
+- Feishu/Media: for inbound video messages that include both `file_key` (video) and `image_key` (thumbnail), prefer `file_key` when downloading media so video attachments are saved instead of silently failing on thumbnail keys. (#23633)
+- Hooks/Loader: avoid redundant hook-module recompilation on gateway restart by skipping cache-busting for bundled hooks and using stable file metadata keys (`mtime+size`) for mutable workspace/managed/plugin hook imports. (#16953) Thanks @mudrii.
+- Hooks/Cron: suppress duplicate main-session events for delivered hook turns and mark `SILENT_REPLY_TOKEN` (`NO_REPLY`) early exits as delivered to prevent hook context pollution. (#20678) Thanks @JonathanWorks.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: inject `cache_control` on system prompts for OpenRouter Anthropic models to improve prompt-cache reuse. (#17473) Thanks @rrenamed.
+- Installer/Smoke tests: remove legacy `OPENCLAW_USE_GUM` overrides from docker install-smoke runs so tests exercise installer auto TTY detection behavior directly.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: allow pass-through OpenRouter and Opencode model IDs in live model filtering so custom routed model IDs are treated as modern refs. (#14312) Thanks @Joly0.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: default reasoning to enabled when the selected model advertises `reasoning: true` and no session/directive override is set. (#22513) Thanks @zwffff.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: map `/think` levels to `reasoning.effort` in embedded runs while preserving explicit `reasoning.max_tokens` payloads. (#17236) Thanks @robbyczgw-cla.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: preserve stored session provider when model IDs are vendor-prefixed (for example, `anthropic/...`) so follow-up turns do not incorrectly route to direct provider APIs. (#22753) Thanks @dndodson.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: preserve the required `openrouter/` prefix for OpenRouter-native model IDs during model-ref normalization. (#12942) Thanks @omair445.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: pass through provider routing parameters from model params.provider to OpenRouter request payloads for provider selection controls. (#17148) Thanks @carrotRakko.
+- Providers/OpenRouter: preserve model allowlist entries containing OpenRouter preset paths (for example `openrouter/@preset/...`) by treating `/model ...@profile` auth-profile parsing as a suffix-only override. (#14120) Thanks @NotMainstream.
+- Cron/Auth: propagate auth-profile resolution to isolated cron sessions so provider API keys are resolved the same way as main sessions, fixing 401 errors when using providers configured via auth-profiles. (#20689) Thanks @lailoo.
+- Cron/Follow-up: pass resolved `agentDir` through isolated cron and queued follow-up embedded runs so auth/profile lookups stay scoped to the correct agent directory. (#22845) Thanks @seilk.
+- Agents/Media: route tool-result `MEDIA:` extraction through shared parser validation so malformed prose like `MEDIA:-prefixed ...` is no longer treated as a local file path (prevents Telegram ENOENT tool-error overrides). (#18780) Thanks @HOYALIM.
+- Logging: cap single log-file size with `logging.maxFileBytes` (default 500 MB) and suppress additional writes after cap hit to prevent disk exhaustion from repeated error storms.
+- Memory/Remote HTTP: centralize remote memory HTTP calls behind a shared guarded helper (`withRemoteHttpResponse`) so embeddings and batch flows use one request/release path.
+- Memory/Embeddings: apply configured remote-base host pinning (`allowedHostnames`) across OpenAI/Voyage/Gemini embedding requests to keep private/self-hosted endpoints working without cross-host drift. (#18198) Thanks @ianpcook.
+- Memory/Batch: route OpenAI/Voyage/Gemini batch upload/create/status/download requests through the same guarded HTTP path for consistent SSRF policy enforcement.
+- Memory/Index: detect memory source-set changes (for example enabling `sessions` after an existing memory-only index) and trigger a full reindex so existing session transcripts are indexed without requiring `--force`. (#17576) Thanks @TarsAI-Agent.
+- Memory/Embeddings: enforce a per-input 8k safety cap before embedding batching and apply a conservative 2k fallback limit for local providers without declared input limits, preventing oversized session/memory chunks from triggering provider context-size failures during sync/indexing. (#6016) Thanks @batumilove.
+- Memory/QMD: on Windows, resolve bare `qmd`/`mcporter` command names to npm shim executables (`.cmd`) before spawning, so qmd boot updates and mcporter-backed searches no longer fail with `spawn ... ENOENT` on default npm installs. (#23899) Thanks @arcbuilder-ai.
+- Memory/QMD: parse plain-text `qmd collection list --json` output when older qmd builds ignore JSON mode, and retry memory searches once after re-ensuring managed collections when qmd returns `Collection not found ...`. (#23613) Thanks @leozhucn.
+- Signal/RPC: guard malformed Signal RPC JSON responses with a clear status-scoped error and add regression coverage for invalid JSON responses. (#22995) Thanks @adhitShet.
+- Gateway/Subagents: guard gateway and subagent session-key/message trim paths against undefined inputs to prevent early `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'trim')` crashes during subagent spawn and wait flows.
+- Agents/Workspace: guard `resolveUserPath` against undefined/null input to prevent `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'trim')` crashes when workspace paths are missing in embedded runner flows.
+- Auth/Profiles: keep active `cooldownUntil`/`disabledUntil` windows immutable across retries so mid-window failures cannot extend recovery indefinitely; only recompute a backoff window after the previous deadline has expired. This resolves cron/inbound retry loops that could trap gateways until manual `usageStats` cleanup. (#23516, #23536) Thanks @arosstale.
+- Channels/Security: fail closed on missing provider group policy config by defaulting runtime group policy to `allowlist` (instead of inheriting `channels.defaults.groupPolicy`) when `channels.<provider>` is absent across message channels, and align runtime + security warnings/docs to the same fallback behavior (Slack, Discord, iMessage, Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal, LINE, Matrix, Mattermost, Google Chat, IRC, Nextcloud Talk, Feishu, and Zalo user flows; plus Discord message/native-command paths). (#23367) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- Gateway/Onboarding: harden remote gateway onboarding defaults and guidance by defaulting discovered direct URLs to `wss://`, rejecting insecure non-loopback `ws://` targets in onboarding validation, and expanding remote-security remediation messaging across gateway client/call/doctor flows. (#23476) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- CLI/Sessions: pass the configured sessions directory when resolving transcript paths in `agentCommand`, so custom `session.store` locations resume sessions reliably. Thanks @davidrudduck.
+- Signal/Monitor: treat user-initiated abort shutdowns as clean exits when auto-started `signal-cli` is terminated, while still surfacing unexpected daemon exits as startup/runtime failures. (#23379) Thanks @frankekn.
+- Channels/Dedupe: centralize plugin dedupe primitives in plugin SDK (memory + persistent), move Feishu inbound dedupe to a namespace-scoped persistent store, and reuse shared dedupe cache logic for Zalo webhook replay + Tlon processed-message tracking to reduce duplicate handling during reconnect/replay paths. (#23377) Thanks @SidQin-cyber.
+- Channels/Delivery: remove hardcoded WhatsApp delivery fallbacks; require explicit/session channel context or auto-pick the sole configured channel when unambiguous. (#23357) Thanks @lbo728.
+- ACP/Gateway: wait for gateway hello before opening ACP requests, and fail fast on pre-hello connect failures to avoid startup hangs and early `gateway not connected` request races. (#23390) Thanks @janckerchen.
+- Gateway/Auth: preserve `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD` env override precedence for remote gateway call credentials after shared resolver refactors, preventing stale configured remote passwords from overriding runtime secret rotation.
+- Gateway/Auth: preserve shared-token `gateway token mismatch` auth errors when `auth.token` fallback device-token checks fail, and reserve `device token mismatch` guidance for explicit `auth.deviceToken` failures.
+- Gateway/Tools: when agent tools pass an allowlisted `gatewayUrl` override, resolve local override tokens from env/config fallback but keep remote overrides strict to `gateway.remote.token`, preventing local token leakage to remote targets.
+- Gateway/Client: keep cached device-auth tokens on `device token mismatch` closes when the client used explicit shared token/password credentials, avoiding accidental pairing-token churn during explicit-auth failures.
+- Node host/Exec: keep strict Windows allowlist behavior for `cmd.exe /c` shell-wrapper runs, and return explicit approval guidance when blocked (`SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: allowlist miss`).
+- Control UI: show pairing-required guidance (commands + mobile tokenized URL reminder) when the dashboard disconnects with `1008 pairing required`.
+- Security/Audit: add `openclaw security audit` detection for open group policies that expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards (`security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs`).
+- Security/Audit: make `gateway.real_ip_fallback_enabled` severity conditional for loopback trusted-proxy setups (warn for loopback-only `trustedProxies`, critical when non-loopback proxies are trusted). (#23428) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- Security/Exec env: block request-scoped `HOME` and `ZDOTDIR` overrides in host exec env sanitizers (Node + macOS), preventing shell startup-file execution before allowlist-evaluated command bodies. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Exec env: block `SHELLOPTS`/`PS4` in host exec env sanitizers and restrict shell-wrapper (`bash|sh|zsh ... -c/-lc`) request env overrides to a small explicit allowlist (`TERM`, `LANG`, `LC_*`, `COLORTERM`, `NO_COLOR`, `FORCE_COLOR`) on both node host and macOS companion paths, preventing xtrace prompt command-substitution allowlist bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- WhatsApp/Security: enforce `allowFrom` for direct-message outbound targets in all send modes (including `mode: "explicit"`), preventing sends to non-allowlisted numbers. (#20108) Thanks @zahlmann.
+- Security/Exec approvals: fail closed on shell line continuations (`\\\n`/`\\\r\n`) and treat shell-wrapper execution as approval-required in allowlist mode, preventing `$\\` newline command-substitution bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Gateway: emit a startup security warning when insecure/dangerous config flags are enabled (including `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true`) and point operators to `openclaw security audit`.
+- Security/Hooks auth: normalize hook auth rate-limit client IP keys so IPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses share one throttle bucket, preventing dual-form auth-attempt budget bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
+- Security/Exec approvals: treat `env` and shell-dispatch wrappers as transparent during allowlist analysis on node-host and macOS companion paths so policy checks match the effective executable/inline shell payload instead of the wrapper binary, blocking wrapper-smuggled allowlist bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Exec approvals: require explicit safe-bin profiles for `tools.exec.safeBins` entries in allowlist mode (remove generic safe-bin profile fallback), and add `tools.exec.safeBinProfiles` for safe custom binaries so unprofiled interpreter-style entries cannot be treated as stdin-safe. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Channels: harden Slack external menu token handling by switching to CSPRNG tokens, validating token shape, requiring user identity for external option lookups, and avoiding fabricated timestamp `trigger_id` fallbacks; also switch Tlon Urbit channel IDs to CSPRNG UUIDs, centralize secure ID/token generation via shared infra helpers, and add a guardrail test to block new runtime `Date.now()+Math.random()` token/id patterns.
+- Security/Hooks transforms: enforce symlink-safe containment for webhook transform module paths (including `hooks.transformsDir` and `hooks.mappings[].transform.module`) by resolving existing-path ancestors via realpath before import, while preserving in-root symlink support; add regression coverage for both escape and allow cases. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
+- Telegram/WSL2: disable `autoSelectFamily` by default on WSL2 and memoize WSL2 detection in Telegram network decision logic to avoid repeated sync `/proc/version` probes on fetch/send paths. (#21916) Thanks @MizukiMachine.
+- Telegram/Network: default Node 22+ DNS result ordering to `ipv4first` for Telegram fetch paths and add `OPENCLAW_TELEGRAM_DNS_RESULT_ORDER`/`channels.telegram.network.dnsResultOrder` overrides to reduce IPv6-path fetch failures. (#5405) Thanks @Glucksberg.
+- Telegram/Forward bursts: coalesce forwarded text+media updates through a dedicated forward lane debounce window that works with default inbound debounce config, while keeping forwarded control commands immediate. (#19476) thanks @napetrov.
+- Telegram/Streaming: preserve archived draft preview mapping after flush and clean superseded reasoning preview bubbles so multi-message preview finals no longer cross-edit or orphan stale messages under send/rotation races. (#23202) Thanks @obviyus.
+- Telegram/Replies: scope messaging-tool text/media dedupe to same-target sends only, so cross-target tool sends can no longer silently suppress Telegram final replies.
+- Telegram/Replies: normalize `file://` and local-path media variants during messaging dedupe so equivalent media paths do not produce duplicate Telegram replies.
+- Telegram/Replies: extract forwarded-origin context from unified reply targets (`reply_to_message` and `external_reply`) so forward+comment metadata is preserved across partial reply shapes. (#9720) thanks @mcaxtr.
+- Telegram/Polling: persist a safe update-offset watermark bounded by pending updates so crash/restart cannot skip queued lower `update_id` updates after out-of-order completion. (#23284) thanks @frankekn.
+- Telegram/Polling: force-restart stuck runner instances when recoverable unhandled network rejections escape the polling task path, so polling resumes instead of silently stalling. (#19721) Thanks @jg-noncelogic.
+- Slack/Slash commands: preserve the Bolt app receiver when registering external select options handlers so monitor startup does not crash on runtimes that require bound `app.options` calls. (#23209) Thanks @0xgaia.
+- Slack/Telegram slash sessions: await session metadata persistence before dispatch so first-turn native slash runs do not race session-origin metadata updates. (#23065) thanks @hydro13.
+- Slack/Queue routing: preserve string `thread_ts` values through collect-mode queue drain and DM `deliveryContext` updates so threaded follow-ups do not leak to the main channel when Slack thread IDs are strings. (#11934) Thanks @sandieman2 and @vincentkoc.
+- Telegram/Native commands: set `ctx.Provider="telegram"` for native slash-command context so elevated gate checks resolve provider correctly (fixes `provider (ctx.Provider)` failures in `/elevated` flows). (#23748) Thanks @serhii12.
+- Agents/Ollama: preserve unsafe integer tool-call arguments as exact strings during NDJSON parsing, preventing large numeric IDs from being rounded before tool execution. (#23170) Thanks @BestJoester.
+- Cron/Gateway: keep `cron.list` and `cron.status` responsive during startup catch-up by avoiding a long-held cron lock while missed jobs execute. (#23106) Thanks @jayleekr.
+- Gateway/Config reload: compare array-valued config paths structurally during diffing so unchanged `memory.qmd.paths` and `memory.qmd.scope.rules` no longer trigger false restart-required reloads. (#23185) Thanks @rex05ai.
+- Gateway/Config reload: retry short-lived missing config snapshots during reload before skipping, preventing atomic-write unlink windows from triggering restart loops. (#23343) Thanks @lbo728.
+- Cron/Scheduling: validate runtime cron expressions before schedule/stagger evaluation so malformed persisted jobs report a clear `invalid cron schedule: expr is required` error instead of crashing with `undefined.trim` failures and auto-disable churn. (#23223) Thanks @asimons81.
+- Memory/QMD: migrate legacy unscoped collection bindings (for example `memory-root`) to per-agent scoped names (for example `memory-root-main`) during startup when safe, so QMD-backed `memory_search` no longer fails with `Collection not found` after upgrades. (#23228, #20727) Thanks @JLDynamics and @AaronFaby.
+- Memory/QMD: normalize Han-script BM25 search queries before invoking `qmd search` so mixed CJK+Latin prompts no longer return empty results due to tokenizer mismatch. (#23426) Thanks @LunaLee0130.
+- TUI/Input: enable multiline-paste burst coalescing on macOS Terminal.app and iTerm so pasted blocks no longer submit line-by-line as separate messages. (#18809) Thanks @fwends.
+- TUI/RTL: isolate right-to-left script lines (Arabic/Hebrew ranges) with Unicode bidi isolation marks in TUI text sanitization so RTL assistant output no longer renders in reversed visual order in terminal chat panes. (#21936) Thanks @Asm3r96.
+- TUI/Status: request immediate renders after setting `sending`/`waiting` activity states so in-flight runs always show visible progress indicators instead of appearing idle until completion. (#21549) Thanks @13Guinness.
+- TUI/Input: arm Ctrl+C exit timing when clearing non-empty composer text and add a SIGINT fallback path so double Ctrl+C exits remain responsive during active runs instead of requiring an extra press or appearing stuck. (#23407) Thanks @tinybluedev.
+- Agents/Fallbacks: treat JSON payloads with `type: "api_error"` + `"Internal server error"` as transient failover errors so Anthropic 500-style failures trigger model fallback. (#23193) Thanks @jarvis-lane.
+- Agents/Google: sanitize non-base64 `thought_signature`/`thoughtSignature` values from assistant replay transcripts for native Google Gemini requests while preserving valid signatures and tool-call order. (#23457) Thanks @echoVic.
+- Agents/Transcripts: validate assistant tool-call names (syntax/length + registered tool allowlist) before transcript persistence and during replay sanitization so malformed failover tool names no longer poison sessions with repeated provider HTTP 400 errors. (#23324) Thanks @johnsantry.
+- Agents/Mistral: sanitize tool-call IDs in the embedded agent loop and generate strict provider-safe pending tool-call IDs, preventing Mistral strict9 `HTTP 400` failures on tool continuations. (#23698) Thanks @echoVic.
+- Agents/Compaction: strip stale assistant usage snapshots from pre-compaction turns when replaying history after a compaction summary so context-token estimation no longer reuses pre-compaction totals and immediately re-triggers destructive follow-up compactions. (#19127) Thanks @tedwatson.
+- Agents/Replies: emit a default completion acknowledgement (`✅ Done.`) only for direct/private tool-only completions with no final assistant text, while suppressing synthetic acknowledgements for channel/group sessions and runs that already delivered output via messaging tools. (#22834) Thanks @Oldshue.
+- Agents/Subagents: honor `tools.subagents.tools.alsoAllow` and explicit subagent `allow` entries when resolving built-in subagent deny defaults, so explicitly granted tools (for example `sessions_send`) are no longer blocked unless re-denied in `tools.subagents.tools.deny`. (#23359) Thanks @goren-beehero.
+- Agents/Subagents: make announce call timeouts configurable via `agents.defaults.subagents.announceTimeoutMs` and restore a 60s default to prevent false timeout failures on slower announce paths. (#22719) Thanks @Valadon.
+- Agents/Diagnostics: include resolved lifecycle error text in `embedded run agent end` warnings so UI/TUI “Connection error” runs expose actionable provider failure reasons in gateway logs. (#23054) Thanks @Raize.
+- Agents/Auth profiles: resolve `agentCommand` session scope before choosing `agentDir`/workspace so resumed runs no longer read auth from `agents/main/agent` when the resolved session belongs to a different/default agent (for example `agent:exec:*` sessions). (#24016) Thanks @abersonFAC.
+- Agents/Auth profiles: skip auth-profile cooldown writes for timeout failures in embedded runner rotation so model/network timeouts do not poison same-provider fallback model selection while still allowing in-turn account rotation. (#22622) Thanks @vageeshkumar.
+- Plugins/Hooks: run legacy `before_agent_start` once per agent turn and reuse that result across model-resolve and prompt-build compatibility paths, preventing duplicate hook side effects (for example duplicate external API calls). (#23289) Thanks @ksato8710.
+- Models/Config: default missing Anthropic provider/model `api` fields to `anthropic-messages` during config validation so custom relay model entries are preserved instead of being dropped by runtime model registry validation. (#23332) Thanks @bigbigmonkey123.
+- Gateway/Pairing: preserve existing approved token scopes when processing repair pairings that omit `scopes`, preventing empty-scope token regressions on reconnecting clients. (#21906) Thanks @paki81.
+- Memory/QMD: add optional `memory.qmd.mcporter` search routing so QMD `query/search/vsearch` can run through mcporter keep-alive flows (including multi-collection paths) to reduce cold starts, while keeping searches on agent-scoped QMD state for consistent recall. (#19617) Thanks @nicole-luxe and @vignesh07.
+- Infra/Network: classify undici `TypeError: fetch failed` as transient in unhandled-rejection detection even when nested causes are unclassified, preventing avoidable gateway crash loops on flaky networks. (#14345) Thanks @Unayung.
+- Telegram/Retry: classify undici `TypeError: fetch failed` as recoverable in both polling and send retry paths so transient fetch failures no longer fail fast. (#16699) thanks @Glucksberg.
+- Docs/Telegram: correct Node 22+ network defaults (`autoSelectFamily`, `dnsResultOrder`) and clarify Telegram setup does not use positional `openclaw channels login telegram`. (#23609) Thanks @ryanbastic.
+- BlueBubbles/DM history: restore DM backfill context with account-scoped rolling history, bounded backfill retries, and safer history payload limits. (#20302) Thanks @Ryan-Haines.
+- BlueBubbles/Private API cache: treat unknown (`null`) private-API cache status as disabled for send/attachment/reply flows to avoid stale-cache 500s, and log a warning when reply/effect features are requested while capability is unknown. (#23459) Thanks @echoVic.
+- BlueBubbles/Webhooks: accept inbound/reaction webhook payloads when BlueBubbles omits `handle` but provides DM `chatGuid`, and harden payload extraction for array/string-wrapped message bodies so valid webhook events no longer get rejected as unparseable. (#23275) Thanks @toph31.
+- Security/Audit: add `openclaw security audit` finding `gateway.nodes.allow_commands_dangerous` for risky `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` overrides, with severity upgraded to critical on remote gateway exposure.
+- Gateway/Control plane: reduce cross-client write limiter contention by adding `connId` fallback keying when device ID and client IP are both unavailable.
+- Security/Config: block prototype-key traversal during config merge patch and legacy migration merge helpers (`__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype`) to prevent prototype pollution during config mutation flows. (#22968) Thanks @Clawborn.
+- Security/Shell env: validate login-shell executable paths for shell-env fallback (`/etc/shells` + trusted prefixes), block `SHELL`/`HOME`/`ZDOTDIR` in config env ingestion before fallback execution, and sanitize fallback shell exec env to pin `HOME` to the real user home while dropping `ZDOTDIR` and other dangerous startup vars. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Network/SSRF: enable `autoSelectFamily` on pinned undici dispatchers (with attempt timeout) so IPv6-unreachable environments can quickly fall back to IPv4 for guarded fetch paths. (#19950) Thanks @ENAwareness.
+- Security/Config: make parsed chat allowlist checks fail closed when `allowFrom` is empty, restoring expected DM/pairing gating.
+- Security/Exec: in non-default setups that manually add `sort` to `tools.exec.safeBins`, block `sort --compress-program` so allowlist-mode safe-bin checks cannot bypass approval. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Exec approvals: when users choose `allow-always` for shell-wrapper commands (for example `/bin/zsh -lc ...`), persist allowlist patterns for the inner executable(s) instead of the wrapper shell binary, preventing accidental broad shell allowlisting in moderate mode. (#23276) Thanks @xrom2863.
+- Security/Exec: fail closed when `tools.exec.host=sandbox` is configured/requested but sandbox runtime is unavailable. (#23398) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- Security/macOS app beta: enforce path-only `system.run` allowlist matching (drop basename matches like `echo`), migrate legacy basename entries to last resolved paths when available, and harden shell-chain handling to fail closed on unsafe parse/control syntax (including quoted command substitution/backticks). This is an optional allowlist-mode feature; default installs remain deny-by-default. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Agents: auto-generate and persist a dedicated `commands.ownerDisplaySecret` when `commands.ownerDisplay=hash`, remove gateway token fallback from owner-ID prompt hashing across CLI and embedded agent runners, and centralize owner-display secret resolution in one shared helper. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
+- Security/SSRF: expand IPv4 fetch guard blocking to include RFC special-use/non-global ranges (including benchmarking, TEST-NET, multicast, and reserved/broadcast blocks), centralize range checks into a single CIDR policy table, and reuse one shared host/IP classifier across literal + DNS checks to reduce classifier drift. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @princeeismond-dot for reporting.
+- Security/SSRF: block RFC2544 benchmarking range (`198.18.0.0/15`) across direct and embedded-IP paths, and normalize IPv6 dotted-quad transition literals (for example `::127.0.0.1`, `64:ff9b::8.8.8.8`) in shared IP parsing/classification.
+- Security/Archive: block zip symlink escapes during archive extraction.
+- Security/Media sandbox: keep tmp media allowance for absolute tmp paths only and enforce symlink-escape checks before sandbox-validated reads, preventing tmp symlink exfiltration and relative `../` sandbox escapes when sandboxes live under tmp. (#17892) Thanks @dashed.
+- Browser/Upload: accept canonical in-root upload paths when the configured uploads directory is a symlink alias (for example `/tmp` -> `/private/tmp` on macOS), so browser upload validation no longer rejects valid files during client->server revalidation. (#23300, #23222, #22848) Thanks @bgaither4, @parkerati, and @Nabsku.
+- Security/Discord: add `openclaw security audit` warnings for name/tag-based Discord allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel `users`, and pairing-store entries), highlighting slug-collision risk while keeping name-based matching supported, and canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs at runtime without rewriting config files. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Gateway: block node-role connections when device identity metadata is missing.
+- Security/Media: enforce inbound media byte limits during download/read across Discord, Telegram, Zalo, Microsoft Teams, and BlueBubbles to prevent oversized payload memory spikes before rejection. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Media/Understanding: preserve `application/pdf` MIME classification during text-like file heuristics so PDF uploads use PDF extraction paths instead of being inlined as raw text. (#23191) Thanks @claudeplay2026-byte.
+- Security/Control UI: block symlink-based out-of-root static file reads by enforcing realpath containment and file-identity checks when serving Control UI assets and SPA fallback `index.html`. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Gateway avatars: block symlink traversal during local avatar `data:` URL resolution by enforcing realpath containment and file-identity checks before reads. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Control UI: centralize avatar URL/path validation across gateway/config helpers and enforce a 2 MB max size for local agent avatar files before `/avatar` resolution, reducing oversized-avatar memory risk without changing supported avatar formats.
+- Security/Control UI avatars: harden `/avatar/:agentId` local avatar serving by rejecting symlink paths and requiring fd-level file identity + size checks before reads. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/MSTeams media: enforce allowlist checks for SharePoint reference attachment URLs and redirect targets during Graph-backed media fetches so redirect chains cannot escape configured media host boundaries. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/MSTeams media: route attachment auth-retry and Graph SharePoint download redirects through shared `safeFetch` so each hop is validated with allowlist + DNS/IP checks across the full redirect chain. (#23598) Thanks @Asm3r96 and @lewiswigmore.
+- Security/macOS discovery: fail closed for unresolved discovery endpoints by clearing stale remote selection values, use resolved service host only for SSH target derivation, and keep remote URL config aligned with resolved endpoint availability. (#21618) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- Chat/Usage/TUI: strip synthetic inbound metadata blocks (including `Conversation info` and trailing `Untrusted context` channel metadata wrappers) from displayed conversation history so internal prompt context no longer leaks into user-visible logs.
+- CI/Tests: fix TypeScript case-table typing and lint assertion regressions so `pnpm check` passes again after Synology Chat landing. (#23012) Thanks @druide67.
+- Security/Browser relay: harden extension relay auth token handling for `/extension` and `/cdp` pathways.
+- Cron: persist `delivered` state in cron job records so delivery failures remain visible in status and logs. (#19174) Thanks @simonemacario.
+- Config/Doctor: only repair the OAuth credentials directory when affected channels are configured, avoiding fresh-install noise.
+- Config/Channels: whitelist `channels.modelByChannel` in config validation and exclude it from plugin auto-enable channel detection so model overrides no longer trigger `unknown channel id` validation errors or bogus `modelByChannel` plugin enables. (#23412) Thanks @ProspectOre.
+- Config/Bindings: allow optional `bindings[].comment` in strict config validation so annotated binding entries no longer fail load. (#23458) Thanks @echoVic.
+- Usage/Pricing: correct MiniMax M2.5 pricing defaults to fix inflated cost reporting. (#22755) Thanks @miloudbelarebia.
+- Gateway/Daemon: verify gateway health after daemon restart.
+- Agents/UI text: stop rewriting normal assistant billing/payment language outside explicit error contexts. (#17834) Thanks @niceysam.
+
+## 2026.2.21
+
+### Changes
+
+- Models/Google: add Gemini 3.1 support (`google/gemini-3.1-pro-preview`).
+- Providers/Onboarding: add Volcano Engine (Doubao) and BytePlus providers/models (including coding variants), wire onboarding auth choices for interactive + non-interactive flows, and align docs to `volcengine-api-key`. (#7967) Thanks @funmore123.
+- Channels/CLI: add per-account/channel `defaultTo` outbound routing fallback so `openclaw agent --deliver` can send without explicit `--reply-to` when a default target is configured. (#16985) Thanks @KirillShchetinin.
+- Channels: allow per-channel model overrides via `channels.modelByChannel` and note them in /status. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Telegram/Streaming: simplify preview streaming config to `channels.telegram.streaming` (boolean), auto-map legacy `streamMode` values, and remove block-vs-partial preview branching. (#22012) thanks @obviyus.
+- Discord/Streaming: add stream preview mode for live draft replies with partial/block options and configurable chunking. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow. Inspiration @neoagentic-ship-it.
+- Discord/Telegram: add configurable lifecycle status reactions for queued/thinking/tool/done/error phases with a shared controller and emoji/timing overrides. Thanks @wolly-tundracube and @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Discord/Voice: add voice channel join/leave/status via `/vc`, plus auto-join configuration for realtime voice conversations. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Discord: add configurable ephemeral defaults for slash-command responses. (#16563) Thanks @wei.
+- Discord: support updating forum `available_tags` via channel edit actions for forum tag management. (#12070) Thanks @xiaoyaner0201.
+- Discord: include channel topics in trusted inbound metadata on new sessions. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Discord/Subagents: add thread-bound subagent sessions on Discord with per-thread focus/list controls and thread-bound continuation routing for spawned helper agents. (#21805) Thanks @onutc.
+- iOS/Chat: clean chat UI noise by stripping inbound untrusted metadata/timestamp prefixes, formatting tool outputs into concise summaries/errors, compacting the composer while typing, and supporting tap-to-dismiss keyboard in chat view. (#22122) thanks @mbelinky.
+- iOS/Watch: bridge mirrored watch prompt notification actions into iOS quick-reply handling, including queued action handoff until app model initialization. (#22123) thanks @mbelinky.
+- iOS/Gateway: stabilize background wake and reconnect behavior with background reconnect suppression/lease windows, BGAppRefresh wake fallback, location wake hook throttling, and APNs wake retry+nudge instrumentation. (#21226) thanks @mbelinky.
+- Auto-reply/UI: add model fallback lifecycle visibility in verbose logs, /status active-model context with fallback reason, and cohesive WebUI fallback indicators. (#20704) Thanks @joshavant.
+- MSTeams: dedupe sent-message cache storage by removing duplicate per-message Set storage and using timestamps Map keys as the single membership source. (#22514) Thanks @TaKO8Ki.
+- Agents/Subagents: default subagent spawn depth now uses shared `maxSpawnDepth=2`, enabling depth-1 orchestrator spawning by default while keeping depth policy checks consistent across spawn and prompt paths. (#22223) Thanks @tyler6204.
+- Security/Agents: make owner-ID obfuscation use a dedicated HMAC secret from configuration (`ownerDisplaySecret`) and update hashing behavior so obfuscation is decoupled from gateway token handling for improved control. (#7343) Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Security/Infra: switch gateway lock and tool-call synthetic IDs from SHA-1 to SHA-256 with unchanged truncation length to strengthen hash basis while keeping deterministic behavior and lock key format. (#7343) Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Dependencies/Tooling: add non-blocking dead-code scans in CI via Knip/ts-prune/ts-unused-exports to surface unused dependencies and exports earlier. (#22468) Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Dependencies/Unused Dependencies: remove or scope unused root and extension deps (`@larksuiteoapi/node-sdk`, `signal-utils`, `ollama`, `lit`, `@lit/context`, `@lit-labs/signals`, `@microsoft/agents-hosting-express`, `@microsoft/agents-hosting-extensions-teams`, and plugin-local `openclaw` devDeps in `extensions/open-prose`, `extensions/lobster`, and `extensions/llm-task`). (#22471, #22495) Thanks @vincentkoc.
+- Dependencies/A2UI: harden dependency resolution after root cleanup (resolve `lit`, `@lit/context`, `@lit-labs/signals`, and `signal-utils` from workspace/root) and simplify bundling fallback behavior, including `pnpm dlx rolldown` compatibility. (#22481, #22507) Thanks @vincentkoc.
+
+### Fixes
+
+- Agents/Bootstrap: skip malformed bootstrap files with missing/invalid paths instead of crashing agent sessions; hooks using `filePath` (or non-string `path`) are skipped with a warning. (#22693, #22698) Thanks @arosstale.
+- Security/Agents: cap embedded Pi runner outer retry loop with a higher profile-aware dynamic limit (32-160 attempts) and return an explicit `retry_limit` error payload when retries never converge, preventing unbounded internal retry cycles (`GHSA-76m6-pj3w-v7mf`).
+- Telegram: detect duplicate bot-token ownership across Telegram accounts at startup/status time, mark secondary accounts as not configured with an explicit fix message, and block duplicate account startup before polling to avoid endless `getUpdates` conflict loops.
+- Agents/Tool images: include source filenames in `agents/tool-images` resize logs so compression events can be traced back to specific files.
+- Providers/OAuth: harden Qwen and Chutes refresh handling by validating refresh response expiry values and preserving prior refresh tokens when providers return empty refresh token fields, with regression coverage for empty-token responses.
+- Models/Kimi-Coding: add missing implicit provider template for `kimi-coding` with correct `anthropic-messages` API type and base URL, fixing 403 errors when using Kimi for Coding. (#22409)
 - Auto-reply/Tools: forward `senderIsOwner` through embedded queued/followup runner params so owner-only tools remain available for authorized senders. (#22296) thanks @hcoj.
-- Agents/Subagents: restore announce-chain delivery to agent injection, defer nested announce output until descendant follow-up content is ready, and prevent descendant deferrals from consuming announce retry budget so deep chains do not drop final completions. (#22223) Thanks @tyler6204.
-- Gateway/Auth: require `gateway.trustedProxies` to include a loopback proxy address when `auth.mode="trusted-proxy"` and `bind="loopback"`, preventing same-host proxy misconfiguration from silently blocking auth. (#22082, follow-up to #20097) thanks @mbelinky.
-- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: prevent injected inbound user context metadata blocks from leaking into chat history in TUI, webchat, and macOS surfaces by stripping all untrusted metadata prefixes at display boundaries. (#22142) Thanks @Mellowambience, @vincentkoc.
-- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: strip inbound metadata blocks from user messages in TUI rendering while preserving user-authored content. (#22345) Thanks @kansodata, @vincentkoc.
-- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: prevent inbound metadata leaks and reply-tag streaming artifacts in TUI rendering by stripping untrusted metadata prefixes at display boundaries. (#22346) Thanks @akramcodez, @vincentkoc.
-- Agents/System Prompt: label allowlisted senders as authorized senders to avoid implying ownership. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Agents/Tool display: fix exec cwd suffix inference so `pushd ... && popd ... && <command>` does not keep stale `(in <dir>)` context in summaries. (#21925) Thanks @Lukavyi.
 - Discord: restore model picker back navigation when a provider is missing and document the Discord picker flow. (#21458) Thanks @pejmanjohn and @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Gateway/Auth: allow trusted-proxy mode with loopback bind for same-host reverse-proxy deployments, while still requiring configured `gateway.trustedProxies`. (#20097) thanks @xinhuagu.
-- Gateway/Auth: allow authenticated clients across roles/scopes to call `health` while preserving role and scope enforcement for non-health methods. (#19699) thanks @Nachx639.
-- Gateway/Security: remove shared-IP fallback for canvas endpoints and require token or session capability for canvas access. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Gateway/Hooks: include transform export name in hook-transform cache keys so distinct exports from the same module do not reuse the wrong cached transform function. (#13855) thanks @mcaxtr.
-- Gateway/Control UI: return 404 for missing static-asset paths instead of serving SPA fallback HTML, while preserving client-route fallback behavior for extensionless and non-asset dotted paths. (#12060) thanks @mcaxtr.
-- Gateway/Pairing: prevent device-token rotate scope escalation by enforcing an approved-scope baseline, preserving approved scopes across metadata updates, and rejecting rotate requests that exceed approved role scope implications. (#20703) thanks @coygeek.
-- Gateway/Security: require secure context and paired-device checks for Control UI auth even when `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth` is set, and align audit messaging with the hardened behavior. (#20684) thanks @coygeek.
-- Security/Agents: restrict local MEDIA tool attachments to core tools and the OpenClaw temp root to prevent untrusted MCP tool file exfiltration. Thanks @NucleiAv and @thewilloftheshadow.
-- macOS/Build: default release packaging to `BUNDLE_ID=ai.openclaw.mac` in `scripts/package-mac-dist.sh`, so Sparkle feed URL is retained and auto-update no longer fails with an empty appcast feed. (#19750) thanks @loganprit.
-- Gateway/Pairing: clear persisted paired-device state when the gateway client closes with `device token mismatch` (`1008`) so reconnect flows can cleanly re-enter pairing. (#22071) Thanks @mbelinky.
 - Memory/QMD: respect per-agent `memorySearch.enabled=false` during gateway QMD startup initialization, split multi-collection QMD searches into per-collection queries (`search`/`vsearch`/`query`) to avoid sparse-term drops, prefer collection-hinted doc resolution to avoid stale-hash collisions, retry boot updates on transient lock/timeout failures, skip `qmd embed` in BM25-only `search` mode (including `memory index --force`), and serialize embed runs globally with failure backoff to prevent CPU storms on multi-agent hosts. (#20581, #21590, #20513, #20001, #21266, #21583, #20346, #19493) Thanks @danielrevivo, @zanderkrause, @sunyan034-cmd, @tilleulenspiegel, @dae-oss, @adamlongcreativellc, @jonathanadams96, and @kiliansitel.
 - Memory/Builtin: prevent automatic sync races with manager shutdown by skipping post-close sync starts and waiting for in-flight sync before closing SQLite, so `onSearch`/`onSessionStart` no longer fail with `database is not open` in ephemeral CLI flows. (#20556, #7464) Thanks @FuzzyTG and @henrybottter.
-- Hooks/Session memory: trigger bundled `session-memory` persistence on both `/new` and `/reset` so reset flows no longer skip markdown transcript capture before archival. (#21382) Thanks @mofesolapaul.
-- Signal/Outbound: preserve case for Base64 group IDs during outbound target normalization so cross-context routing and policy checks no longer break when group IDs include uppercase characters. (#5578) Thanks @heyhudson.
 - Providers/Copilot: drop persisted assistant `thinking` blocks for Claude models (while preserving turn structure/tool blocks) so follow-up requests no longer fail on invalid `thinkingSignature` payloads. (#19459) Thanks @jackheuberger.
 - Providers/Copilot: add `claude-sonnet-4.6` and `claude-sonnet-4.5` to the default GitHub Copilot model catalog and add coverage for model-list/definition helpers. (#20270, fixes #20091) Thanks @Clawborn.
-- Dependencies/Agents: bump embedded Pi SDK packages (`@mariozechner/pi-agent-core`, `@mariozechner/pi-ai`, `@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent`, `@mariozechner/pi-tui`) to `0.54.0`. (#21578) Thanks @Takhoffman.
-- Gateway/Config: allow `gateway.customBindHost` in strict config validation when `gateway.bind="custom"` so valid custom bind-host configurations no longer fail startup. (#20318, fixes #20289) Thanks @MisterGuy420.
-- Config/Agents: expose Pi compaction tuning values `agents.defaults.compaction.reserveTokens` and `agents.defaults.compaction.keepRecentTokens` in config schema/types and apply them in embedded Pi runner settings overrides with floor enforcement via `reserveTokensFloor`. (#21568) Thanks @Takhoffman.
 - Auto-reply/WebChat: avoid defaulting inbound runtime channel labels to unrelated providers (for example `whatsapp`) for webchat sessions so channel-specific formatting guidance stays accurate. (#21534) Thanks @lbo728.
 - Status: include persisted `cacheRead`/`cacheWrite` in session summaries so compact `/status` output consistently shows cache hit percentages from real session data.
+- Sessions/Usage: persist `totalTokens` from `promptTokens` snapshots even when providers omit structured usage payloads, so session history/status no longer regress to `unknown` token utilization for otherwise successful runs. (#21819) Thanks @zymclaw.
 - Heartbeat/Cron: restore interval heartbeat behavior so missing `HEARTBEAT.md` no longer suppresses runs (only effectively empty files skip), preserving prompt-driven and tagged-cron execution paths.
 - WhatsApp/Cron/Heartbeat: enforce allowlisted routing for implicit scheduled/system delivery by merging pairing-store + configured `allowFrom` recipients, selecting authorized recipients when last-route context points to a non-allowlisted chat, and preventing heartbeat fan-out to recent unauthorized chats.
 - Heartbeat/Active hours: constrain active-hours `24` sentinel parsing to `24:00` in time validation so invalid values like `24:30` are rejected early. (#21410) thanks @adhitShet.
 - Heartbeat: treat `activeHours` windows with identical `start`/`end` times as zero-width (always outside the window) instead of always-active. (#21408) thanks @adhitShet.
-- Gateway/Pairing: tolerate legacy paired devices missing `roles`/`scopes` metadata in websocket upgrade checks and backfill metadata on reconnect. (#21447, fixes #21236) Thanks @joshavant.
-- Gateway/Pairing/CLI: align read-scope compatibility in pairing/device-token checks and add local `openclaw devices` fallback recovery for loopback `pairing required` deadlocks, with explicit fallback notice to unblock approval bootstrap flows. (#21616) Thanks @shakkernerd.
 - CLI/Pairing: default `pairing list` and `pairing approve` to the sole available pairing channel when omitted, so TUI-only setups can recover from `pairing required` without guessing channel arguments. (#21527) Thanks @losts1.
 - TUI/Pairing: show explicit pairing-required recovery guidance after gateway disconnects that return `pairing required`, including approval steps to unblock quickstart TUI hatching on fresh installs. (#21841) Thanks @nicolinux.
 - TUI/Input: suppress duplicate backspace events arriving in the same input burst window so SSH sessions no longer delete two characters per backspace press in the composer. (#19318) Thanks @eheimer.
+- TUI/Models: scope `models.list` to the configured model allowlist (`agents.defaults.models`) so `/model` picker no longer floods with unrelated catalog entries by default. (#18816) Thanks @fwends.
 - TUI/Heartbeat: suppress heartbeat ACK/prompt noise in chat streaming when `showOk` is disabled, while still preserving non-ACK heartbeat alerts in final output. (#20228) Thanks @bhalliburton.
 - TUI/History: cap chat-log component growth and prune stale render nodes/references so large default history loads no longer overflow render recursion with `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`. (#18068) Thanks @JaniJegoroff.
 - Memory/QMD: diversify mixed-source search ranking when both session and memory collections are present so session transcript hits no longer crowd out durable memory-file matches in top results. (#19913) Thanks @alextempr.
 - Memory/Tools: return explicit `unavailable` warnings/actions from `memory_search` when embedding/provider failures occur (including quota exhaustion), so disabled memory does not look like an empty recall result. (#21894) Thanks @XBS9.
 - Session/Startup: require the `/new` and `/reset` greeting path to run Session Startup file-reading instructions before responding, so daily memory startup context is not skipped on fresh-session greetings. (#22338) Thanks @armstrong-pv.
 - Auth/Onboarding: align OAuth profile-id config mapping with stored credential IDs for OpenAI Codex and Chutes flows, preventing `provider:default` mismatches when OAuth returns email-scoped credentials. (#12692) thanks @mudrii.
-- Docker: pin base images to SHA256 digests in Docker builds to prevent mutable tag drift. (#7734) Thanks @coygeek.
-- Docker/Security: run E2E and install-sh test images as non-root by adding appuser directives. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Docker: run build steps as the `node` user and use `COPY --chown` to avoid recursive ownership changes, trimming image size and layer churn. Thanks @huntharo.
 - Provider/HTTP: treat HTTP 503 as failover-eligible for LLM provider errors. (#21086) Thanks @Protocol-zero-0.
-- Anthropic/Agents: preserve required pi-ai default OAuth beta headers when `context1m` injects `anthropic-beta`, preventing 401 auth failures for `sk-ant-oat-*` tokens. (#19789, fixes #19769) Thanks @minupla.
 - Slack: pass `recipient_team_id` / `recipient_user_id` through Slack native streaming calls so `chat.startStream`/`appendStream`/`stopStream` work reliably across DMs and Slack Connect setups, and disable block streaming when native streaming is active. (#20988) Thanks @Dithilli. Earlier recipient-ID groundwork was contributed in #20377 by @AsserAl1012.
 - CLI/Config: add canonical `--strict-json` parsing for `config set` and keep `--json` as a legacy alias to reduce help/behavior drift. (#21332) thanks @adhitShet.
+- CLI/Config: preserve explicitly unset config paths in persisted JSON after writes so `openclaw config unset <path>` no longer re-introduces defaulted keys (for example `commands.ownerDisplay`) through schema normalization. (#22984) Thanks @aronchick.
 - CLI: keep `openclaw -v` as a root-only version alias so subcommand `-v, --verbose` flags (for example ACP/hooks/skills) are no longer intercepted globally. (#21303) thanks @adhitShet.
-- Config/Memory: restore schema help/label metadata for hybrid `mmr` and `temporalDecay` settings so configuration surfaces show correct names and guidance. (#18786) Thanks @rodrigouroz.
 - Memory: return empty snippets when `memory_get`/QMD read files that have not been created yet, and harden memory indexing/session helpers against ENOENT races so missing Markdown no longer crashes tools. (#20680) Thanks @pahdo.
-- Tools/web_search: handle xAI Responses API payloads that emit top-level `output_text` blocks (without a `message` wrapper) so Grok web_search no longer returns `No response` for those results. (#20508) Thanks @echoVic.
 - Telegram/Streaming: always clean up draft previews even when dispatch throws before fallback handling, preventing orphaned preview messages during failed runs. (#19041) thanks @mudrii.
 - Telegram/Streaming: split reasoning and answer draft preview lanes to prevent cross-lane overwrites, and ignore literal `<think>` tags inside inline/fenced code snippets so sample markup is not misrouted as reasoning. (#20774) Thanks @obviyus.
+- Telegram/Streaming: restore 30-char first-preview debounce and scope `NO_REPLY` prefix suppression to partial sentinel fragments so normal `No...` text is not filtered. (#22613) thanks @obviyus.
 - Telegram/Status reactions: refresh stall timers on repeated phase updates and honor ack-reaction scope when lifecycle reactions are enabled, preventing false stall emojis and unwanted group reactions. Thanks @wolly-tundracube and @thewilloftheshadow.
 - Telegram/Status reactions: keep lifecycle reactions active when available-reactions lookup fails by falling back to unrestricted variant selection instead of suppressing reaction updates. (#22380) thanks @obviyus.
+- Discord/Events: await `DiscordMessageListener` message handlers so regular `MESSAGE_CREATE` traffic is processed through queue ordering/timeout flow instead of fire-and-forget drops. (#22396) Thanks @sIlENtbuffER.
 - Discord/Streaming: apply `replyToMode: first` only to the first Discord chunk so block-streamed replies do not spam mention pings. (#20726) Thanks @thewilloftheshadow for the report.
 - Discord/Components: map DM channel targets back to user-scoped component sessions so button/select interactions stay in the main DM session. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
 - Discord/Allowlist: lazy-load guild lists when resolving Discord user allowlists so ID-only entries resolve even if guild fetch fails. (#20208) Thanks @zhangjunmengyang.
-
 - Discord/Gateway: handle close code 4014 (missing privileged gateway intents) without crashing the gateway. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
 - Discord: ingest inbound stickers as media so sticker-only messages and forwarded stickers are visible to agents. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Security/Net: strip sensitive headers (`Authorization`, `Proxy-Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Cookie2`) on cross-origin redirects in `fetchWithSsrFGuard` to prevent credential forwarding across origin boundaries. (#20313) Thanks @afurm.
-- Security/Systemd: reject CR/LF in systemd unit environment values and fix argument escaping so generated units cannot be injected with extra directives. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Security/Tools: add per-wrapper random IDs to untrusted-content markers from `wrapExternalContent`/`wrapWebContent`, preventing marker spoofing from escaping content boundaries. (#19009) Thanks @Whoaa512.
-- Skills/Security: sanitize skill env overrides to block unsafe runtime injection variables and only allow sensitive keys when declared in skill metadata, with warnings for suspicious values. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
-- Skills/SonosCLI: add troubleshooting guidance for `sonos discover` failures on macOS direct mode (`sendto: no route to host`) and sandbox network restrictions (`bind: operation not permitted`). (#21316) Thanks @huntharo.
 - Auto-reply/Runner: emit `onAgentRunStart` only after agent lifecycle or tool activity begins (and only once per run), so fallback preflight errors no longer mark runs as started. (#21165) Thanks @shakkernerd.
-- Agents/Failover: treat non-default override runs as direct fallback-to-configured-primary (skip configured fallback chain), normalize default-model detection for provider casing/whitespace, and add regression coverage for override/auth error paths. (#18820) Thanks @Glucksberg.
 - Auto-reply/Tool results: serialize tool-result delivery and keep the delivery chain progressing after individual failures so concurrent tool outputs preserve user-visible ordering. (#21231) thanks @ahdernasr.
 - Auto-reply/Prompt caching: restore prefix-cache stability by keeping inbound system metadata session-stable and moving per-message IDs (`message_id`, `message_id_full`, `reply_to_id`, `sender_id`) into untrusted conversation context. (#20597) Thanks @anisoptera.
-- iOS/Security: force `https://` for non-loopback manual gateway hosts during iOS onboarding to block insecure remote transport URLs. (#21969) Thanks @mbelinky.
-- Shared/Security: reject insecure deep links that use `ws://` non-loopback gateway URLs to prevent plaintext remote websocket configuration. (#21970) Thanks @mbelinky.
-- macOS/Security: reject non-loopback `ws://` remote gateway URLs in macOS remote config to block insecure plaintext websocket endpoints. (#21971) Thanks @mbelinky.
-- Browser/Security: block upload path symlink escapes so browser upload sources cannot traverse outside the allowed workspace via symlinked paths. (#21972) Thanks @mbelinky.
 - iOS/Watch: add actionable watch approval/reject controls and quick-reply actions so watch-originated approvals and responses can be sent directly from notification flows. (#21996) Thanks @mbelinky.
 - iOS/Watch: refresh iOS and watch app icon assets with the lobster icon set to keep phone/watch branding aligned. (#21997) Thanks @mbelinky.
 - CLI/Onboarding: fix Anthropic-compatible custom provider verification by normalizing base URLs to avoid duplicate `/v1` paths during setup checks. (#21336) Thanks @17jmumford.
+- iOS/Gateway/Tools: prefer uniquely connected node matches when duplicate display names exist, surface actionable `nodes invoke` pairing-required guidance with request IDs, and refresh active iOS gateway registration after location-capability setting changes so capability updates apply immediately. (#22120) thanks @mbelinky.
+- Gateway/Auth: require `gateway.trustedProxies` to include a loopback proxy address when `auth.mode="trusted-proxy"` and `bind="loopback"`, preventing same-host proxy misconfiguration from silently blocking auth. (#22082, follow-up to #20097) thanks @mbelinky.
+- Gateway/Auth: allow trusted-proxy mode with loopback bind for same-host reverse-proxy deployments, while still requiring configured `gateway.trustedProxies`. (#20097) thanks @xinhuagu.
+- Gateway/Auth: allow authenticated clients across roles/scopes to call `health` while preserving role and scope enforcement for non-health methods. (#19699) thanks @Nachx639.
+- Gateway/Hooks: include transform export name in hook-transform cache keys so distinct exports from the same module do not reuse the wrong cached transform function. (#13855) thanks @mcaxtr.
+- Gateway/Control UI: return 404 for missing static-asset paths instead of serving SPA fallback HTML, while preserving client-route fallback behavior for extensionless and non-asset dotted paths. (#12060) thanks @mcaxtr.
+- Gateway/Pairing: prevent device-token rotate scope escalation by enforcing an approved-scope baseline, preserving approved scopes across metadata updates, and rejecting rotate requests that exceed approved role scope implications. (#20703) thanks @coygeek.
+- Gateway/Pairing: clear persisted paired-device state when the gateway client closes with `device token mismatch` (`1008`) so reconnect flows can cleanly re-enter pairing. (#22071) Thanks @mbelinky.
+- Gateway/Config: allow `gateway.customBindHost` in strict config validation when `gateway.bind="custom"` so valid custom bind-host configurations no longer fail startup. (#20318, fixes #20289) Thanks @MisterGuy420.
+- Gateway/Pairing: tolerate legacy paired devices missing `roles`/`scopes` metadata in websocket upgrade checks and backfill metadata on reconnect. (#21447, fixes #21236) Thanks @joshavant.
+- Gateway/Pairing/CLI: align read-scope compatibility in pairing/device-token checks and add local `openclaw devices` fallback recovery for loopback `pairing required` deadlocks, with explicit fallback notice to unblock approval bootstrap flows. (#21616) Thanks @shakkernerd.
+- Cron: honor `cron.maxConcurrentRuns` in the timer loop so due jobs can execute up to the configured parallelism instead of always running serially. (#11595) Thanks @Takhoffman.
+- Agents/Compaction: restore embedded compaction safeguard/context-pruning extension loading in production by wiring bundled extension factories into the resource loader instead of runtime file-path resolution. (#22349) Thanks @Glucksberg.
+- Agents/Subagents: restore announce-chain delivery to agent injection, defer nested announce output until descendant follow-up content is ready, and prevent descendant deferrals from consuming announce retry budget so deep chains do not drop final completions. (#22223) Thanks @tyler6204.
+- Agents/System Prompt: label allowlisted senders as authorized senders to avoid implying ownership. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Agents/Tool display: fix exec cwd suffix inference so `pushd ... && popd ... && <command>` does not keep stale `(in <dir>)` context in summaries. (#21925) Thanks @Lukavyi.
+- Agents/Google: flatten residual nested `anyOf`/`oneOf` unions in Gemini tool-schema cleanup so Cloud Code Assist no longer rejects unsupported union keywords that survive earlier simplification. (#22825) Thanks @Oceanswave.
+- Tools/web_search: handle xAI Responses API payloads that emit top-level `output_text` blocks (without a `message` wrapper) so Grok web_search no longer returns `No response` for those results. (#20508) Thanks @echoVic.
+- Agents/Failover: treat non-default override runs as direct fallback-to-configured-primary (skip configured fallback chain), normalize default-model detection for provider casing/whitespace, and add regression coverage for override/auth error paths. (#18820) Thanks @Glucksberg.
+- Docker/Build: include `ownerDisplay` in `CommandsSchema` object-level defaults so Docker `pnpm build` no longer fails with `TS2769` during plugin SDK d.ts generation. (#22558) Thanks @obviyus.
+- Docker/Browser: install Playwright Chromium into `/home/node/.cache/ms-playwright` and set `node:node` ownership so browser binaries are available to the runtime user in browser-enabled images. (#22585) thanks @obviyus.
+- Hooks/Session memory: trigger bundled `session-memory` persistence on both `/new` and `/reset` so reset flows no longer skip markdown transcript capture before archival. (#21382) Thanks @mofesolapaul.
+- Dependencies/Agents: bump embedded Pi SDK packages (`@mariozechner/pi-agent-core`, `@mariozechner/pi-ai`, `@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent`, `@mariozechner/pi-tui`) to `0.54.0`. (#21578) Thanks @Takhoffman.
+- Config/Agents: expose Pi compaction tuning values `agents.defaults.compaction.reserveTokens` and `agents.defaults.compaction.keepRecentTokens` in config schema/types and apply them in embedded Pi runner settings overrides with floor enforcement via `reserveTokensFloor`. (#21568) Thanks @Takhoffman.
+- Docker: pin base images to SHA256 digests in Docker builds to prevent mutable tag drift. (#7734) Thanks @coygeek.
+- Docker: run build steps as the `node` user and use `COPY --chown` to avoid recursive ownership changes, trimming image size and layer churn. Thanks @huntharo.
+- Config/Memory: restore schema help/label metadata for hybrid `mmr` and `temporalDecay` settings so configuration surfaces show correct names and guidance. (#18786) Thanks @rodrigouroz.
+- Skills/SonosCLI: add troubleshooting guidance for `sonos discover` failures on macOS direct mode (`sendto: no route to host`) and sandbox network restrictions (`bind: operation not permitted`). (#21316) Thanks @huntharo.
+- macOS/Build: default release packaging to `BUNDLE_ID=ai.openclaw.mac` in `scripts/package-mac-dist.sh`, so Sparkle feed URL is retained and auto-update no longer fails with an empty appcast feed. (#19750) thanks @loganprit.
+- Signal/Outbound: preserve case for Base64 group IDs during outbound target normalization so cross-context routing and policy checks no longer break when group IDs include uppercase characters. (#5578) Thanks @heyhudson.
+- Anthropic/Agents: preserve required pi-ai default OAuth beta headers when `context1m` injects `anthropic-beta`, preventing 401 auth failures for `sk-ant-oat-*` tokens. (#19789, fixes #19769) Thanks @minupla.
+- Security/Exec: block unquoted heredoc body expansion tokens in shell allowlist analysis, reject unterminated heredocs, and require explicit approval for allowlisted heredoc execution on gateway hosts to prevent heredoc substitution allowlist bypass. Thanks @torturado for reporting.
+- macOS/Security: evaluate `system.run` allowlists per shell segment in macOS node runtime and companion exec host (including chained shell operators), fail closed on shell/process substitution parsing, and require explicit approval on unsafe parse cases to prevent allowlist bypass via `rawCommand` chaining. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- WhatsApp/Security: enforce allowlist JID authorization for reaction actions so authenticated callers cannot target non-allowlisted chats by forging `chatJid` + valid `messageId` pairs. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
+- ACP/Security: escape control and delimiter characters in ACP `resource_link` title/URI metadata before prompt interpolation to prevent metadata-driven prompt injection through resource links. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
+- TTS/Security: make model-driven provider switching opt-in by default (`messages.tts.modelOverrides.allowProvider=false` unless explicitly enabled), while keeping voice/style overrides available, to reduce prompt-injection-driven provider hops and unexpected TTS cost escalation. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
+- Security/Agents: keep overflow compaction retry budgeting global across tool-result truncation recovery so successful truncation cannot reset the overflow retry counter and amplify retry/cost cycles. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
+- BlueBubbles/Security: require webhook token authentication for all BlueBubbles webhook requests (including loopback/proxied setups), removing passwordless webhook fallback behavior. Thanks @zpbrent.
+- iOS/Security: force `https://` for non-loopback manual gateway hosts during iOS onboarding to block insecure remote transport URLs. (#21969) Thanks @mbelinky.
+- Gateway/Security: remove shared-IP fallback for canvas endpoints and require token or session capability for canvas access. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Gateway/Security: require secure context and paired-device checks for Control UI auth even when `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth` is set, and align audit messaging with the hardened behavior. (#20684) Thanks @coygeek and @Vasco0x4 for reporting.
+- Gateway/Security: scope tokenless Tailscale forwarded-header auth to Control UI websocket auth only, so HTTP gateway routes still require token/password even on trusted hosts. Thanks @zpbrent for reporting.
+- Docker/Security: run E2E and install-sh test images as non-root by adding appuser directives. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Skills/Security: sanitize skill env overrides to block unsafe runtime injection variables and only allow sensitive keys when declared in skill metadata, with warnings for suspicious values. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Security/Commands: block prototype-key injection in runtime `/debug` overrides and require own-property checks for gated command flags (`bash`, `config`, `debug`) so inherited prototype values cannot enable privileged commands. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Browser: block non-network browser navigation protocols (including `file:`, `data:`, and `javascript:`) while preserving `about:blank`, preventing local file reads via browser tool navigation. Thanks @q1uf3ng for reporting.
+- Security/Exec: block shell startup-file env injection (`BASH_ENV`, `ENV`, `BASH_FUNC_*`, `LD_*`, `DYLD_*`) across config env ingestion, node-host inherited environment sanitization, and macOS exec host runtime to prevent pre-command execution from attacker-controlled environment variables. Thanks @tdjackey.
+- Security/Exec (Windows): canonicalize `cmd.exe /c` command text across validation, approval binding, and audit/event rendering to prevent trailing-argument approval mismatches in `system.run`. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Gateway/Hooks: block `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` traversal in webhook template path resolution to prevent prototype-chain payload data leakage in `messageTemplate` rendering. (#22213) Thanks @SleuthCo.
+- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: prevent injected inbound user context metadata blocks from leaking into chat history in TUI, webchat, and macOS surfaces by stripping all untrusted metadata prefixes at display boundaries. (#22142) Thanks @Mellowambience, @vincentkoc.
+- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: strip inbound metadata blocks from user messages in TUI rendering while preserving user-authored content. (#22345) Thanks @kansodata, @vincentkoc.
+- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: prevent inbound metadata leaks and reply-tag streaming artifacts in TUI rendering by stripping untrusted metadata prefixes at display boundaries. (#22346) Thanks @akramcodez, @vincentkoc.
+- Security/Agents: restrict local MEDIA tool attachments to core tools and the OpenClaw temp root to prevent untrusted MCP tool file exfiltration. Thanks @NucleiAv and @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Security/Net: strip sensitive headers (`Authorization`, `Proxy-Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Cookie2`) on cross-origin redirects in `fetchWithSsrFGuard` to prevent credential forwarding across origin boundaries. (#20313) Thanks @afurm.
+- Security/Systemd: reject CR/LF in systemd unit environment values and fix argument escaping so generated units cannot be injected with extra directives. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
+- Security/Tools: add per-wrapper random IDs to untrusted-content markers from `wrapExternalContent`/`wrapWebContent`, preventing marker spoofing from escaping content boundaries. (#19009) Thanks @Whoaa512.
+- Shared/Security: reject insecure deep links that use `ws://` non-loopback gateway URLs to prevent plaintext remote websocket configuration. (#21970) Thanks @mbelinky.
+- macOS/Security: reject non-loopback `ws://` remote gateway URLs in macOS remote config to block insecure plaintext websocket endpoints. (#21971) Thanks @mbelinky.
+- Browser/Security: block upload path symlink escapes so browser upload sources cannot traverse outside the allowed workspace via symlinked paths. (#21972) Thanks @mbelinky.
 - Security/Dependencies: bump transitive `hono` usage to `4.11.10` to incorporate timing-safe authentication comparison hardening for `basicAuth`/`bearerAuth` (`GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf`). Thanks @vincentkoc.
 - Security/Gateway: parse `X-Forwarded-For` with trust-preserving semantics when requests come from configured trusted proxies, preventing proxy-chain spoofing from influencing client IP classification and rate-limit identity. Thanks @AnthonyDiSanti and @vincentkoc.
-- iOS/Gateway/Tools: prefer uniquely connected node matches when duplicate display names exist, surface actionable `nodes invoke` pairing-required guidance with request IDs, and refresh active iOS gateway registration after location-capability setting changes so capability updates apply immediately. (#22120) thanks @mbelinky.
-- Security/Sandbox: remove default `--no-sandbox` for the browser container entrypoint, add explicit opt-in via `OPENCLAW_BROWSER_NO_SANDBOX` / `CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_NO_SANDBOX`, and harden the default container security posture (`GHSA-43x4-g22p-3hrq`). Thanks @TerminalsandCoffee and @vincentkoc.
+- Security/Sandbox: remove default `--no-sandbox` for the browser container entrypoint, add explicit opt-in via `OPENCLAW_BROWSER_NO_SANDBOX` / `CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_NO_SANDBOX`, and add security-audit checks for stale/missing sandbox browser Docker hash labels. Thanks @TerminalsandCoffee and @vincentkoc.
+- Security/Sandbox Browser: require VNC password auth for noVNC observer sessions in the sandbox browser entrypoint, plumb per-container noVNC passwords from runtime, and emit short-lived noVNC observer token URLs while keeping loopback-only host port publishing. Thanks @TerminalsandCoffee for reporting.
+- Security/Sandbox Browser: default browser sandbox containers to a dedicated Docker network (`openclaw-sandbox-browser`), add optional CDP ingress source-range restrictions, auto-create missing dedicated networks, and warn in `openclaw security --audit` when browser sandboxing runs on bridge without source-range limits. Thanks @TerminalsandCoffee for reporting.
 
 ## 2026.2.19
 
@@ -140,6 +486,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
 ### Fixes
 
+- Security: strip hidden text from `web_fetch` extracted content to prevent indirect prompt injection, covering CSS-hidden elements, class-based hiding (sr-only, d-none, etc.), invisible Unicode, color:transparent, offscreen transforms, and non-content tags. (#8027, #21074) Thanks @hydro13 for the fix and @LucasAIBuilder for reporting.
 - Agents/Streaming: keep assistant partial streaming active during reasoning streams, handle native `thinking_*` stream events consistently, dedupe mixed reasoning-end signals, and clear stale mutating tool errors after same-target retry success. (#20635) Thanks @obviyus.
 - iOS/Chat: use a dedicated iOS chat session key for ChatSheet routing to avoid cross-client session collisions with main-session traffic. (#21139) thanks @mbelinky.
 - iOS/Chat: auto-resync chat history after reconnect sequence gaps, clear stale pending runs, and avoid dead-end manual refresh errors after transient disconnects. (#21135) thanks @mbelinky.
@@ -149,8 +496,10 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - iOS/Onboarding: stabilize pairing and reconnect behavior by resetting stale pairing request state on manual retry, disconnecting both operator and node gateways on operator failure, and avoiding duplicate pairing loops from operator transport identity attachment. (#20056) Thanks @mbelinky.
 - iOS/Signing: restore local auto-selected signing-team overrides during iOS project generation by wiring `.local-signing.xcconfig` into the active signing config and emitting `OPENCLAW_DEVELOPMENT_TEAM` in local signing setup. (#19993) Thanks @ngutman.
 - Telegram: unify message-like inbound handling so `message` and `channel_post` share the same dedupe/access/media pipeline and remain behaviorally consistent. (#20591) Thanks @obviyus.
+- Telegram: keep media-group processing resilient by skipping recoverable per-item download failures while still failing loud on non-recoverable media errors. (#20598) thanks @mcaxtr.
 - Telegram/Agents: gate exec/bash tool-failure warnings behind verbose mode so default Telegram replies stay clean while verbose sessions still surface diagnostics. (#20560) Thanks @obviyus.
 - Telegram/Cron/Heartbeat: honor explicit Telegram topic targets in cron and heartbeat delivery (`<chatId>:topic:<threadId>`) so scheduled sends land in the configured topic instead of the last active thread. (#19367) Thanks @Lukavyi.
+- Telegram/DM routing: prevent DM inbound origin metadata from leaking into main-session `lastRoute` updates and normalize DM `lastRoute.to` to provider-prefixed `telegram:<chatId>`. (#19491) thanks @guirguispierre.
 - Gateway/Daemon: forward `TMPDIR` into installed service environments so macOS LaunchAgent gateway runs can open SQLite temp/journal files reliably instead of failing with `SQLITE_CANTOPEN`. (#20512) Thanks @Clawborn.
 - Agents/Billing: include the active model that produced a billing error in user-facing billing messages (for example, `OpenAI (gpt-5.3)`) across payload, failover, and lifecycle error paths, so users can identify exactly which key needs credits. (#20510) Thanks @echoVic.
 - Gateway/TUI: honor `agents.defaults.blockStreamingDefault` for `chat.send` by removing the hardcoded block-streaming disable override, so replies can use configured block-mode delivery. (#19693) Thanks @neipor.
@@ -175,8 +524,8 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - OTEL/diagnostics-otel: complete OpenTelemetry v2 API migration. (#12897) Thanks @vincentkoc.
 - Cron/Webhooks: protect cron webhook POST delivery with SSRF-guarded outbound fetch (`fetchWithSsrFGuard`) to block private/metadata destinations before request dispatch. Thanks @Adam55A-code.
 - Security/Voice Call: harden `voice-call` telephony TTS override merging by blocking unsafe deep-merge keys (`__proto__`, `prototype`, `constructor`) and add regression coverage for top-level and nested prototype-pollution payloads.
-- Security/Windows Daemon: harden Scheduled Task `gateway.cmd` generation by quoting cmd metacharacter arguments, escaping `%`/`!` expansions, and rejecting CR/LF in arguments, descriptions, and environment assignments (`set "KEY=VALUE"`), preventing command injection in Windows daemon startup scripts. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
-- Security/Gateway/Canvas: replace shared-IP fallback auth with node-scoped session capability URLs for `/__openclaw__/canvas/*` and `/__openclaw__/a2ui/*`, fail closed when trusted-proxy requests omit forwarded client headers, and add IPv6/proxy-header regression coverage. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
+- Security/Windows Daemon: harden Scheduled Task `gateway.cmd` generation by quoting cmd metacharacter arguments, escaping `%`/`!` expansions, and rejecting CR/LF in arguments, descriptions, and environment assignments (`set "KEY=VALUE"`), preventing command injection in Windows daemon startup scripts. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Gateway/Canvas: replace shared-IP fallback auth with node-scoped session capability URLs for `/__openclaw__/canvas/*` and `/__openclaw__/a2ui/*`, fail closed when trusted-proxy requests omit forwarded client headers, and add IPv6/proxy-header regression coverage. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
 - Security/Net: enforce strict dotted-decimal IPv4 literals in SSRF checks and fail closed on unsupported legacy forms (octal/hex/short/packed, for example `0177.0.0.1`, `127.1`, `2130706433`) before DNS lookup.
 - Security/Discord: enforce trusted-sender guild permission checks for moderation actions (`timeout`, `kick`, `ban`) and ignore untrusted `senderUserId` params to prevent privilege escalation in tool-driven flows. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
 - Security/ACP+Exec: add `openclaw acp --token-file/--password-file` secret-file support (with inline secret flag warnings), redact ACP working-directory prefixes to `~` home-relative paths, constrain exec script preflight file inspection to the effective `workdir` boundary, and add security-audit warnings when `tools.exec.host="sandbox"` is configured while sandbox mode is off.
@@ -204,9 +553,10 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/Media: harden local media ingestion against TOCTOU/symlink swap attacks by pinning reads to a single file descriptor with symlink rejection and inode/device verification in `saveMediaSource`. Thanks @dorjoos for reporting.
 - Security/Lobster (Windows): for the next npm release, remove shell-based fallback when launching Lobster wrappers (`.cmd`/`.bat`) and switch to explicit argv execution with wrapper entrypoint resolution, preventing command injection while preserving Windows wrapper compatibility. Thanks @allsmog for reporting.
 - Security/Exec: require `tools.exec.safeBins` binaries to resolve from trusted bin directories (system defaults plus gateway startup `PATH`) so PATH-hijacked trojan binaries cannot bypass allowlist checks. Thanks @jackhax for reporting.
-- Security/Exec: remove file-existence oracle behavior from `tools.exec.safeBins` by using deterministic argv-only stdin-safe validation and blocking file-oriented flags (for example `sort -o`, `jq -f`, `grep -f`) so allow/deny results no longer disclose host file presence. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
-- Security/Browser: route browser URL navigation through one SSRF-guarded validation path for tab-open/CDP-target/Playwright navigation flows and block private/metadata destinations by default (configurable via `browser.ssrfPolicy`). This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @dorjoos for reporting.
+- Security/Exec: remove file-existence oracle behavior from `tools.exec.safeBins` by using deterministic argv-only stdin-safe validation and blocking file-oriented flags (for example `sort -o`, `jq -f`, `grep -f`) so allow/deny results no longer disclose host file presence. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
+- Security/Browser: route browser URL navigation through one SSRF-guarded validation path for tab-open/CDP-target/Playwright navigation flows and block private/metadata destinations by default (configurable via `browser.ssrfPolicy`). Thanks @dorjoos for reporting.
 - Security/Exec: for the next npm release, harden safe-bin stdin-only enforcement by blocking output/recursive flags (`sort -o/--output`, grep recursion) and tightening default safe bins to remove `sort`/`grep`, preventing safe-bin allowlist bypass for file writes/recursive reads. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
+- Security/Exec: block grep safe-bin positional operand bypass by setting grep positional budget to zero, so `-e/--regexp` cannot smuggle bare filename reads (for example `.env`) via ambiguous positionals; safe-bin grep patterns must come from `-e/--regexp`. Thanks @athuljayaram for reporting.
 - Security/Gateway/Agents: remove implicit admin scopes from agent tool gateway calls by classifying methods to least-privilege operator scopes, and enforce owner-only tooling (`cron`, `gateway`, `whatsapp_login`) through centralized tool-policy wrappers plus tool metadata to prevent non-owner DM privilege escalation. Ships in the next npm release. Thanks @Adam55A-code for reporting.
 - Security/Gateway: centralize gateway method-scope authorization and default non-CLI gateway callers to least-privilege method scopes, with explicit CLI scope handling, full core-handler scope classification coverage, and regression guards to prevent scope drift.
 - Security/Net: block SSRF bypass via NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, `64:ff9b:1::/48`), 6to4 (`2002::/16`), and Teredo (`2001:0000::/32`) IPv6 transition addresses, and fail closed on IPv6 parse errors. Thanks @jackhax.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1 +1 @@
-AGENTS.md
+AGENTS.md

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -44,11 +44,14 @@ Welcome to the lobster tank! 🦞
 - **Gustavo Madeira Santana** - Multi-agents, CLI, web UI
   - GitHub: [@gumadeiras](https://github.com/gumadeiras) · X: [@gumadeiras](https://x.com/gumadeiras)
 
+- **Onur Solmaz** - Agents, dev workflows, ACP integrations, MS Teams
+  - GitHub: [@onutc](https://github.com/onutc), [@osolmaz](https://github.com/osolmaz) · X: [@onusoz](https://x.com/onusoz)
+
 ## How to Contribute
 
 1. **Bugs & small fixes** → Open a PR!
 2. **New features / architecture** → Start a [GitHub Discussion](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/discussions) or ask in Discord first
-3. **Questions** → Discord #setup-help
+3. **Questions** → Discord [#help](https://discord.com/channels/1456350064065904867/1459642797895319552) / [#users-helping-users](https://discord.com/channels/1456350064065904867/1459007081603403828)
 
 ## Before You PR
 

Dockerfile

@@ -34,7 +34,10 @@ ARG OPENCLAW_INSTALL_BROWSER=""
 RUN if [ -n "$OPENCLAW_INSTALL_BROWSER" ]; then \
       apt-get update && \
       DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends xvfb && \
+      mkdir -p /home/node/.cache/ms-playwright && \
+      PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH=/home/node/.cache/ms-playwright \
       node /app/node_modules/playwright-core/cli.js install --with-deps chromium && \
+      chown -R node:node /home/node/.cache/ms-playwright && \
       apt-get clean && \
       rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* /var/cache/apt/archives/*; \
     fi

README.md

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ The wizard guides you step by step through setting up the gateway, workspace, ch
 Works with npm, pnpm, or bun.
 New install? Start here: [Getting started](https://docs.openclaw.ai/start/getting-started)
 
+## Sponsors
+
+| OpenAI                                                            | Blacksmith                                                                   |
+| ----------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [![OpenAI](docs/assets/sponsors/openai.svg)](https://openai.com/) | [![Blacksmith](docs/assets/sponsors/blacksmith.svg)](https://blacksmith.sh/) |
+
 **Subscriptions (OAuth):**
 
 - **[Anthropic](https://www.anthropic.com/)** (Claude Pro/Max)

SECURITY.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Report vulnerabilities directly to the repository where the issue lives:
 - **ClawHub** — [openclaw/clawhub](https://github.com/openclaw/clawhub)
 - **Trust and threat model** — [openclaw/trust](https://github.com/openclaw/trust)
 
-For issues that don't fit a specific repo, or if you're unsure, email **security@openclaw.ai** and we'll route it.
+For issues that don't fit a specific repo, or if you're unsure, email **[security@openclaw.ai](mailto:security@openclaw.ai)** and we'll route it.
 
 For full reporting instructions see our [Trust page](https://trust.openclaw.ai).
 
@@ -30,6 +30,39 @@ For full reporting instructions see our [Trust page](https://trust.openclaw.ai).
 
 Reports without reproduction steps, demonstrated impact, and remediation advice will be deprioritized. Given the volume of AI-generated scanner findings, we must ensure we're receiving vetted reports from researchers who understand the issues.
 
+### Report Acceptance Gate (Triage Fast Path)
+
+For fastest triage, include all of the following:
+
+- Exact vulnerable path (`file`, function, and line range) on a current revision.
+- Tested version details (OpenClaw version and/or commit SHA).
+- Reproducible PoC against latest `main` or latest released version.
+- Demonstrated impact tied to OpenClaw's documented trust boundaries.
+- For exposed-secret reports: proof the credential is OpenClaw-owned (or grants access to OpenClaw-operated infrastructure/services).
+- Explicit statement that the report does not rely on adversarial operators sharing one gateway host/config.
+- Scope check explaining why the report is **not** covered by the Out of Scope section below.
+
+Reports that miss these requirements may be closed as `invalid` or `no-action`.
+
+### Common False-Positive Patterns
+
+These are frequently reported but are typically closed with no code change:
+
+- Prompt-injection-only chains without a boundary bypass (prompt injection is out of scope).
+- Operator-intended local features (for example TUI local `!` shell) presented as remote injection.
+- Reports that assume per-user multi-tenant authorization on a shared gateway host/config.
+- ReDoS/DoS claims that require trusted operator configuration input (for example catastrophic regex in `sessionFilter` or `logging.redactPatterns`) without a trust-boundary bypass.
+- Missing HSTS findings on default local/loopback deployments.
+- Slack webhook signature findings when HTTP mode already uses signing-secret verification.
+- Discord inbound webhook signature findings for paths not used by this repo's Discord integration.
+- Scanner-only claims against stale/nonexistent paths, or claims without a working repro.
+
+### Duplicate Report Handling
+
+- Search existing advisories before filing.
+- Include likely duplicate GHSA IDs in your report when applicable.
+- Maintainers may close lower-quality/later duplicates in favor of the earliest high-quality canonical report.
+
 ## Security & Trust
 
 **Jamieson O'Reilly** ([@theonejvo](https://twitter.com/theonejvo)) is Security & Trust at OpenClaw. Jamieson is the founder of [Dvuln](https://dvuln.com) and brings extensive experience in offensive security, penetration testing, and security program development.
@@ -43,11 +76,73 @@ The best way to help the project right now is by sending PRs.
 
 When patching a GHSA via `gh api`, include `X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28` (or newer). Without it, some fields (notably CVSS) may not persist even if the request returns 200.
 
+## Operator Trust Model (Important)
+
+OpenClaw does **not** model one gateway as a multi-tenant, adversarial user boundary.
+
+- Authenticated Gateway callers are treated as trusted operators for that gateway instance.
+- Session identifiers (`sessionKey`, session IDs, labels) are routing controls, not per-user authorization boundaries.
+- If one operator can view data from another operator on the same gateway, that is expected in this trust model.
+- OpenClaw can technically run multiple gateway instances on one machine, but recommended operations are clean separation by trust boundary.
+- Recommended mode: one user per machine/host (or VPS), one gateway for that user, and one or more agents inside that gateway.
+- If multiple users need OpenClaw, use one VPS (or host/OS user boundary) per user.
+- For advanced setups, multiple gateways on one machine are possible, but only with strict isolation and are not the recommended default.
+
 ## Out of Scope
 
 - Public Internet Exposure
 - Using OpenClaw in ways that the docs recommend not to
-- Prompt injection attacks
+- Deployments where mutually untrusted/adversarial operators share one gateway host and config (for example, reports expecting per-operator isolation for `sessions.list`, `sessions.preview`, `chat.history`, or similar control-plane reads)
+- Prompt-injection-only attacks (without a policy/auth/sandbox boundary bypass)
+- Reports that require write access to trusted local state (`~/.openclaw`, workspace files like `MEMORY.md` / `memory/*.md`)
+- Any report whose only claim is that an operator-enabled `dangerous*`/`dangerously*` config option weakens defaults (these are explicit break-glass tradeoffs by design)
+- Reports that depend on trusted operator-supplied configuration values to trigger availability impact (for example custom regex patterns). These may still be fixed as defense-in-depth hardening, but are not security-boundary bypasses.
+- Exposed secrets that are third-party/user-controlled credentials (not OpenClaw-owned and not granting access to OpenClaw-operated infrastructure/services) without demonstrated OpenClaw impact
+
+## Deployment Assumptions
+
+OpenClaw security guidance assumes:
+
+- The host where OpenClaw runs is within a trusted OS/admin boundary.
+- Anyone who can modify `~/.openclaw` state/config (including `openclaw.json`) is effectively a trusted operator.
+- A single Gateway shared by mutually untrusted people is **not a recommended setup**. Use separate gateways (or at minimum separate OS users/hosts) per trust boundary.
+- Authenticated Gateway callers are treated as trusted operators. Session identifiers (for example `sessionKey`) are routing controls, not per-user authorization boundaries.
+- Multiple gateway instances can run on one machine, but the recommended model is clean per-user isolation (prefer one host/VPS per user).
+
+## One-User Trust Model (Personal Assistant)
+
+OpenClaw's security model is "personal assistant" (one trusted operator, potentially many agents), not "shared multi-tenant bus."
+
+- If multiple people can message the same tool-enabled agent (for example a shared Slack workspace), they can all steer that agent within its granted permissions.
+- Session or memory scoping reduces context bleed, but does **not** create per-user host authorization boundaries.
+- For mixed-trust or adversarial users, isolate by OS user/host/gateway and use separate credentials per boundary.
+- A company-shared agent can be a valid setup when users are in the same trust boundary and the agent is strictly business-only.
+- For company-shared setups, use a dedicated machine/VM/container and dedicated accounts; avoid mixing personal data on that runtime.
+- If that host/browser profile is logged into personal accounts (for example Apple/Google/personal password manager), you have collapsed the boundary and increased personal-data exposure risk.
+
+## Agent and Model Assumptions
+
+- The model/agent is **not** a trusted principal. Assume prompt/content injection can manipulate behavior.
+- Security boundaries come from host/config trust, auth, tool policy, sandboxing, and exec approvals.
+- Prompt injection by itself is not a vulnerability report unless it crosses one of those boundaries.
+
+## Gateway and Node trust concept
+
+OpenClaw separates routing from execution, but both remain inside the same operator trust boundary:
+
+- **Gateway** is the control plane. If a caller passes Gateway auth, they are treated as a trusted operator for that Gateway.
+- **Node** is an execution extension of the Gateway. Pairing a node grants operator-level remote capability on that node.
+- **Exec approvals** (allowlist/ask UI) are operator guardrails to reduce accidental command execution, not a multi-tenant authorization boundary.
+- For untrusted-user isolation, split by trust boundary: separate gateways and separate OS users/hosts per boundary.
+
+## Workspace Memory Trust Boundary
+
+`MEMORY.md` and `memory/*.md` are plain workspace files and are treated as trusted local operator state.
+
+- If someone can edit workspace memory files, they already crossed the trusted operator boundary.
+- Memory search indexing/recall over those files is expected behavior, not a sandbox/security boundary.
+- Example report pattern considered out of scope: "attacker writes malicious content into `memory/*.md`, then `memory_search` returns it."
+- If you need isolation between mutually untrusted users, split by OS user or host and run separate gateways.
 
 ## Plugin Trust Boundary
 
@@ -76,6 +171,10 @@ OpenClaw's web interface (Gateway Control UI + HTTP endpoints) is intended for *
 - Recommended: keep the Gateway **loopback-only** (`127.0.0.1` / `::1`).
   - Config: `gateway.bind="loopback"` (default).
   - CLI: `openclaw gateway run --bind loopback`.
+- `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth` is intended for localhost-only break-glass use.
+  - OpenClaw keeps deployment flexibility by design and does not hard-forbid non-local setups.
+  - Non-local and other risky configurations are surfaced by `openclaw security audit` as dangerous findings.
+  - This operator-selected tradeoff is by design and not, by itself, a security vulnerability.
 - Canvas host note: network-visible canvas is **intentional** for trusted node scenarios (LAN/tailnet).
   - Expected setup: non-loopback bind + Gateway auth (token/password/trusted-proxy) + firewall/tailnet controls.
   - Expected routes: `/__openclaw__/canvas/`, `/__openclaw__/a2ui/`.

appcast.xml

@@ -209,105 +209,251 @@
             <enclosure url="https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/download/v2026.2.15/OpenClaw-2026.2.15.zip" length="22896513" type="application/octet-stream" sparkle:edSignature="MLGsd2NeHXFRH1Or0bFQnAjqfuuJDuhl1mvKFIqTQcRvwbeyvOyyLXrqSbmaOgJR3wBQBKLs6jYQ9dQ/3R8RCg=="/>
         </item>
         <item>
-            <title>2026.2.13</title>
-            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 04:30:23 +0100</pubDate>
+            <title>2026.2.22</title>
+            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 01:51:13 +0100</pubDate>
             <link>https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openclaw/openclaw/main/appcast.xml</link>
-            <sparkle:version>9846</sparkle:version>
-            <sparkle:shortVersionString>2026.2.13</sparkle:shortVersionString>
+            <sparkle:version>14126</sparkle:version>
+            <sparkle:shortVersionString>2026.2.22</sparkle:shortVersionString>
             <sparkle:minimumSystemVersion>15.0</sparkle:minimumSystemVersion>
-            <description><![CDATA[<h2>OpenClaw 2026.2.13</h2>
+            <description><![CDATA[<h2>OpenClaw 2026.2.22</h2>
 <h3>Changes</h3>
 <ul>
-<li>Discord: send voice messages with waveform previews from local audio files (including silent delivery). (#7253) Thanks @nyanjou.</li>
-<li>Discord: add configurable presence status/activity/type/url (custom status defaults to activity text). (#10855) Thanks @h0tp-ftw.</li>
-<li>Slack/Plugins: add thread-ownership outbound gating via <code>message_sending</code> hooks, including @-mention bypass tracking and Slack outbound hook wiring for cancel/modify behavior. (#15775) Thanks @DarlingtonDeveloper.</li>
-<li>Agents: add synthetic catalog support for <code>hf:zai-org/GLM-5</code>. (#15867) Thanks @battman21.</li>
-<li>Skills: remove duplicate <code>local-places</code> Google Places skill/proxy and keep <code>goplaces</code> as the single supported Google Places path.</li>
-<li>Agents: add pre-prompt context diagnostics (<code>messages</code>, <code>systemPromptChars</code>, <code>promptChars</code>, provider/model, session file) before embedded runner prompt calls to improve overflow debugging. (#8930) Thanks @Glucksberg.</li>
+<li>Provider/Mistral: add support for the Mistral provider, including memory embeddings and voice support. (#23845) Thanks @vincentkoc.</li>
+<li>Update/Core: add an optional built-in auto-updater for package installs (<code>update.auto.*</code>), default-off, with stable rollout delay+jitter and beta hourly cadence.</li>
+<li>CLI/Update: add <code>openclaw update --dry-run</code> to preview channel/tag/target/restart actions without mutating config, installing, syncing plugins, or restarting.</li>
+<li>Config/UI: add tag-aware settings filtering and broaden config labels/help copy so fields are easier to discover and understand in the dashboard config screen.</li>
+<li>Channels/Synology Chat: add a native Synology Chat channel plugin with webhook ingress, direct-message routing, outbound send/media support, per-account config, and DM policy controls. (#23012)</li>
+<li>iOS/Talk: prefetch TTS segments and suppress expected speech-cancellation errors for smoother talk playback. (#22833) Thanks @ngutman.</li>
+<li>Memory/FTS: add Spanish and Portuguese stop-word filtering for query expansion in FTS-only search mode, improving conversational recall for both languages. Thanks @vincentkoc.</li>
+<li>Memory/FTS: add Japanese-aware query expansion tokenization and stop-word filtering (including mixed-script terms like ASCII + katakana) for FTS-only search mode. Thanks @vincentkoc.</li>
+<li>Memory/FTS: add Korean stop-word filtering and particle-aware keyword extraction (including mixed Korean/English stems) for query expansion in FTS-only search mode. (#18899) Thanks @ruypang.</li>
+<li>Memory/FTS: add Arabic stop-word filtering for query expansion in FTS-only search mode to reduce conversational filler in Arabic memory searches. Thanks @vincentkoc.</li>
+<li>Discord/Allowlist: canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs and split resolution flow for clearer fail-closed behavior.</li>
+<li>Channels/Config: unify channel preview streaming config handling with a shared resolver and canonical migration path.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Auth: unify call/probe/status/auth credential-source precedence on shared resolver helpers, with table-driven parity coverage across gateway entrypoints.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Auth: refactor gateway credential resolution and websocket auth handshake paths to use shared typed auth contexts, including explicit <code>auth.deviceToken</code> support in connect frames and tests.</li>
+<li>Skills: remove bundled <code>food-order</code> skill from this repo; manage/install it from ClawHub instead.</li>
+<li>Docs/Subagents: make thread-bound session guidance channel-first instead of Discord-specific, and list thread-supporting channels explicitly. (#23589) Thanks @osolmaz.</li>
+</ul>
+<h3>Breaking</h3>
+<ul>
+<li><strong>BREAKING:</strong> tool-failure replies now hide raw error details by default. OpenClaw still sends a failure summary, but detailed error suffixes (for example provider/runtime messages and local path fragments) now require <code>/verbose on</code> or <code>/verbose full</code>.</li>
+<li><strong>BREAKING:</strong> CLI local onboarding now sets <code>session.dmScope</code> to <code>per-channel-peer</code> by default for new/implicit DM scope configuration. If you depend on shared DM continuity across senders, explicitly set <code>session.dmScope</code> to <code>main</code>. (#23468) Thanks @bmendonca3.</li>
+<li><strong>BREAKING:</strong> unify channel preview-streaming config to <code>channels.<channel>.streaming</code> with enum values <code>off | partial | block | progress</code>, and move Slack native stream toggle to <code>channels.slack.nativeStreaming</code>. Legacy keys (<code>streamMode</code>, Slack boolean <code>streaming</code>) are still read and migrated by <code>openclaw doctor --fix</code>, but canonical saved config/docs now use the unified names.</li>
+<li><strong>BREAKING:</strong> remove legacy Gateway device-auth signature <code>v1</code>. Device-auth clients must now sign <code>v2</code> payloads with the per-connection <code>connect.challenge</code> nonce and send <code>device.nonce</code>; nonce-less connects are rejected.</li>
 </ul>
 <h3>Fixes</h3>
 <ul>
-<li>Outbound: add a write-ahead delivery queue with crash-recovery retries to prevent lost outbound messages after gateway restarts. (#15636) Thanks @nabbilkhan, @thewilloftheshadow.</li>
-<li>Auto-reply/Threading: auto-inject implicit reply threading so <code>replyToMode</code> works without requiring model-emitted <code>[[reply_to_current]]</code>, while preserving <code>replyToMode: "off"</code> behavior for implicit Slack replies and keeping block-streaming chunk coalescing stable under <code>replyToMode: "first"</code>. (#14976) Thanks @Diaspar4u.</li>
-<li>Outbound/Threading: pass <code>replyTo</code> and <code>threadId</code> from <code>message send</code> tool actions through the core outbound send path to channel adapters, preserving thread/reply routing. (#14948) Thanks @mcaxtr.</li>
-<li>Auto-reply/Media: allow image-only inbound messages (no caption) to reach the agent instead of short-circuiting as empty text, and preserve thread context in queued/followup prompt bodies for media-only runs. (#11916) Thanks @arosstale.</li>
-<li>Discord: route autoThread replies to existing threads instead of the root channel. (#8302) Thanks @gavinbmoore, @thewilloftheshadow.</li>
-<li>Web UI: add <code>img</code> to DOMPurify allowed tags and <code>src</code>/<code>alt</code> to allowed attributes so markdown images render in webchat instead of being stripped. (#15437) Thanks @lailoo.</li>
-<li>Telegram/Matrix: treat MP3 and M4A (including <code>audio/mp4</code>) as voice-compatible for <code>asVoice</code> routing, and keep WAV/AAC falling back to regular audio sends. (#15438) Thanks @azade-c.</li>
-<li>WhatsApp: preserve outbound document filenames for web-session document sends instead of always sending <code>"file"</code>. (#15594) Thanks @TsekaLuk.</li>
-<li>Telegram: cap bot menu registration to Telegram's 100-command limit with an overflow warning while keeping typed hidden commands available. (#15844) Thanks @battman21.</li>
-<li>Telegram: scope skill commands to the resolved agent for default accounts so <code>setMyCommands</code> no longer triggers <code>BOT_COMMANDS_TOO_MUCH</code> when multiple agents are configured. (#15599)</li>
-<li>Discord: avoid misrouting numeric guild allowlist entries to <code>/channels/<guildId></code> by prefixing guild-only inputs with <code>guild:</code> during resolution. (#12326) Thanks @headswim.</li>
-<li>MS Teams: preserve parsed mention entities/text when appending OneDrive fallback file links, and accept broader real-world Teams mention ID formats (<code>29:...</code>, <code>8:orgid:...</code>) while still rejecting placeholder patterns. (#15436) Thanks @hyojin.</li>
-<li>Media: classify <code>text/*</code> MIME types as documents in media-kind routing so text attachments are no longer treated as unknown. (#12237) Thanks @arosstale.</li>
-<li>Inbound/Web UI: preserve literal <code>\n</code> sequences when normalizing inbound text so Windows paths like <code>C:\\Work\\nxxx\\README.md</code> are not corrupted. (#11547) Thanks @mcaxtr.</li>
-<li>TUI/Streaming: preserve richer streamed assistant text when final payload drops pre-tool-call text blocks, while keeping non-empty final payload authoritative for plain-text updates. (#15452) Thanks @TsekaLuk.</li>
-<li>Providers/MiniMax: switch implicit MiniMax API-key provider from <code>openai-completions</code> to <code>anthropic-messages</code> with the correct Anthropic-compatible base URL, fixing <code>invalid role: developer (2013)</code> errors on MiniMax M2.5. (#15275) Thanks @lailoo.</li>
-<li>Ollama/Agents: use resolved model/provider base URLs for native <code>/api/chat</code> streaming (including aliased providers), normalize <code>/v1</code> endpoints, and forward abort + <code>maxTokens</code> stream options for reliable cancellation and token caps. (#11853) Thanks @BrokenFinger98.</li>
-<li>OpenAI Codex/Spark: implement end-to-end <code>gpt-5.3-codex-spark</code> support across fallback/thinking/model resolution and <code>models list</code> forward-compat visibility. (#14990, #15174) Thanks @L-U-C-K-Y, @loiie45e.</li>
-<li>Agents/Codex: allow <code>gpt-5.3-codex-spark</code> in forward-compat fallback, live model filtering, and thinking presets, and fix model-picker recognition for spark. (#14990) Thanks @L-U-C-K-Y.</li>
-<li>Models/Codex: resolve configured <code>openai-codex/gpt-5.3-codex-spark</code> through forward-compat fallback during <code>models list</code>, so it is not incorrectly tagged as missing when runtime resolution succeeds. (#15174) Thanks @loiie45e.</li>
-<li>OpenAI Codex/Auth: bridge OpenClaw OAuth profiles into <code>pi</code> <code>auth.json</code> so model discovery and models-list registry resolution can use Codex OAuth credentials. (#15184) Thanks @loiie45e.</li>
-<li>Auth/OpenAI Codex: share OAuth login handling across onboarding and <code>models auth login --provider openai-codex</code>, keep onboarding alive when OAuth fails, and surface a direct OAuth help note instead of terminating the wizard. (#15406, follow-up to #14552) Thanks @zhiluo20.</li>
-<li>Onboarding/Providers: add vLLM as an onboarding provider with model discovery, auth profile wiring, and non-interactive auth-choice validation. (#12577) Thanks @gejifeng.</li>
-<li>Onboarding/Providers: preserve Hugging Face auth intent in auth-choice remapping (<code>tokenProvider=huggingface</code> with <code>authChoice=apiKey</code>) and skip env-override prompts when an explicit token is provided. (#13472) Thanks @Josephrp.</li>
-<li>Onboarding/CLI: restore terminal state without resuming paused <code>stdin</code>, so onboarding exits cleanly after choosing Web UI and the installer returns instead of appearing stuck.</li>
-<li>Signal/Install: auto-install <code>signal-cli</code> via Homebrew on non-x64 Linux architectures, avoiding x86_64 native binary <code>Exec format error</code> failures on arm64/arm hosts. (#15443) Thanks @jogvan-k.</li>
-<li>macOS Voice Wake: fix a crash in trigger trimming for CJK/Unicode transcripts by matching and slicing on original-string ranges instead of transformed-string indices. (#11052) Thanks @Flash-LHR.</li>
-<li>Mattermost (plugin): retry websocket monitor connections with exponential backoff and abort-aware teardown so transient connect failures no longer permanently stop monitoring. (#14962) Thanks @mcaxtr.</li>
-<li>Discord/Agents: apply channel/group <code>historyLimit</code> during embedded-runner history compaction to prevent long-running channel sessions from bypassing truncation and overflowing context windows. (#11224) Thanks @shadril238.</li>
-<li>Outbound targets: fail closed for WhatsApp/Twitch/Google Chat fallback paths so invalid or missing targets are dropped instead of rerouted, and align resolver hints with strict target requirements. (#13578) Thanks @mcaxtr.</li>
-<li>Gateway/Restart: clear stale command-queue and heartbeat wake runtime state after SIGUSR1 in-process restarts to prevent zombie gateway behavior where queued work stops draining. (#15195) Thanks @joeykrug.</li>
-<li>Heartbeat: prevent scheduler silent-death races during runner reloads, preserve retry cooldown backoff under wake bursts, and prioritize user/action wake causes over interval/retry reasons when coalescing. (#15108) Thanks @joeykrug.</li>
-<li>Heartbeat: allow explicit wake (<code>wake</code>) and hook wake (<code>hook:*</code>) reasons to run even when <code>HEARTBEAT.md</code> is effectively empty so queued system events are processed. (#14527) Thanks @arosstale.</li>
-<li>Auto-reply/Heartbeat: strip sentence-ending <code>HEARTBEAT_OK</code> tokens even when followed by up to 4 punctuation characters, while preserving surrounding sentence punctuation. (#15847) Thanks @Spacefish.</li>
-<li>Agents/Heartbeat: stop auto-creating <code>HEARTBEAT.md</code> during workspace bootstrap so missing files continue to run heartbeat as documented. (#11766) Thanks @shadril238.</li>
-<li>Sessions/Agents: pass <code>agentId</code> when resolving existing transcript paths in reply runs so non-default agents and heartbeat/chat handlers no longer fail with <code>Session file path must be within sessions directory</code>. (#15141) Thanks @Goldenmonstew.</li>
-<li>Sessions/Agents: pass <code>agentId</code> through status and usage transcript-resolution paths (auto-reply, gateway usage APIs, and session cost/log loaders) so non-default agents can resolve absolute session files without path-validation failures. (#15103) Thanks @jalehman.</li>
-<li>Sessions: archive previous transcript files on <code>/new</code> and <code>/reset</code> session resets (including gateway <code>sessions.reset</code>) so stale transcripts do not accumulate on disk. (#14869) Thanks @mcaxtr.</li>
-<li>Status/Sessions: stop clamping derived <code>totalTokens</code> to context-window size, keep prompt-token snapshots wired through session accounting, and surface context usage as unknown when fresh snapshot data is missing to avoid false 100% reports. (#15114) Thanks @echoVic.</li>
-<li>CLI/Completion: route plugin-load logs to stderr and write generated completion scripts directly to stdout to avoid <code>source <(openclaw completion ...)</code> corruption. (#15481) Thanks @arosstale.</li>
-<li>CLI: lazily load outbound provider dependencies and remove forced success-path exits so commands terminate naturally without killing intentional long-running foreground actions. (#12906) Thanks @DrCrinkle.</li>
-<li>Security/Gateway + ACP: block high-risk tools (<code>sessions_spawn</code>, <code>sessions_send</code>, <code>gateway</code>, <code>whatsapp_login</code>) from HTTP <code>/tools/invoke</code> by default with <code>gateway.tools.{allow,deny}</code> overrides, and harden ACP permission selection to fail closed when tool identity/options are ambiguous while supporting <code>allow_always</code>/<code>reject_always</code>. (#15390) Thanks @aether-ai-agent.</li>
-<li>Security/Gateway: breaking default-behavior change - canvas IP-based auth fallback now only accepts machine-scoped addresses (RFC1918, link-local, ULA IPv6, CGNAT); public-source IP matches now require bearer token auth. (#14661) Thanks @sumleo.</li>
-<li>Security/Link understanding: block loopback/internal host patterns and private/mapped IPv6 addresses in extracted URL handling to close SSRF bypasses in link CLI flows. (#15604) Thanks @AI-Reviewer-QS.</li>
-<li>Security/Browser: constrain <code>POST /trace/stop</code>, <code>POST /wait/download</code>, and <code>POST /download</code> output paths to OpenClaw temp roots and reject traversal/escape paths.</li>
-<li>Security/Canvas: serve A2UI assets via the shared safe-open path (<code>openFileWithinRoot</code>) to close traversal/TOCTOU gaps, with traversal and symlink regression coverage. (#10525) Thanks @abdelsfane.</li>
-<li>Security/WhatsApp: enforce <code>0o600</code> on <code>creds.json</code> and <code>creds.json.bak</code> on save/backup/restore paths to reduce credential file exposure. (#10529) Thanks @abdelsfane.</li>
-<li>Security/Gateway: sanitize and truncate untrusted WebSocket header values in pre-handshake close logs to reduce log-poisoning risk. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.</li>
-<li>Security/Audit: add misconfiguration checks for sandbox Docker config with sandbox mode off, ineffective <code>gateway.nodes.denyCommands</code> entries, global minimal tool-profile overrides by agent profiles, and permissive extension-plugin tool reachability.</li>
-<li>Security/Audit: distinguish external webhooks (<code>hooks.enabled</code>) from internal hooks (<code>hooks.internal.enabled</code>) in attack-surface summaries to avoid false exposure signals when only internal hooks are enabled. (#13474) Thanks @mcaxtr.</li>
-<li>Security/Onboarding: clarify multi-user DM isolation remediation with explicit <code>openclaw config set session.dmScope ...</code> commands in security audit, doctor security, and channel onboarding guidance. (#13129) Thanks @VintLin.</li>
-<li>Agents/Nodes: harden node exec approval decision handling in the <code>nodes</code> tool run path by failing closed on unexpected approval decisions, and add regression coverage for approval-required retry/deny/timeout flows. (#4726) Thanks @rmorse.</li>
-<li>Android/Nodes: harden <code>app.update</code> by requiring HTTPS and gateway-host URL matching plus SHA-256 verification, stream URL camera downloads to disk with size guards to avoid memory spikes, and stop signing release builds with debug keys. (#13541) Thanks @smartprogrammer93.</li>
-<li>Routing: enforce strict binding-scope matching across peer/guild/team/roles so peer-scoped Discord/Slack bindings no longer match unrelated guild/team contexts or fallback tiers. (#15274) Thanks @lailoo.</li>
-<li>Exec/Allowlist: allow multiline heredoc bodies (<code><<</code>, <code><<-</code>) while keeping multiline non-heredoc shell commands blocked, so exec approval parsing permits heredoc input safely without allowing general newline command chaining. (#13811) Thanks @mcaxtr.</li>
-<li>Config: preserve <code>${VAR}</code> env references when writing config files so <code>openclaw config set/apply/patch</code> does not persist secrets to disk. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.</li>
-<li>Config: remove a cross-request env-snapshot race in config writes by carrying read-time env context into write calls per request, preserving <code>${VAR}</code> refs safely under concurrent gateway config mutations. (#11560) Thanks @akoscz.</li>
-<li>Config: log overwrite audit entries (path, backup target, and hash transition) whenever an existing config file is replaced, improving traceability for unexpected config clobbers.</li>
-<li>Config: keep legacy audio transcription migration strict by rejecting non-string/unsafe command tokens while still migrating valid custom script executables. (#5042) Thanks @shayan919293.</li>
-<li>Config: accept <code>$schema</code> key in config file so JSON Schema editor tooling works without validation errors. (#14998)</li>
-<li>Gateway/Tools Invoke: sanitize <code>/tools/invoke</code> execution failures while preserving <code>400</code> for tool input errors and returning <code>500</code> for unexpected runtime failures, with regression coverage and docs updates. (#13185) Thanks @davidrudduck.</li>
-<li>Gateway/Hooks: preserve <code>408</code> for hook request-body timeout responses while keeping bounded auth-failure cache eviction behavior, with timeout-status regression coverage. (#15848) Thanks @AI-Reviewer-QS.</li>
-<li>Plugins/Hooks: fire <code>before_tool_call</code> hook exactly once per tool invocation in embedded runs by removing duplicate dispatch paths while preserving parameter mutation semantics. (#15635) Thanks @lailoo.</li>
-<li>Agents/Transcript policy: sanitize OpenAI/Codex tool-call ids during transcript policy normalization to prevent invalid tool-call identifiers from propagating into session history. (#15279) Thanks @divisonofficer.</li>
-<li>Agents/Image tool: cap image-analysis completion <code>maxTokens</code> by model capability (<code>min(4096, model.maxTokens)</code>) to avoid over-limit provider failures while still preventing truncation. (#11770) Thanks @detecti1.</li>
-<li>Agents/Compaction: centralize exec default resolution in the shared tool factory so per-agent <code>tools.exec</code> overrides (host/security/ask/node and related defaults) persist across compaction retries. (#15833) Thanks @napetrov.</li>
-<li>Gateway/Agents: stop injecting a phantom <code>main</code> agent into gateway agent listings when <code>agents.list</code> explicitly excludes it. (#11450) Thanks @arosstale.</li>
-<li>Process/Exec: avoid shell execution for <code>.exe</code> commands on Windows so env overrides work reliably in <code>runCommandWithTimeout</code>. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.</li>
-<li>Daemon/Windows: preserve literal backslashes in <code>gateway.cmd</code> command parsing so drive and UNC paths are not corrupted in runtime checks and doctor entrypoint comparisons. (#15642) Thanks @arosstale.</li>
-<li>Sandbox: pass configured <code>sandbox.docker.env</code> variables to sandbox containers at <code>docker create</code> time. (#15138) Thanks @stevebot-alive.</li>
-<li>Voice Call: route webhook runtime event handling through shared manager event logic so rejected inbound hangups are idempotent in production, with regression tests for duplicate reject events and provider-call-ID remapping parity. (#15892) Thanks @dcantu96.</li>
-<li>Cron: add regression coverage for announce-mode isolated jobs so runs that already report <code>delivered: true</code> do not enqueue duplicate main-session relays, including delivery configs where <code>mode</code> is omitted and defaults to announce. (#15737) Thanks @brandonwise.</li>
-<li>Cron: honor <code>deleteAfterRun</code> in isolated announce delivery by mapping it to subagent announce cleanup mode, so cron run sessions configured for deletion are removed after completion. (#15368) Thanks @arosstale.</li>
-<li>Web tools/web_fetch: prefer <code>text/markdown</code> responses for Cloudflare Markdown for Agents, add <code>cf-markdown</code> extraction for markdown bodies, and redact fetched URLs in <code>x-markdown-tokens</code> debug logs to avoid leaking raw paths/query params. (#15376) Thanks @Yaxuan42.</li>
-<li>Clawdock: avoid Zsh readonly variable collisions in helper scripts. (#15501) Thanks @nkelner.</li>
-<li>Memory: switch default local embedding model to the QAT <code>embeddinggemma-300m-qat-Q8_0</code> variant for better quality at the same footprint. (#15429) Thanks @azade-c.</li>
-<li>Docs/Mermaid: remove hardcoded Mermaid init theme blocks from four docs diagrams so dark mode inherits readable theme defaults. (#15157) Thanks @heytulsiprasad.</li>
+<li>Security/CLI: redact sensitive values in <code>openclaw config get</code> output before printing config paths, preventing credential leakage to terminal output/history. (#13683) Thanks @SleuthCo.</li>
+<li>Install/Discord Voice: make <code>@discordjs/opus</code> an optional dependency so <code>openclaw</code> install/update no longer hard-fails when native Opus builds fail, while keeping <code>opusscript</code> as the runtime fallback decoder for Discord voice flows. (#23737, #23733, #23703) Thanks @jeadland, @Sheetaa, and @Breakyman.</li>
+<li>Docker/Setup: precreate <code>$OPENCLAW_CONFIG_DIR/identity</code> during <code>docker-setup.sh</code> so CLI commands that need device identity (for example <code>devices list</code>) avoid <code>EACCES ... /home/node/.openclaw/identity</code> failures on restrictive bind mounts. (#23948) Thanks @ackson-beep.</li>
+<li>Exec/Background: stop applying the default exec timeout to background sessions (<code>background: true</code> or explicit <code>yieldMs</code>) when no explicit timeout is set, so long-running background jobs are no longer terminated at the default timeout boundary. (#23303)</li>
+<li>Slack/Threading: sessions: keep parent-session forking and thread-history context active beyond first turn by removing first-turn-only gates in session init, thread-history fetch, and reply prompt context injection. (#23843, #23090) Thanks @vincentkoc and @Taskle.</li>
+<li>Slack/Threading: respect <code>replyToMode</code> when Slack auto-populates top-level <code>thread_ts</code>, and ignore inline <code>replyToId</code> directive tags when <code>replyToMode</code> is <code>off</code> so thread forcing stays disabled unless explicitly configured. (#23839, #23320, #23513) Thanks @vincentkoc and @dorukardahan.</li>
+<li>Slack/Extension: forward <code>message read</code> <code>threadId</code> to <code>readMessages</code> and use delivery-context <code>threadId</code> as outbound <code>thread_ts</code> fallback so extension replies/reads stay in the correct Slack thread. (#22216, #22485, #23836) Thanks @vincentkoc, @lan17 and @dorukardahan.</li>
+<li>Slack/Upload: resolve bare user IDs (U-prefix) to DM channel IDs via <code>conversations.open</code> before calling <code>files.uploadV2</code>, which rejects non-channel IDs. <code>chat.postMessage</code> tolerates user IDs directly, but <code>files.uploadV2</code> → <code>completeUploadExternal</code> validates <code>channel_id</code> against <code>^[CGDZ][A-Z0-9]{8,}$</code>, causing <code>invalid_arguments</code> when agents reply with media to DM conversations.</li>
+<li>Webchat/Chat: apply assistant <code>final</code> payload messages directly to chat state so sent turns render without waiting for a full history refresh cycle. (#14928) Thanks @BradGroux.</li>
+<li>Webchat/Chat: for out-of-band final events (for example tool-call side runs), append provided final assistant payloads directly instead of forcing a transient history reset. (#11139) Thanks @AkshayNavle.</li>
+<li>Webchat/Performance: reload <code>chat.history</code> after final events only when the final payload lacks a renderable assistant message, avoiding expensive full-history refreshes on normal turns. (#20588) Thanks @amzzzzzzz.</li>
+<li>Webchat/Sessions: preserve external session routing metadata when internal <code>chat.send</code> turns run under <code>webchat</code>, so explicit channel-keyed sessions (for example Telegram) no longer get rewritten to <code>webchat</code> and misroute follow-up delivery. (#23258) Thanks @binary64.</li>
+<li>Webchat/Sessions: preserve existing session <code>label</code> across <code>/new</code> and <code>/reset</code> rollovers so reset sessions remain discoverable in session history lists. (#23755) Thanks @ThunderStormer.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Chat UI: strip inline reply/audio directive tags from non-streaming final webchat broadcasts (including <code>chat.inject</code>) while preserving empty-string message content when tags are the entire reply. (#23298) Thanks @SidQin-cyber.</li>
+<li>Chat/UI: strip inline reply/audio directive tags (<code>[[reply_to_current]]</code>, <code>[[reply_to:<id>]]</code>, <code>[[audio_as_voice]]</code>) from displayed chat history, live chat event output, and session preview snippets so control tags no longer leak into user-visible surfaces.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Media: send a user-facing Telegram reply when media download fails (non-size errors) instead of silently dropping the message.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Webhook: keep webhook monitors alive until gateway abort signals fire, preventing false channel exits and immediate webhook auto-restart loops.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Polling: retry recoverable setup-time network failures in monitor startup and await runner teardown before retry to avoid overlapping polling sessions.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Polling: clear Telegram webhooks (<code>deleteWebhook</code>) before starting long-poll <code>getUpdates</code>, including retry handling for transient cleanup failures.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Webhook: add <code>channels.telegram.webhookPort</code> config support and pass it through plugin startup wiring to the monitor listener.</li>
+<li>Browser/Extension Relay: refactor the MV3 worker to preserve debugger attachments across relay drops, auto-reconnect with bounded backoff+jitter, persist and rehydrate attached tab state via <code>chrome.storage.session</code>, recover from <code>target_closed</code> navigation detaches, guard stale socket handlers, enforce per-tab operation locks and per-request timeouts, and add lifecycle keepalive/badge refresh hooks (<code>alarms</code>, <code>webNavigation</code>). (#15099, #6175, #8468, #9807)</li>
+<li>Browser/Relay: treat extension websocket as connected only when <code>OPEN</code>, allow reconnect when a stale <code>CLOSING/CLOSED</code> extension socket lingers, and guard stale socket message/close handlers so late events cannot clear active relay state; includes regression coverage for live-duplicate <code>409</code> rejection and immediate reconnect-after-close races. (#15099, #18698, #20688)</li>
+<li>Browser/Remote CDP: extend stale-target recovery so <code>ensureTabAvailable()</code> now reuses the sole available tab for remote CDP profiles (same behavior as extension profiles) while preserving strict <code>tab not found</code> errors when multiple tabs exist; includes remote-profile regression tests. (#15989)</li>
+<li>Gateway/Pairing: treat <code>operator.admin</code> as satisfying other <code>operator.*</code> scope checks during device-auth verification so local CLI/TUI sessions stop entering pairing-required loops for pairing/approval-scoped commands. (#22062, #22193, #21191) Thanks @Botaccess, @jhartshorn, and @ctbritt.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Pairing: auto-approve loopback <code>scope-upgrade</code> pairing requests (including device-token reconnects) so local clients do not disconnect on pairing-required scope elevation. (#23708) Thanks @widingmarcus-cyber.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Scopes: include <code>operator.read</code> and <code>operator.write</code> in default operator connect scope bundles across CLI, Control UI, and macOS clients so write-scoped announce/sub-agent follow-up calls no longer hit <code>pairing required</code> disconnects on loopback gateways. (#22582) thanks @YuzuruS.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Pairing: treat operator.admin pairing tokens as satisfying operator.write requests so legacy devices stop looping through scope-upgrade prompts introduced in 2026.2.19. (#23125, #23006) Thanks @vignesh07.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Restart: fix restart-loop edge cases by keeping <code>openclaw.mjs -> dist/entry.js</code> bootstrap detection explicit, reacquiring the gateway lock for in-process restart fallback paths, and tightening restart-loop regression coverage. (#23416) Thanks @jeffwnli.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Lock: use optional gateway-port reachability as a primary stale-lock liveness signal (and wire gateway run-loop lock acquisition to the resolved port), reducing false "already running" lockouts after unclean exits. (#23760) Thanks @Operative-001.</li>
+<li>Delivery/Queue: quarantine queue entries immediately on known permanent delivery errors (for example invalid recipients or missing conversation references) by moving them to <code>failed/</code> instead of retrying on every restart. (#23794) Thanks @aldoeliacim.</li>
+<li>Cron/Status: split execution outcome (<code>lastRunStatus</code>) from delivery outcome (<code>lastDeliveryStatus</code>) in persisted cron state, finished events, and run history so failed/unknown announcement delivery is visible without conflating it with run errors.</li>
+<li>Cron/Delivery: route text-only announce jobs with explicit thread/topic targets through direct outbound delivery so forum/thread destinations do not get dropped by intermediary announce turns. (#23841) Thanks @AndrewArto.</li>
+<li>Cron: honor <code>cron.maxConcurrentRuns</code> in the timer loop so due jobs can execute up to the configured parallelism instead of always running serially. (#11595) Thanks @Takhoffman.</li>
+<li>Cron/Run: enforce the same per-job timeout guard for manual <code>cron.run</code> executions as timer-driven runs, including abort propagation for isolated agent jobs, so forced runs cannot wedge indefinitely. (#23704) Thanks @tkuehnl.</li>
+<li>Cron/Run: persist the manual-run <code>runningAtMs</code> marker before releasing the cron lock so overlapping timer ticks cannot start the same job concurrently.</li>
+<li>Cron/Startup: enforce per-job timeout guards for startup catch-up replay runs so missed isolated jobs cannot hang indefinitely during gateway boot recovery.</li>
+<li>Cron/Main session: honor abort/timeout signals while retrying <code>wakeMode=now</code> heartbeat contention loops so main-target cron runs stop promptly instead of waiting through the full busy-retry window.</li>
+<li>Cron/Schedule: for <code>every</code> jobs, prefer <code>lastRunAtMs + everyMs</code> when still in the future after restarts, then fall back to anchor scheduling for catch-up windows, so NEXT timing matches the last successful cadence. (#22895) Thanks @SidQin-cyber.</li>
+<li>Cron/Service: execute manual <code>cron.run</code> jobs outside the cron lock (while still persisting started/finished state atomically) so <code>cron.list</code> and <code>cron.status</code> remain responsive during long forced runs. (#23628) Thanks @dsgraves.</li>
+<li>Cron/Timer: keep a watchdog recheck timer armed while <code>onTimer</code> is actively executing so the scheduler continues polling even if a due-run tick stalls for an extended period. (#23628) Thanks @dsgraves.</li>
+<li>Cron/Run log: clean up settled per-path run-log write queue entries so long-running cron uptime does not retain stale promise bookkeeping in memory.</li>
+<li>Cron/Isolation: force fresh session IDs for isolated cron runs so <code>sessionTarget="isolated"</code> executions never reuse prior run context. (#23470) Thanks @echoVic.</li>
+<li>Plugins/Install: strip <code>workspace:*</code> devDependency entries from copied plugin manifests before <code>npm install --omit=dev</code>, preventing <code>EUNSUPPORTEDPROTOCOL</code> install failures for npm-published channel plugins (including Feishu and MS Teams).</li>
+<li>Feishu/Plugins: restore bundled Feishu SDK availability for global installs and strip <code>openclaw: workspace:*</code> from plugin <code>devDependencies</code> during plugin-version sync so npm-installed Feishu plugins do not fail dependency install. (#23611, #23645, #23603)</li>
+<li>Config/Channels: auto-enable built-in channels by writing <code>channels.<id>.enabled=true</code> (not <code>plugins.entries.<id></code>), and stop adding built-ins to <code>plugins.allow</code>, preventing <code>plugins.entries.telegram: plugin not found</code> validation failures.</li>
+<li>Config/Channels: when <code>plugins.allow</code> is active, auto-enable/enable flows now also allowlist configured built-in channels so <code>channels.<id>.enabled=true</code> cannot remain blocked by restrictive plugin allowlists.</li>
+<li>Plugins/Discovery: ignore scanned extension backup/disabled directory patterns (for example <code>.backup-*</code>, <code>.bak</code>, <code>.disabled*</code>) and move updater backup directories under <code>.openclaw-install-backups</code>, preventing duplicate plugin-id collisions from archived copies.</li>
+<li>Plugins/CLI: make <code>openclaw plugins enable</code> and plugin install/link flows update allowlists via shared plugin-enable policy so enabled plugins are not left disabled by allowlist mismatch. (#23190) Thanks @downwind7clawd-ctrl.</li>
+<li>Security/Voice Call: harden media stream WebSocket handling against pre-auth idle-connection DoS by adding strict pre-start timeouts, pending/per-IP connection limits, and total connection caps for streaming endpoints. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Sessions: redact sensitive token patterns from <code>sessions_history</code> tool output and surface <code>contentRedacted</code> metadata when masking occurs. (#16928) Thanks @aether-ai-agent.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec: stop trusting <code>PATH</code>-derived directories for safe-bin allowlist checks, add explicit <code>tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs</code>, and pin safe-bin shell execution to resolved absolute executable paths to prevent binary-shadowing approval bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Elevated: match <code>tools.elevated.allowFrom</code> against sender identities only (not recipient <code>ctx.To</code>), closing a recipient-token bypass for <code>/elevated</code> authorization. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Feishu: enforce ID-only allowlist matching for DM/group sender authorization, normalize Feishu ID prefixes during checks, and ignore mutable display names so display-name collisions cannot satisfy allowlist entries. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Group policy: harden <code>channels.*.groups.*.toolsBySender</code> matching by requiring explicit sender-key types (<code>id:</code>, <code>e164:</code>, <code>username:</code>, <code>name:</code>), preventing cross-identifier collisions across mutable/display-name fields while keeping legacy untyped keys on a deprecated ID-only path. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.</li>
+<li>Channels/Group policy: fail closed when <code>groupPolicy: "allowlist"</code> is set without explicit <code>groups</code>, honor account-level <code>groupPolicy</code> overrides, and enforce <code>groupPolicy: "disabled"</code> as a hard group block. (#22215) Thanks @etereo.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Discord extensions: propagate trusted <code>mediaLocalRoots</code> through extension outbound <code>sendMedia</code> options so extension direct-send media paths honor agent-scoped local-media allowlists. (#20029, #21903, #23227)</li>
+<li>Agents/Exec: honor explicit agent context when resolving <code>tools.exec</code> defaults for runs with opaque/non-agent session keys, so per-agent <code>host/security/ask</code> policies are applied consistently. (#11832)</li>
+<li>Doctor/Security: add an explicit warning that <code>approvals.exec.enabled=false</code> disables forwarding only, while enforcement remains driven by host-local <code>exec-approvals.json</code> policy. (#15047)</li>
+<li>Sandbox/Docker: default sandbox container user to the workspace owner <code>uid:gid</code> when <code>agents.*.sandbox.docker.user</code> is unset, fixing non-root gateway file-tool permissions under capability-dropped containers. (#20979)</li>
+<li>Plugins/Media sandbox: propagate trusted <code>mediaLocalRoots</code> through plugin action dispatch (including Discord/Telegram action adapters) so plugin send paths enforce the same agent-scoped local-media sandbox roots as core outbound sends. (#20258, #22718)</li>
+<li>Agents/Workspace guard: map sandbox container-workdir file-tool paths (for example <code>/workspace/...</code> and <code>file:///workspace/...</code>) to host workspace roots before workspace-only validation, preventing false <code>Path escapes sandbox root</code> rejections for sandbox file tools. (#9560)</li>
+<li>Gateway/Exec approvals: expire approval requests immediately when no approval-capable gateway clients are connected and no forwarding targets are available, avoiding delayed approvals after restarts/offline approver windows. (#22144)</li>
+<li>Security/Exec approvals: when approving wrapper commands with allow-always in allowlist mode, persist inner executable paths for known dispatch wrappers (<code>env</code>, <code>nice</code>, <code>nohup</code>, <code>stdbuf</code>, <code>timeout</code>) and fail closed (no persisted entry) when wrapper unwrapping is not safe, preventing wrapper-path approval bypasses. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Node/macOS exec host: default headless macOS node <code>system.run</code> to local execution and only route through the companion app when <code>OPENCLAW_NODE_EXEC_HOST=app</code> is explicitly set, avoiding companion-app filesystem namespace mismatches during exec. (#23547)</li>
+<li>Sandbox/Media: map container workspace paths (<code>/workspace/...</code> and <code>file:///workspace/...</code>) back to the host sandbox root for outbound media validation, preventing false deny errors for sandbox-generated local media. (#23083) Thanks @echo931.</li>
+<li>Sandbox/Docker: apply custom bind mounts after workspace mounts and prioritize bind-source resolution on overlapping paths, so explicit workspace binds are no longer ignored. (#22669) Thanks @tasaankaeris.</li>
+<li>Exec approvals/Forwarding: restore Discord text forwarding when component approvals are not configured, and carry request snapshots through resolve events so resolved notices still forward after cache misses/restarts. (#22988) Thanks @bubmiller.</li>
+<li>Control UI/WebSocket: stop and clear the browser gateway client on UI teardown so remounts cannot leave orphan websocket clients that create duplicate active connections. (#23422) Thanks @floatinggball-design.</li>
+<li>Control UI/WebSocket: send a stable per-tab <code>instanceId</code> in websocket connect frames so reconnect cycles keep a consistent client identity for diagnostics and presence tracking. (#23616) Thanks @zq58855371-ui.</li>
+<li>Config/Memory: allow <code>"mistral"</code> in <code>agents.defaults.memorySearch.provider</code> and <code>agents.defaults.memorySearch.fallback</code> schema validation. (#14934) Thanks @ThomsenDrake.</li>
+<li>Feishu/Commands: in group chats, command authorization now falls back to top-level <code>channels.feishu.allowFrom</code> when per-group <code>allowFrom</code> is not set, so <code>/command</code> no longer gets blocked by an unintended empty allowlist. (#23756)</li>
+<li>Dev tooling: prevent <code>CLAUDE.md</code> symlink target regressions by excluding CLAUDE symlink sentinels from <code>oxfmt</code> and marking them <code>-text</code> in <code>.gitattributes</code>, so formatter/EOL normalization cannot reintroduce trailing-newline targets. Thanks @vincentkoc.</li>
+<li>Agents/Compaction: restore embedded compaction safeguard/context-pruning extension loading in production by wiring bundled extension factories into the resource loader instead of runtime file-path resolution. (#22349) Thanks @Glucksberg.</li>
+<li>Feishu/Media: for inbound video messages that include both <code>file_key</code> (video) and <code>image_key</code> (thumbnail), prefer <code>file_key</code> when downloading media so video attachments are saved instead of silently failing on thumbnail keys. (#23633)</li>
+<li>Hooks/Loader: avoid redundant hook-module recompilation on gateway restart by skipping cache-busting for bundled hooks and using stable file metadata keys (<code>mtime+size</code>) for mutable workspace/managed/plugin hook imports. (#16953) Thanks @mudrii.</li>
+<li>Hooks/Cron: suppress duplicate main-session events for delivered hook turns and mark <code>SILENT_REPLY_TOKEN</code> (<code>NO_REPLY</code>) early exits as delivered to prevent hook context pollution. (#20678) Thanks @JonathanWorks.</li>
+<li>Providers/OpenRouter: inject <code>cache_control</code> on system prompts for OpenRouter Anthropic models to improve prompt-cache reuse. (#17473) Thanks @rrenamed.</li>
+<li>Installer/Smoke tests: remove legacy <code>OPENCLAW_USE_GUM</code> overrides from docker install-smoke runs so tests exercise installer auto TTY detection behavior directly.</li>
+<li>Providers/OpenRouter: allow pass-through OpenRouter and Opencode model IDs in live model filtering so custom routed model IDs are treated as modern refs. (#14312) Thanks @Joly0.</li>
+<li>Providers/OpenRouter: default reasoning to enabled when the selected model advertises <code>reasoning: true</code> and no session/directive override is set. (#22513) Thanks @zwffff.</li>
+<li>Providers/OpenRouter: map <code>/think</code> levels to <code>reasoning.effort</code> in embedded runs while preserving explicit <code>reasoning.max_tokens</code> payloads. (#17236) Thanks @robbyczgw-cla.</li>
+<li>Providers/OpenRouter: preserve stored session provider when model IDs are vendor-prefixed (for example, <code>anthropic/...</code>) so follow-up turns do not incorrectly route to direct provider APIs. (#22753) Thanks @dndodson.</li>
+<li>Providers/OpenRouter: preserve the required <code>openrouter/</code> prefix for OpenRouter-native model IDs during model-ref normalization. (#12942) Thanks @omair445.</li>
+<li>Providers/OpenRouter: pass through provider routing parameters from model params.provider to OpenRouter request payloads for provider selection controls. (#17148) Thanks @carrotRakko.</li>
+<li>Providers/OpenRouter: preserve model allowlist entries containing OpenRouter preset paths (for example <code>openrouter/@preset/...</code>) by treating <code>/model ...@profile</code> auth-profile parsing as a suffix-only override. (#14120) Thanks @NotMainstream.</li>
+<li>Cron/Auth: propagate auth-profile resolution to isolated cron sessions so provider API keys are resolved the same way as main sessions, fixing 401 errors when using providers configured via auth-profiles. (#20689) Thanks @lailoo.</li>
+<li>Cron/Follow-up: pass resolved <code>agentDir</code> through isolated cron and queued follow-up embedded runs so auth/profile lookups stay scoped to the correct agent directory. (#22845) Thanks @seilk.</li>
+<li>Agents/Media: route tool-result <code>MEDIA:</code> extraction through shared parser validation so malformed prose like <code>MEDIA:-prefixed ...</code> is no longer treated as a local file path (prevents Telegram ENOENT tool-error overrides). (#18780) Thanks @HOYALIM.</li>
+<li>Logging: cap single log-file size with <code>logging.maxFileBytes</code> (default 500 MB) and suppress additional writes after cap hit to prevent disk exhaustion from repeated error storms.</li>
+<li>Memory/Remote HTTP: centralize remote memory HTTP calls behind a shared guarded helper (<code>withRemoteHttpResponse</code>) so embeddings and batch flows use one request/release path.</li>
+<li>Memory/Embeddings: apply configured remote-base host pinning (<code>allowedHostnames</code>) across OpenAI/Voyage/Gemini embedding requests to keep private/self-hosted endpoints working without cross-host drift. (#18198) Thanks @ianpcook.</li>
+<li>Memory/Batch: route OpenAI/Voyage/Gemini batch upload/create/status/download requests through the same guarded HTTP path for consistent SSRF policy enforcement.</li>
+<li>Memory/Index: detect memory source-set changes (for example enabling <code>sessions</code> after an existing memory-only index) and trigger a full reindex so existing session transcripts are indexed without requiring <code>--force</code>. (#17576) Thanks @TarsAI-Agent.</li>
+<li>Memory/Embeddings: enforce a per-input 8k safety cap before embedding batching and apply a conservative 2k fallback limit for local providers without declared input limits, preventing oversized session/memory chunks from triggering provider context-size failures during sync/indexing. (#6016) Thanks @batumilove.</li>
+<li>Memory/QMD: on Windows, resolve bare <code>qmd</code>/<code>mcporter</code> command names to npm shim executables (<code>.cmd</code>) before spawning, so qmd boot updates and mcporter-backed searches no longer fail with <code>spawn ... ENOENT</code> on default npm installs. (#23899) Thanks @arcbuilder-ai.</li>
+<li>Memory/QMD: parse plain-text <code>qmd collection list --json</code> output when older qmd builds ignore JSON mode, and retry memory searches once after re-ensuring managed collections when qmd returns <code>Collection not found ...</code>. (#23613) Thanks @leozhucn.</li>
+<li>Signal/RPC: guard malformed Signal RPC JSON responses with a clear status-scoped error and add regression coverage for invalid JSON responses. (#22995) Thanks @adhitShet.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Subagents: guard gateway and subagent session-key/message trim paths against undefined inputs to prevent early <code>Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'trim')</code> crashes during subagent spawn and wait flows.</li>
+<li>Agents/Workspace: guard <code>resolveUserPath</code> against undefined/null input to prevent <code>Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'trim')</code> crashes when workspace paths are missing in embedded runner flows.</li>
+<li>Auth/Profiles: keep active <code>cooldownUntil</code>/<code>disabledUntil</code> windows immutable across retries so mid-window failures cannot extend recovery indefinitely; only recompute a backoff window after the previous deadline has expired. This resolves cron/inbound retry loops that could trap gateways until manual <code>usageStats</code> cleanup. (#23516, #23536) Thanks @arosstale.</li>
+<li>Channels/Security: fail closed on missing provider group policy config by defaulting runtime group policy to <code>allowlist</code> (instead of inheriting <code>channels.defaults.groupPolicy</code>) when <code>channels.<provider></code> is absent across message channels, and align runtime + security warnings/docs to the same fallback behavior (Slack, Discord, iMessage, Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal, LINE, Matrix, Mattermost, Google Chat, IRC, Nextcloud Talk, Feishu, and Zalo user flows; plus Discord message/native-command paths). (#23367) Thanks @bmendonca3.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Onboarding: harden remote gateway onboarding defaults and guidance by defaulting discovered direct URLs to <code>wss://</code>, rejecting insecure non-loopback <code>ws://</code> targets in onboarding validation, and expanding remote-security remediation messaging across gateway client/call/doctor flows. (#23476) Thanks @bmendonca3.</li>
+<li>CLI/Sessions: pass the configured sessions directory when resolving transcript paths in <code>agentCommand</code>, so custom <code>session.store</code> locations resume sessions reliably. Thanks @davidrudduck.</li>
+<li>Signal/Monitor: treat user-initiated abort shutdowns as clean exits when auto-started <code>signal-cli</code> is terminated, while still surfacing unexpected daemon exits as startup/runtime failures. (#23379) Thanks @frankekn.</li>
+<li>Channels/Dedupe: centralize plugin dedupe primitives in plugin SDK (memory + persistent), move Feishu inbound dedupe to a namespace-scoped persistent store, and reuse shared dedupe cache logic for Zalo webhook replay + Tlon processed-message tracking to reduce duplicate handling during reconnect/replay paths. (#23377) Thanks @SidQin-cyber.</li>
+<li>Channels/Delivery: remove hardcoded WhatsApp delivery fallbacks; require explicit/session channel context or auto-pick the sole configured channel when unambiguous. (#23357) Thanks @lbo728.</li>
+<li>ACP/Gateway: wait for gateway hello before opening ACP requests, and fail fast on pre-hello connect failures to avoid startup hangs and early <code>gateway not connected</code> request races. (#23390) Thanks @janckerchen.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Auth: preserve <code>OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD</code> env override precedence for remote gateway call credentials after shared resolver refactors, preventing stale configured remote passwords from overriding runtime secret rotation.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Auth: preserve shared-token <code>gateway token mismatch</code> auth errors when <code>auth.token</code> fallback device-token checks fail, and reserve <code>device token mismatch</code> guidance for explicit <code>auth.deviceToken</code> failures.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Tools: when agent tools pass an allowlisted <code>gatewayUrl</code> override, resolve local override tokens from env/config fallback but keep remote overrides strict to <code>gateway.remote.token</code>, preventing local token leakage to remote targets.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Client: keep cached device-auth tokens on <code>device token mismatch</code> closes when the client used explicit shared token/password credentials, avoiding accidental pairing-token churn during explicit-auth failures.</li>
+<li>Node host/Exec: keep strict Windows allowlist behavior for <code>cmd.exe /c</code> shell-wrapper runs, and return explicit approval guidance when blocked (<code>SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: allowlist miss</code>).</li>
+<li>Control UI: show pairing-required guidance (commands + mobile tokenized URL reminder) when the dashboard disconnects with <code>1008 pairing required</code>.</li>
+<li>Security/Audit: add <code>openclaw security audit</code> detection for open group policies that expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards (<code>security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs</code>).</li>
+<li>Security/Audit: make <code>gateway.real_ip_fallback_enabled</code> severity conditional for loopback trusted-proxy setups (warn for loopback-only <code>trustedProxies</code>, critical when non-loopback proxies are trusted). (#23428) Thanks @bmendonca3.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec env: block request-scoped <code>HOME</code> and <code>ZDOTDIR</code> overrides in host exec env sanitizers (Node + macOS), preventing shell startup-file execution before allowlist-evaluated command bodies. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec env: block <code>SHELLOPTS</code>/<code>PS4</code> in host exec env sanitizers and restrict shell-wrapper (<code>bash|sh|zsh ... -c/-lc</code>) request env overrides to a small explicit allowlist (<code>TERM</code>, <code>LANG</code>, <code>LC_*</code>, <code>COLORTERM</code>, <code>NO_COLOR</code>, <code>FORCE_COLOR</code>) on both node host and macOS companion paths, preventing xtrace prompt command-substitution allowlist bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>WhatsApp/Security: enforce <code>allowFrom</code> for direct-message outbound targets in all send modes (including <code>mode: "explicit"</code>), preventing sends to non-allowlisted numbers. (#20108) Thanks @zahlmann.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec approvals: fail closed on shell line continuations (<code>\\\n</code>/<code>\\\r\n</code>) and treat shell-wrapper execution as approval-required in allowlist mode, preventing <code>$\\</code> newline command-substitution bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Gateway: emit a startup security warning when insecure/dangerous config flags are enabled (including <code>gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true</code>) and point operators to <code>openclaw security audit</code>.</li>
+<li>Security/Hooks auth: normalize hook auth rate-limit client IP keys so IPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses share one throttle bucket, preventing dual-form auth-attempt budget bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec approvals: treat <code>env</code> and shell-dispatch wrappers as transparent during allowlist analysis on node-host and macOS companion paths so policy checks match the effective executable/inline shell payload instead of the wrapper binary, blocking wrapper-smuggled allowlist bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec approvals: require explicit safe-bin profiles for <code>tools.exec.safeBins</code> entries in allowlist mode (remove generic safe-bin profile fallback), and add <code>tools.exec.safeBinProfiles</code> for safe custom binaries so unprofiled interpreter-style entries cannot be treated as stdin-safe. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Channels: harden Slack external menu token handling by switching to CSPRNG tokens, validating token shape, requiring user identity for external option lookups, and avoiding fabricated timestamp <code>trigger_id</code> fallbacks; also switch Tlon Urbit channel IDs to CSPRNG UUIDs, centralize secure ID/token generation via shared infra helpers, and add a guardrail test to block new runtime <code>Date.now()+Math.random()</code> token/id patterns.</li>
+<li>Security/Hooks transforms: enforce symlink-safe containment for webhook transform module paths (including <code>hooks.transformsDir</code> and <code>hooks.mappings[].transform.module</code>) by resolving existing-path ancestors via realpath before import, while preserving in-root symlink support; add regression coverage for both escape and allow cases. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.</li>
+<li>Telegram/WSL2: disable <code>autoSelectFamily</code> by default on WSL2 and memoize WSL2 detection in Telegram network decision logic to avoid repeated sync <code>/proc/version</code> probes on fetch/send paths. (#21916) Thanks @MizukiMachine.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Network: default Node 22+ DNS result ordering to <code>ipv4first</code> for Telegram fetch paths and add <code>OPENCLAW_TELEGRAM_DNS_RESULT_ORDER</code>/<code>channels.telegram.network.dnsResultOrder</code> overrides to reduce IPv6-path fetch failures. (#5405) Thanks @Glucksberg.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Forward bursts: coalesce forwarded text+media updates through a dedicated forward lane debounce window that works with default inbound debounce config, while keeping forwarded control commands immediate. (#19476) thanks @napetrov.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Streaming: preserve archived draft preview mapping after flush and clean superseded reasoning preview bubbles so multi-message preview finals no longer cross-edit or orphan stale messages under send/rotation races. (#23202) Thanks @obviyus.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Replies: scope messaging-tool text/media dedupe to same-target sends only, so cross-target tool sends can no longer silently suppress Telegram final replies.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Replies: normalize <code>file://</code> and local-path media variants during messaging dedupe so equivalent media paths do not produce duplicate Telegram replies.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Replies: extract forwarded-origin context from unified reply targets (<code>reply_to_message</code> and <code>external_reply</code>) so forward+comment metadata is preserved across partial reply shapes. (#9720) thanks @mcaxtr.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Polling: persist a safe update-offset watermark bounded by pending updates so crash/restart cannot skip queued lower <code>update_id</code> updates after out-of-order completion. (#23284) thanks @frankekn.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Polling: force-restart stuck runner instances when recoverable unhandled network rejections escape the polling task path, so polling resumes instead of silently stalling. (#19721) Thanks @jg-noncelogic.</li>
+<li>Slack/Slash commands: preserve the Bolt app receiver when registering external select options handlers so monitor startup does not crash on runtimes that require bound <code>app.options</code> calls. (#23209) Thanks @0xgaia.</li>
+<li>Slack/Telegram slash sessions: await session metadata persistence before dispatch so first-turn native slash runs do not race session-origin metadata updates. (#23065) thanks @hydro13.</li>
+<li>Slack/Queue routing: preserve string <code>thread_ts</code> values through collect-mode queue drain and DM <code>deliveryContext</code> updates so threaded follow-ups do not leak to the main channel when Slack thread IDs are strings. (#11934) Thanks @sandieman2 and @vincentkoc.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Native commands: set <code>ctx.Provider="telegram"</code> for native slash-command context so elevated gate checks resolve provider correctly (fixes <code>provider (ctx.Provider)</code> failures in <code>/elevated</code> flows). (#23748) Thanks @serhii12.</li>
+<li>Agents/Ollama: preserve unsafe integer tool-call arguments as exact strings during NDJSON parsing, preventing large numeric IDs from being rounded before tool execution. (#23170) Thanks @BestJoester.</li>
+<li>Cron/Gateway: keep <code>cron.list</code> and <code>cron.status</code> responsive during startup catch-up by avoiding a long-held cron lock while missed jobs execute. (#23106) Thanks @jayleekr.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Config reload: compare array-valued config paths structurally during diffing so unchanged <code>memory.qmd.paths</code> and <code>memory.qmd.scope.rules</code> no longer trigger false restart-required reloads. (#23185) Thanks @rex05ai.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Config reload: retry short-lived missing config snapshots during reload before skipping, preventing atomic-write unlink windows from triggering restart loops. (#23343) Thanks @lbo728.</li>
+<li>Cron/Scheduling: validate runtime cron expressions before schedule/stagger evaluation so malformed persisted jobs report a clear <code>invalid cron schedule: expr is required</code> error instead of crashing with <code>undefined.trim</code> failures and auto-disable churn. (#23223) Thanks @asimons81.</li>
+<li>Memory/QMD: migrate legacy unscoped collection bindings (for example <code>memory-root</code>) to per-agent scoped names (for example <code>memory-root-main</code>) during startup when safe, so QMD-backed <code>memory_search</code> no longer fails with <code>Collection not found</code> after upgrades. (#23228, #20727) Thanks @JLDynamics and @AaronFaby.</li>
+<li>Memory/QMD: normalize Han-script BM25 search queries before invoking <code>qmd search</code> so mixed CJK+Latin prompts no longer return empty results due to tokenizer mismatch. (#23426) Thanks @LunaLee0130.</li>
+<li>TUI/Input: enable multiline-paste burst coalescing on macOS Terminal.app and iTerm so pasted blocks no longer submit line-by-line as separate messages. (#18809) Thanks @fwends.</li>
+<li>TUI/RTL: isolate right-to-left script lines (Arabic/Hebrew ranges) with Unicode bidi isolation marks in TUI text sanitization so RTL assistant output no longer renders in reversed visual order in terminal chat panes. (#21936) Thanks @Asm3r96.</li>
+<li>TUI/Status: request immediate renders after setting <code>sending</code>/<code>waiting</code> activity states so in-flight runs always show visible progress indicators instead of appearing idle until completion. (#21549) Thanks @13Guinness.</li>
+<li>TUI/Input: arm Ctrl+C exit timing when clearing non-empty composer text and add a SIGINT fallback path so double Ctrl+C exits remain responsive during active runs instead of requiring an extra press or appearing stuck. (#23407) Thanks @tinybluedev.</li>
+<li>Agents/Fallbacks: treat JSON payloads with <code>type: "api_error"</code> + <code>"Internal server error"</code> as transient failover errors so Anthropic 500-style failures trigger model fallback. (#23193) Thanks @jarvis-lane.</li>
+<li>Agents/Google: sanitize non-base64 <code>thought_signature</code>/<code>thoughtSignature</code> values from assistant replay transcripts for native Google Gemini requests while preserving valid signatures and tool-call order. (#23457) Thanks @echoVic.</li>
+<li>Agents/Transcripts: validate assistant tool-call names (syntax/length + registered tool allowlist) before transcript persistence and during replay sanitization so malformed failover tool names no longer poison sessions with repeated provider HTTP 400 errors. (#23324) Thanks @johnsantry.</li>
+<li>Agents/Mistral: sanitize tool-call IDs in the embedded agent loop and generate strict provider-safe pending tool-call IDs, preventing Mistral strict9 <code>HTTP 400</code> failures on tool continuations. (#23698) Thanks @echoVic.</li>
+<li>Agents/Compaction: strip stale assistant usage snapshots from pre-compaction turns when replaying history after a compaction summary so context-token estimation no longer reuses pre-compaction totals and immediately re-triggers destructive follow-up compactions. (#19127) Thanks @tedwatson.</li>
+<li>Agents/Replies: emit a default completion acknowledgement (<code>✅ Done.</code>) only for direct/private tool-only completions with no final assistant text, while suppressing synthetic acknowledgements for channel/group sessions and runs that already delivered output via messaging tools. (#22834) Thanks @Oldshue.</li>
+<li>Agents/Subagents: honor <code>tools.subagents.tools.alsoAllow</code> and explicit subagent <code>allow</code> entries when resolving built-in subagent deny defaults, so explicitly granted tools (for example <code>sessions_send</code>) are no longer blocked unless re-denied in <code>tools.subagents.tools.deny</code>. (#23359) Thanks @goren-beehero.</li>
+<li>Agents/Subagents: make announce call timeouts configurable via <code>agents.defaults.subagents.announceTimeoutMs</code> and restore a 60s default to prevent false timeout failures on slower announce paths. (#22719) Thanks @Valadon.</li>
+<li>Agents/Diagnostics: include resolved lifecycle error text in <code>embedded run agent end</code> warnings so UI/TUI “Connection error” runs expose actionable provider failure reasons in gateway logs. (#23054) Thanks @Raize.</li>
+<li>Agents/Auth profiles: skip auth-profile cooldown writes for timeout failures in embedded runner rotation so model/network timeouts do not poison same-provider fallback model selection while still allowing in-turn account rotation. (#22622) Thanks @vageeshkumar.</li>
+<li>Plugins/Hooks: run legacy <code>before_agent_start</code> once per agent turn and reuse that result across model-resolve and prompt-build compatibility paths, preventing duplicate hook side effects (for example duplicate external API calls). (#23289) Thanks @ksato8710.</li>
+<li>Models/Config: default missing Anthropic provider/model <code>api</code> fields to <code>anthropic-messages</code> during config validation so custom relay model entries are preserved instead of being dropped by runtime model registry validation. (#23332) Thanks @bigbigmonkey123.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Pairing: preserve existing approved token scopes when processing repair pairings that omit <code>scopes</code>, preventing empty-scope token regressions on reconnecting clients. (#21906) Thanks @paki81.</li>
+<li>Memory/QMD: add optional <code>memory.qmd.mcporter</code> search routing so QMD <code>query/search/vsearch</code> can run through mcporter keep-alive flows (including multi-collection paths) to reduce cold starts, while keeping searches on agent-scoped QMD state for consistent recall. (#19617) Thanks @nicole-luxe and @vignesh07.</li>
+<li>Infra/Network: classify undici <code>TypeError: fetch failed</code> as transient in unhandled-rejection detection even when nested causes are unclassified, preventing avoidable gateway crash loops on flaky networks. (#14345) Thanks @Unayung.</li>
+<li>Telegram/Retry: classify undici <code>TypeError: fetch failed</code> as recoverable in both polling and send retry paths so transient fetch failures no longer fail fast. (#16699) thanks @Glucksberg.</li>
+<li>Docs/Telegram: correct Node 22+ network defaults (<code>autoSelectFamily</code>, <code>dnsResultOrder</code>) and clarify Telegram setup does not use positional <code>openclaw channels login telegram</code>. (#23609) Thanks @ryanbastic.</li>
+<li>BlueBubbles/DM history: restore DM backfill context with account-scoped rolling history, bounded backfill retries, and safer history payload limits. (#20302) Thanks @Ryan-Haines.</li>
+<li>BlueBubbles/Private API cache: treat unknown (<code>null</code>) private-API cache status as disabled for send/attachment/reply flows to avoid stale-cache 500s, and log a warning when reply/effect features are requested while capability is unknown. (#23459) Thanks @echoVic.</li>
+<li>BlueBubbles/Webhooks: accept inbound/reaction webhook payloads when BlueBubbles omits <code>handle</code> but provides DM <code>chatGuid</code>, and harden payload extraction for array/string-wrapped message bodies so valid webhook events no longer get rejected as unparseable. (#23275) Thanks @toph31.</li>
+<li>Security/Audit: add <code>openclaw security audit</code> finding <code>gateway.nodes.allow_commands_dangerous</code> for risky <code>gateway.nodes.allowCommands</code> overrides, with severity upgraded to critical on remote gateway exposure.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Control plane: reduce cross-client write limiter contention by adding <code>connId</code> fallback keying when device ID and client IP are both unavailable.</li>
+<li>Security/Config: block prototype-key traversal during config merge patch and legacy migration merge helpers (<code>__proto__</code>, <code>constructor</code>, <code>prototype</code>) to prevent prototype pollution during config mutation flows. (#22968) Thanks @Clawborn.</li>
+<li>Security/Shell env: validate login-shell executable paths for shell-env fallback (<code>/etc/shells</code> + trusted prefixes), block <code>SHELL</code>/<code>HOME</code>/<code>ZDOTDIR</code> in config env ingestion before fallback execution, and sanitize fallback shell exec env to pin <code>HOME</code> to the real user home while dropping <code>ZDOTDIR</code> and other dangerous startup vars. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Network/SSRF: enable <code>autoSelectFamily</code> on pinned undici dispatchers (with attempt timeout) so IPv6-unreachable environments can quickly fall back to IPv4 for guarded fetch paths. (#19950) Thanks @ENAwareness.</li>
+<li>Security/Config: make parsed chat allowlist checks fail closed when <code>allowFrom</code> is empty, restoring expected DM/pairing gating.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec: in non-default setups that manually add <code>sort</code> to <code>tools.exec.safeBins</code>, block <code>sort --compress-program</code> so allowlist-mode safe-bin checks cannot bypass approval. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec approvals: when users choose <code>allow-always</code> for shell-wrapper commands (for example <code>/bin/zsh -lc ...</code>), persist allowlist patterns for the inner executable(s) instead of the wrapper shell binary, preventing accidental broad shell allowlisting in moderate mode. (#23276) Thanks @xrom2863.</li>
+<li>Security/Exec: fail closed when <code>tools.exec.host=sandbox</code> is configured/requested but sandbox runtime is unavailable. (#23398) Thanks @bmendonca3.</li>
+<li>Security/macOS app beta: enforce path-only <code>system.run</code> allowlist matching (drop basename matches like <code>echo</code>), migrate legacy basename entries to last resolved paths when available, and harden shell-chain handling to fail closed on unsafe parse/control syntax (including quoted command substitution/backticks). This is an optional allowlist-mode feature; default installs remain deny-by-default. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Agents: auto-generate and persist a dedicated <code>commands.ownerDisplaySecret</code> when <code>commands.ownerDisplay=hash</code>, remove gateway token fallback from owner-ID prompt hashing across CLI and embedded agent runners, and centralize owner-display secret resolution in one shared helper. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/SSRF: expand IPv4 fetch guard blocking to include RFC special-use/non-global ranges (including benchmarking, TEST-NET, multicast, and reserved/broadcast blocks), centralize range checks into a single CIDR policy table, and reuse one shared host/IP classifier across literal + DNS checks to reduce classifier drift. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @princeeismond-dot for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/SSRF: block RFC2544 benchmarking range (<code>198.18.0.0/15</code>) across direct and embedded-IP paths, and normalize IPv6 dotted-quad transition literals (for example <code>::127.0.0.1</code>, <code>64:ff9b::8.8.8.8</code>) in shared IP parsing/classification.</li>
+<li>Security/Archive: block zip symlink escapes during archive extraction.</li>
+<li>Security/Media sandbox: keep tmp media allowance for absolute tmp paths only and enforce symlink-escape checks before sandbox-validated reads, preventing tmp symlink exfiltration and relative <code>../</code> sandbox escapes when sandboxes live under tmp. (#17892) Thanks @dashed.</li>
+<li>Browser/Upload: accept canonical in-root upload paths when the configured uploads directory is a symlink alias (for example <code>/tmp</code> -> <code>/private/tmp</code> on macOS), so browser upload validation no longer rejects valid files during client->server revalidation. (#23300, #23222, #22848) Thanks @bgaither4, @parkerati, and @Nabsku.</li>
+<li>Security/Discord: add <code>openclaw security audit</code> warnings for name/tag-based Discord allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel <code>users</code>, and pairing-store entries), highlighting slug-collision risk while keeping name-based matching supported, and canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs at runtime without rewriting config files. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Gateway: block node-role connections when device identity metadata is missing.</li>
+<li>Security/Media: enforce inbound media byte limits during download/read across Discord, Telegram, Zalo, Microsoft Teams, and BlueBubbles to prevent oversized payload memory spikes before rejection. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Media/Understanding: preserve <code>application/pdf</code> MIME classification during text-like file heuristics so PDF uploads use PDF extraction paths instead of being inlined as raw text. (#23191) Thanks @claudeplay2026-byte.</li>
+<li>Security/Control UI: block symlink-based out-of-root static file reads by enforcing realpath containment and file-identity checks when serving Control UI assets and SPA fallback <code>index.html</code>. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Gateway avatars: block symlink traversal during local avatar <code>data:</code> URL resolution by enforcing realpath containment and file-identity checks before reads. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/Control UI: centralize avatar URL/path validation across gateway/config helpers and enforce a 2 MB max size for local agent avatar files before <code>/avatar</code> resolution, reducing oversized-avatar memory risk without changing supported avatar formats.</li>
+<li>Security/Control UI avatars: harden <code>/avatar/:agentId</code> local avatar serving by rejecting symlink paths and requiring fd-level file identity + size checks before reads. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/MSTeams media: enforce allowlist checks for SharePoint reference attachment URLs and redirect targets during Graph-backed media fetches so redirect chains cannot escape configured media host boundaries. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</li>
+<li>Security/MSTeams media: route attachment auth-retry and Graph SharePoint download redirects through shared <code>safeFetch</code> so each hop is validated with allowlist + DNS/IP checks across the full redirect chain. (#23598) Thanks @Asm3r96 and @lewiswigmore.</li>
+<li>Security/macOS discovery: fail closed for unresolved discovery endpoints by clearing stale remote selection values, use resolved service host only for SSH target derivation, and keep remote URL config aligned with resolved endpoint availability. (#21618) Thanks @bmendonca3.</li>
+<li>Chat/Usage/TUI: strip synthetic inbound metadata blocks (including <code>Conversation info</code> and trailing <code>Untrusted context</code> channel metadata wrappers) from displayed conversation history so internal prompt context no longer leaks into user-visible logs.</li>
+<li>CI/Tests: fix TypeScript case-table typing and lint assertion regressions so <code>pnpm check</code> passes again after Synology Chat landing. (#23012) Thanks @druide67.</li>
+<li>Security/Browser relay: harden extension relay auth token handling for <code>/extension</code> and <code>/cdp</code> pathways.</li>
+<li>Cron: persist <code>delivered</code> state in cron job records so delivery failures remain visible in status and logs. (#19174) Thanks @simonemacario.</li>
+<li>Config/Doctor: only repair the OAuth credentials directory when affected channels are configured, avoiding fresh-install noise.</li>
+<li>Config/Channels: whitelist <code>channels.modelByChannel</code> in config validation and exclude it from plugin auto-enable channel detection so model overrides no longer trigger <code>unknown channel id</code> validation errors or bogus <code>modelByChannel</code> plugin enables. (#23412) Thanks @ProspectOre.</li>
+<li>Config/Bindings: allow optional <code>bindings[].comment</code> in strict config validation so annotated binding entries no longer fail load. (#23458) Thanks @echoVic.</li>
+<li>Usage/Pricing: correct MiniMax M2.5 pricing defaults to fix inflated cost reporting. (#22755) Thanks @miloudbelarebia.</li>
+<li>Gateway/Daemon: verify gateway health after daemon restart.</li>
+<li>Agents/UI text: stop rewriting normal assistant billing/payment language outside explicit error contexts. (#17834) Thanks @niceysam.</li>
 </ul>
 <p><a href="https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md">View full changelog</a></p>
 ]]></description>
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+            <enclosure url="https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/download/v2026.2.22-beta.1/OpenClaw-2026.2.22.zip" length="23096856" type="application/octet-stream" sparkle:edSignature="aoVaCQPj9ajiSD+OjMZdUOyNzACFlMxU7m4ns+4LF1eWaizGLGHk4S0OPnHVQ+DAQY2DCHua+z4F0SMI6o01DA=="/>
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 </rss>

apps/android/app/build.gradle.kts

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ android {
     applicationId = "ai.openclaw.android"
     minSdk = 31
     targetSdk = 36
-    versionCode = 202602200
-    versionName = "2026.2.20"
+    versionCode = 202602230
+    versionName = "2026.2.23"
     ndk {
       // Support all major ABIs — native libs are tiny (~47 KB per ABI)
       abiFilters += listOf("armeabi-v7a", "arm64-v8a", "x86", "x86_64")

apps/android/app/src/main/java/ai/openclaw/android/gateway/GatewaySession.kt

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ class GatewaySession(
     private val connectDeferred = CompletableDeferred<Unit>()
     private val closedDeferred = CompletableDeferred<Unit>()
     private val isClosed = AtomicBoolean(false)
-    private val connectNonceDeferred = CompletableDeferred<String?>()
+    private val connectNonceDeferred = CompletableDeferred<String>()
     private val client: OkHttpClient = buildClient()
     private var socket: WebSocket? = null
     private val loggerTag = "OpenClawGateway"
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ class GatewaySession(
       }
     }
 
-    private suspend fun sendConnect(connectNonce: String?) {
+    private suspend fun sendConnect(connectNonce: String) {
       val identity = identityStore.loadOrCreate()
       val storedToken = deviceAuthStore.loadToken(identity.deviceId, options.role)
       val trimmedToken = token?.trim().orEmpty()
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ class GatewaySession(
 
     private fun buildConnectParams(
       identity: DeviceIdentity,
-      connectNonce: String?,
+      connectNonce: String,
       authToken: String,
       authPassword: String?,
     ): JsonObject {
@@ -385,9 +385,7 @@ class GatewaySession(
             put("publicKey", JsonPrimitive(publicKey))
             put("signature", JsonPrimitive(signature))
             put("signedAt", JsonPrimitive(signedAtMs))
-            if (!connectNonce.isNullOrBlank()) {
-              put("nonce", JsonPrimitive(connectNonce))
-            }
+            put("nonce", JsonPrimitive(connectNonce))
           }
         } else {
           null
@@ -447,8 +445,8 @@ class GatewaySession(
         frame["payload"]?.let { it.toString() } ?: frame["payloadJSON"].asStringOrNull()
       if (event == "connect.challenge") {
         val nonce = extractConnectNonce(payloadJson)
-        if (!connectNonceDeferred.isCompleted) {
-          connectNonceDeferred.complete(nonce)
+        if (!connectNonceDeferred.isCompleted && !nonce.isNullOrBlank()) {
+          connectNonceDeferred.complete(nonce.trim())
         }
         return
       }
@@ -459,12 +457,11 @@ class GatewaySession(
       onEvent(event, payloadJson)
     }
 
-    private suspend fun awaitConnectNonce(): String? {
-      if (isLoopbackHost(endpoint.host)) return null
+    private suspend fun awaitConnectNonce(): String {
       return try {
         withTimeout(2_000) { connectNonceDeferred.await() }
-      } catch (_: Throwable) {
-        null
+      } catch (err: Throwable) {
+        throw IllegalStateException("connect challenge timeout", err)
       }
     }
 
@@ -595,14 +592,13 @@ class GatewaySession(
     scopes: List<String>,
     signedAtMs: Long,
     token: String?,
-    nonce: String?,
+    nonce: String,
   ): String {
     val scopeString = scopes.joinToString(",")
     val authToken = token.orEmpty()
-    val version = if (nonce.isNullOrBlank()) "v1" else "v2"
     val parts =
       mutableListOf(
-        version,
+        "v2",
         deviceId,
         clientId,
         clientMode,
@@ -610,10 +606,8 @@ class GatewaySession(
         scopeString,
         signedAtMs.toString(),
         authToken,
+        nonce,
       )
-    if (!nonce.isNullOrBlank()) {
-      parts.add(nonce)
-    }
     return parts.joinToString("|")
   }
 

apps/ios/ShareExtension/Info.plist

@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@
 	<key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
 	<string>XPC!</string>
 	<key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
-	<string>2026.2.20</string>
+	<string>2026.2.23</string>
 	<key>CFBundleVersion</key>
-	<string>20260220</string>
+	<string>20260223</string>
 	<key>NSExtension</key>
 	<dict>
 		<key>NSExtensionAttributes</key>

apps/ios/Sources/Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/Contents.json

@@ -1,31 +1 @@
-{
-  "images" : [
-    { "filename" : "icon-20@1x.png",   "idiom" : "ipad",  "scale" : "1x", "size" : "20x20" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-20@2x.png",   "idiom" : "ipad",  "scale" : "2x", "size" : "20x20" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-20@2x.png",   "idiom" : "iphone","scale" : "2x", "size" : "20x20" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-20@3x.png",   "idiom" : "iphone","scale" : "3x", "size" : "20x20" },
-
-    { "filename" : "icon-29@1x.png",   "idiom" : "ipad",  "scale" : "1x", "size" : "29x29" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-29@2x.png",   "idiom" : "ipad",  "scale" : "2x", "size" : "29x29" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-29@2x.png",   "idiom" : "iphone","scale" : "2x", "size" : "29x29" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-29@3x.png",   "idiom" : "iphone","scale" : "3x", "size" : "29x29" },
-
-    { "filename" : "icon-40@1x.png",   "idiom" : "ipad",  "scale" : "1x", "size" : "40x40" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-40@2x.png",   "idiom" : "ipad",  "scale" : "2x", "size" : "40x40" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-40@2x.png",   "idiom" : "iphone","scale" : "2x", "size" : "40x40" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-40@3x.png",   "idiom" : "iphone","scale" : "3x", "size" : "40x40" },
-
-    { "filename" : "icon-60@2x.png",   "idiom" : "iphone","scale" : "2x", "size" : "60x60" },
-    { "filename" : "icon-60@3x.png",   "idiom" : "iphone","scale" : "3x", "size" : "60x60" },
-
-    { "filename" : "icon-76@2x.png",   "idiom" : "ipad",  "scale" : "2x", "size" : "76x76" },
-
-    { "filename" : "icon-83.5@2x.png", "idiom" : "ipad",  "scale" : "2x", "size" : "83.5x83.5" },
-
-    { "filename" : "icon-1024.png",    "idiom" : "ios-marketing", "scale" : "1x", "size" : "1024x1024" }
-  ],
-  "info" : {
-    "author" : "xcode",
-    "version" : 1
-  }
-}
+{"images":[{"size":"60x60","expected-size":"180","filename":"180.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"3x"},{"size":"40x40","expected-size":"80","filename":"80.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"2x"},{"size":"40x40","expected-size":"120","filename":"120.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"3x"},{"size":"60x60","expected-size":"120","filename":"120.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"2x"},{"size":"57x57","expected-size":"57","filename":"57.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"1x"},{"size":"29x29","expected-size":"58","filename":"58.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"2x"},{"size":"29x29","expected-size":"29","filename":"29.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"1x"},{"size":"29x29","expected-size":"87","filename":"87.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"3x"},{"size":"57x57","expected-size":"114","filename":"114.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"2x"},{"size":"20x20","expected-size":"40","filename":"40.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"2x"},{"size":"20x20","expected-size":"60","filename":"60.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"iphone","scale":"3x"},{"size":"1024x1024","filename":"1024.png","expected-size":"1024","idiom":"ios-marketing","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","scale":"1x"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"172.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"38mm","scale":"2x","size":"86x86","expected-size":"172","role":"quickLook"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"80.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"38mm","scale":"2x","size":"40x40","expected-size":"80","role":"appLauncher"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"88.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"40mm","scale":"2x","size":"44x44","expected-size":"88","role":"appLauncher"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"102.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"45mm","scale":"2x","size":"51x51","expected-size":"102","role":"appLauncher"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"108.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"49mm","scale":"2x","size":"54x54","expected-size":"108","role":"appLauncher"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"92.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"41mm","scale":"2x","size":"46x46","expected-size":"92","role":"appLauncher"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"100.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"44mm","scale":"2x","size":"50x50","expected-size":"100","role":"appLauncher"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"196.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"42mm","scale":"2x","size":"98x98","expected-size":"196","role":"quickLook"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"216.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"44mm","scale":"2x","size":"108x108","expected-size":"216","role":"quickLook"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"234.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"45mm","scale":"2x","size":"117x117","expected-size":"234","role":"quickLook"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"258.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"49mm","scale":"2x","size":"129x129","expected-size":"258","role":"quickLook"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"48.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"38mm","scale":"2x","size":"24x24","expected-size":"48","role":"notificationCenter"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"55.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"42mm","scale":"2x","size":"27.5x27.5","expected-size":"55","role":"notificationCenter"},{"idiom":"watch","filename":"66.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","subtype":"45mm","scale":"2x","size":"33x33","expected-size":"66","role":"notificationCenter"},{"size":"29x29","expected-size":"87","filename":"87.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"watch","role":"companionSettings","scale":"3x"},{"size":"29x29","expected-size":"58","filename":"58.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"watch","role":"companionSettings","scale":"2x"},{"size":"1024x1024","expected-size":"1024","filename":"1024.png","folder":"Assets.xcassets/AppIcon.appiconset/","idiom":"watch-marketing","scale":"1x"}]}

apps/ios/Sources/Assets.xcassets/Contents.json

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "info" : {
-    "author" : "xcode",
-    "version" : 1
-  }
-}

apps/ios/Sources/Gateway/GatewayConnectionController.swift

@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ final class GatewayConnectionController {
         var addr = in_addr()
         let parsed = host.withCString { inet_pton(AF_INET, $0, &addr) == 1 }
         guard parsed else { return false }
-        let value = ntohl(addr.s_addr)
+        let value = UInt32(bigEndian: addr.s_addr)
         let firstOctet = UInt8((value >> 24) & 0xFF)
         return firstOctet == 127
     }

apps/ios/Sources/Info.plist

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 	<key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
 	<string>APPL</string>
 	<key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
-	<string>2026.2.20</string>
+	<string>2026.2.23</string>
 	<key>CFBundleURLTypes</key>
 	<array>
 		<dict>
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 		</dict>
 	</array>
 	<key>CFBundleVersion</key>
-	<string>20260220</string>
+	<string>20260223</string>
 	<key>NSAppTransportSecurity</key>
 	<dict>
 		<key>NSAllowsArbitraryLoadsInWebContent</key>

apps/ios/Sources/Model/NodeAppModel.swift

@@ -1904,6 +1904,7 @@ private extension NodeAppModel {
                             }
                             GatewayDiagnostics.log(
                                 "operator gateway connected host=\(url.host ?? "?") scheme=\(url.scheme ?? "?")")
+                            await self.talkMode.reloadConfig()
                             await self.refreshBrandingFromGateway()
                             await self.refreshAgentsFromGateway()
                             await self.refreshShareRouteFromGateway()

apps/ios/Sources/Settings/SettingsTab.swift

@@ -306,6 +306,26 @@ struct SettingsTab: View {
                             help: "Keeps the screen awake while OpenClaw is open.")
 
                         DisclosureGroup("Advanced") {
+                            VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 8) {
+                                Text("Talk Voice (Gateway)")
+                                    .font(.footnote.weight(.semibold))
+                                    .foregroundStyle(.secondary)
+                                LabeledContent("Provider", value: "ElevenLabs")
+                                LabeledContent(
+                                    "API Key",
+                                    value: self.appModel.talkMode.gatewayTalkConfigLoaded
+                                        ? (self.appModel.talkMode.gatewayTalkApiKeyConfigured ? "Configured" : "Not configured")
+                                        : "Not loaded")
+                                LabeledContent(
+                                    "Default Model",
+                                    value: self.appModel.talkMode.gatewayTalkDefaultModelId ?? "eleven_v3 (fallback)")
+                                LabeledContent(
+                                    "Default Voice",
+                                    value: self.appModel.talkMode.gatewayTalkDefaultVoiceId ?? "auto (first available)")
+                                Text("Configured on gateway via talk.apiKey, talk.modelId, and talk.voiceId.")
+                                    .font(.footnote)
+                                    .foregroundStyle(.secondary)
+                            }
                             self.featureToggle(
                                 "Voice Directive Hint",
                                 isOn: self.$talkVoiceDirectiveHintEnabled,
@@ -399,6 +419,9 @@ struct SettingsTab: View {
                 // Keep setup front-and-center when disconnected; keep things compact once connected.
                 self.gatewayExpanded = !self.isGatewayConnected
                 self.selectedAgentPickerId = self.appModel.selectedAgentId ?? ""
+                if self.isGatewayConnected {
+                    self.appModel.reloadTalkConfig()
+                }
             }
             .onChange(of: self.selectedAgentPickerId) { _, newValue in
                 let trimmed = newValue.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)

apps/ios/Sources/Voice/TalkModeManager.swift

@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ final class TalkModeManager: NSObject {
     var statusText: String = "Off"
     /// 0..1-ish (not calibrated). Intended for UI feedback only.
     var micLevel: Double = 0
+    var gatewayTalkConfigLoaded: Bool = false
+    var gatewayTalkApiKeyConfigured: Bool = false
+    var gatewayTalkDefaultModelId: String?
+    var gatewayTalkDefaultVoiceId: String?
 
     private enum CaptureMode {
         case idle
@@ -87,6 +91,8 @@ final class TalkModeManager: NSObject {
     private var incrementalSpeechBuffer = IncrementalSpeechBuffer()
     private var incrementalSpeechContext: IncrementalSpeechContext?
     private var incrementalSpeechDirective: TalkDirective?
+    private var incrementalSpeechPrefetch: IncrementalSpeechPrefetchState?
+    private var incrementalSpeechPrefetchMonitorTask: Task<Void, Never>?
 
     private let logger = Logger(subsystem: "bot.molt", category: "TalkMode")
 
@@ -547,6 +553,16 @@ final class TalkModeManager: NSObject {
             guard let self else { return }
             if let error {
                 let msg = error.localizedDescription
+                let lowered = msg.lowercased()
+                let isCancellation = lowered.contains("cancelled") || lowered.contains("canceled")
+                if isCancellation {
+                    GatewayDiagnostics.log("talk speech: cancelled")
+                    if self.captureMode == .continuous, self.isEnabled, !self.isSpeaking {
+                        self.statusText = "Listening"
+                    }
+                    self.logger.debug("speech recognition cancelled")
+                    return
+                }
                 GatewayDiagnostics.log("talk speech: error=\(msg)")
                 if !self.isSpeaking {
                     if msg.localizedCaseInsensitiveContains("no speech detected") {
@@ -1173,6 +1189,7 @@ final class TalkModeManager: NSObject {
         self.incrementalSpeechQueue.removeAll()
         self.incrementalSpeechTask?.cancel()
         self.incrementalSpeechTask = nil
+        self.cancelIncrementalPrefetch()
         self.incrementalSpeechActive = true
         self.incrementalSpeechUsed = false
         self.incrementalSpeechLanguage = nil
@@ -1185,6 +1202,7 @@ final class TalkModeManager: NSObject {
         self.incrementalSpeechQueue.removeAll()
         self.incrementalSpeechTask?.cancel()
         self.incrementalSpeechTask = nil
+        self.cancelIncrementalPrefetch()
         self.incrementalSpeechActive = false
         self.incrementalSpeechContext = nil
         self.incrementalSpeechDirective = nil
@@ -1212,20 +1230,168 @@ final class TalkModeManager: NSObject {
 
         self.incrementalSpeechTask = Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
             guard let self else { return }
+            defer {
+                self.cancelIncrementalPrefetch()
+                self.isSpeaking = false
+                self.stopRecognition()
+                self.incrementalSpeechTask = nil
+            }
             while !Task.isCancelled {
                 guard !self.incrementalSpeechQueue.isEmpty else { break }
                 let segment = self.incrementalSpeechQueue.removeFirst()
                 self.statusText = "Speaking…"
                 self.isSpeaking = true
                 self.lastSpokenText = segment
-                await self.speakIncrementalSegment(segment)
+                await self.updateIncrementalContextIfNeeded()
+                let context = self.incrementalSpeechContext
+                let prefetchedAudio = await self.consumeIncrementalPrefetchedAudioIfAvailable(
+                    for: segment,
+                    context: context)
+                if let context {
+                    self.startIncrementalPrefetchMonitor(context: context)
+                }
+                await self.speakIncrementalSegment(
+                    segment,
+                    context: context,
+                    prefetchedAudio: prefetchedAudio)
+                self.cancelIncrementalPrefetchMonitor()
             }
-            self.isSpeaking = false
-            self.stopRecognition()
-            self.incrementalSpeechTask = nil
         }
     }
 
+    private func cancelIncrementalPrefetch() {
+        self.cancelIncrementalPrefetchMonitor()
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch?.task.cancel()
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = nil
+    }
+
+    private func cancelIncrementalPrefetchMonitor() {
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetchMonitorTask?.cancel()
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetchMonitorTask = nil
+    }
+
+    private func startIncrementalPrefetchMonitor(context: IncrementalSpeechContext) {
+        self.cancelIncrementalPrefetchMonitor()
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetchMonitorTask = Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
+            guard let self else { return }
+            while !Task.isCancelled {
+                if self.ensureIncrementalPrefetchForUpcomingSegment(context: context) {
+                    return
+                }
+                try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 40_000_000)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func ensureIncrementalPrefetchForUpcomingSegment(context: IncrementalSpeechContext) -> Bool {
+        guard context.canUseElevenLabs else {
+            self.cancelIncrementalPrefetch()
+            return false
+        }
+        guard let nextSegment = self.incrementalSpeechQueue.first else { return false }
+        if let existing = self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch {
+            if existing.segment == nextSegment, existing.context == context {
+                return true
+            }
+            existing.task.cancel()
+            self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = nil
+        }
+        self.startIncrementalPrefetch(segment: nextSegment, context: context)
+        return self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch != nil
+    }
+
+    private func startIncrementalPrefetch(segment: String, context: IncrementalSpeechContext) {
+        guard context.canUseElevenLabs, let apiKey = context.apiKey, let voiceId = context.voiceId else { return }
+        let prefetchOutputFormat = self.resolveIncrementalPrefetchOutputFormat(context: context)
+        let request = self.makeIncrementalTTSRequest(
+            text: segment,
+            context: context,
+            outputFormat: prefetchOutputFormat)
+        let id = UUID()
+        let task = Task { [weak self] in
+            let stream = ElevenLabsTTSClient(apiKey: apiKey).streamSynthesize(voiceId: voiceId, request: request)
+            var chunks: [Data] = []
+            do {
+                for try await chunk in stream {
+                    try Task.checkCancellation()
+                    chunks.append(chunk)
+                }
+                await self?.completeIncrementalPrefetch(id: id, chunks: chunks)
+            } catch is CancellationError {
+                await self?.clearIncrementalPrefetch(id: id)
+            } catch {
+                await self?.failIncrementalPrefetch(id: id, error: error)
+            }
+        }
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = IncrementalSpeechPrefetchState(
+            id: id,
+            segment: segment,
+            context: context,
+            outputFormat: prefetchOutputFormat,
+            chunks: nil,
+            task: task)
+    }
+
+    private func completeIncrementalPrefetch(id: UUID, chunks: [Data]) {
+        guard var prefetch = self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch, prefetch.id == id else { return }
+        prefetch.chunks = chunks
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = prefetch
+    }
+
+    private func clearIncrementalPrefetch(id: UUID) {
+        guard let prefetch = self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch, prefetch.id == id else { return }
+        prefetch.task.cancel()
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = nil
+    }
+
+    private func failIncrementalPrefetch(id: UUID, error: any Error) {
+        guard let prefetch = self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch, prefetch.id == id else { return }
+        self.logger.debug("incremental prefetch failed: \(error.localizedDescription, privacy: .public)")
+        prefetch.task.cancel()
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = nil
+    }
+
+    private func consumeIncrementalPrefetchedAudioIfAvailable(
+        for segment: String,
+        context: IncrementalSpeechContext?
+    ) async -> IncrementalPrefetchedAudio?
+    {
+        guard let context else {
+            self.cancelIncrementalPrefetch()
+            return nil
+        }
+        guard let prefetch = self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        guard prefetch.context == context else {
+            prefetch.task.cancel()
+            self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = nil
+            return nil
+        }
+        guard prefetch.segment == segment else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        if let chunks = prefetch.chunks, !chunks.isEmpty {
+            let prefetched = IncrementalPrefetchedAudio(chunks: chunks, outputFormat: prefetch.outputFormat)
+            self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = nil
+            return prefetched
+        }
+        await prefetch.task.value
+        guard let completed = self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch else { return nil }
+        guard completed.context == context, completed.segment == segment else { return nil }
+        guard let chunks = completed.chunks, !chunks.isEmpty else { return nil }
+        let prefetched = IncrementalPrefetchedAudio(chunks: chunks, outputFormat: completed.outputFormat)
+        self.incrementalSpeechPrefetch = nil
+        return prefetched
+    }
+
+    private func resolveIncrementalPrefetchOutputFormat(context: IncrementalSpeechContext) -> String? {
+        if TalkTTSValidation.pcmSampleRate(from: context.outputFormat) != nil {
+            return ElevenLabsTTSClient.validatedOutputFormat("mp3_44100")
+        }
+        return context.outputFormat
+    }
+
     private func finishIncrementalSpeech() async {
         guard self.incrementalSpeechActive else { return }
         let leftover = self.incrementalSpeechBuffer.flush()
@@ -1333,77 +1499,103 @@ final class TalkModeManager: NSObject {
             canUseElevenLabs: canUseElevenLabs)
     }
 
-    private func speakIncrementalSegment(_ text: String) async {
-        await self.updateIncrementalContextIfNeeded()
-        guard let context = self.incrementalSpeechContext else {
+    private func makeIncrementalTTSRequest(
+        text: String,
+        context: IncrementalSpeechContext,
+        outputFormat: String?
+    ) -> ElevenLabsTTSRequest
+    {
+        ElevenLabsTTSRequest(
+            text: text,
+            modelId: context.modelId,
+            outputFormat: outputFormat,
+            speed: TalkTTSValidation.resolveSpeed(
+                speed: context.directive?.speed,
+                rateWPM: context.directive?.rateWPM),
+            stability: TalkTTSValidation.validatedStability(
+                context.directive?.stability,
+                modelId: context.modelId),
+            similarity: TalkTTSValidation.validatedUnit(context.directive?.similarity),
+            style: TalkTTSValidation.validatedUnit(context.directive?.style),
+            speakerBoost: context.directive?.speakerBoost,
+            seed: TalkTTSValidation.validatedSeed(context.directive?.seed),
+            normalize: ElevenLabsTTSClient.validatedNormalize(context.directive?.normalize),
+            language: context.language,
+            latencyTier: TalkTTSValidation.validatedLatencyTier(context.directive?.latencyTier))
+    }
+
+    private static func makeBufferedAudioStream(chunks: [Data]) -> AsyncThrowingStream<Data, Error> {
+        AsyncThrowingStream { continuation in
+            for chunk in chunks {
+                continuation.yield(chunk)
+            }
+            continuation.finish()
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func speakIncrementalSegment(
+        _ text: String,
+        context preferredContext: IncrementalSpeechContext? = nil,
+        prefetchedAudio: IncrementalPrefetchedAudio? = nil
+    ) async
+    {
+        let context: IncrementalSpeechContext
+        if let preferredContext {
+            context = preferredContext
+        } else {
+            await self.updateIncrementalContextIfNeeded()
+            guard let resolvedContext = self.incrementalSpeechContext else {
+                try? await TalkSystemSpeechSynthesizer.shared.speak(
+                    text: text,
+                    language: self.incrementalSpeechLanguage)
+                return
+            }
+            context = resolvedContext
+        }
+
+        guard context.canUseElevenLabs, let apiKey = context.apiKey, let voiceId = context.voiceId else {
             try? await TalkSystemSpeechSynthesizer.shared.speak(
                 text: text,
                 language: self.incrementalSpeechLanguage)
             return
         }
 
-        if context.canUseElevenLabs, let apiKey = context.apiKey, let voiceId = context.voiceId {
-            let request = ElevenLabsTTSRequest(
-                text: text,
-                modelId: context.modelId,
-                outputFormat: context.outputFormat,
-                speed: TalkTTSValidation.resolveSpeed(
-                    speed: context.directive?.speed,
-                    rateWPM: context.directive?.rateWPM),
-                stability: TalkTTSValidation.validatedStability(
-                    context.directive?.stability,
-                    modelId: context.modelId),
-                similarity: TalkTTSValidation.validatedUnit(context.directive?.similarity),
-                style: TalkTTSValidation.validatedUnit(context.directive?.style),
-                speakerBoost: context.directive?.speakerBoost,
-                seed: TalkTTSValidation.validatedSeed(context.directive?.seed),
-                normalize: ElevenLabsTTSClient.validatedNormalize(context.directive?.normalize),
-                language: context.language,
-                latencyTier: TalkTTSValidation.validatedLatencyTier(context.directive?.latencyTier))
-            let client = ElevenLabsTTSClient(apiKey: apiKey)
-            let stream = client.streamSynthesize(voiceId: voiceId, request: request)
-            let sampleRate = TalkTTSValidation.pcmSampleRate(from: context.outputFormat)
-            let result: StreamingPlaybackResult
-            if let sampleRate {
-                self.lastPlaybackWasPCM = true
-                var playback = await self.pcmPlayer.play(stream: stream, sampleRate: sampleRate)
-                if !playback.finished, playback.interruptedAt == nil {
-                    self.logger.warning("pcm playback failed; retrying mp3")
-                    self.lastPlaybackWasPCM = false
-                    let mp3Format = ElevenLabsTTSClient.validatedOutputFormat("mp3_44100")
-                    let mp3Stream = client.streamSynthesize(
-                        voiceId: voiceId,
-                        request: ElevenLabsTTSRequest(
-                            text: text,
-                            modelId: context.modelId,
-                            outputFormat: mp3Format,
-                            speed: TalkTTSValidation.resolveSpeed(
-                                speed: context.directive?.speed,
-                                rateWPM: context.directive?.rateWPM),
-                            stability: TalkTTSValidation.validatedStability(
-                                context.directive?.stability,
-                                modelId: context.modelId),
-                            similarity: TalkTTSValidation.validatedUnit(context.directive?.similarity),
-                            style: TalkTTSValidation.validatedUnit(context.directive?.style),
-                            speakerBoost: context.directive?.speakerBoost,
-                            seed: TalkTTSValidation.validatedSeed(context.directive?.seed),
-                            normalize: ElevenLabsTTSClient.validatedNormalize(context.directive?.normalize),
-                            language: context.language,
-                            latencyTier: TalkTTSValidation.validatedLatencyTier(context.directive?.latencyTier)))
-                    playback = await self.mp3Player.play(stream: mp3Stream)
-                }
-                result = playback
-            } else {
-                self.lastPlaybackWasPCM = false
-                result = await self.mp3Player.play(stream: stream)
-            }
-            if !result.finished, let interruptedAt = result.interruptedAt {
-                self.lastInterruptedAtSeconds = interruptedAt
-            }
+        let client = ElevenLabsTTSClient(apiKey: apiKey)
+        let request = self.makeIncrementalTTSRequest(
+            text: text,
+            context: context,
+            outputFormat: context.outputFormat)
+        let stream: AsyncThrowingStream<Data, Error>
+        if let prefetchedAudio, !prefetchedAudio.chunks.isEmpty {
+            stream = Self.makeBufferedAudioStream(chunks: prefetchedAudio.chunks)
         } else {
-            try? await TalkSystemSpeechSynthesizer.shared.speak(
-                text: text,
-                language: self.incrementalSpeechLanguage)
+            stream = client.streamSynthesize(voiceId: voiceId, request: request)
+        }
+        let playbackFormat = prefetchedAudio?.outputFormat ?? context.outputFormat
+        let sampleRate = TalkTTSValidation.pcmSampleRate(from: playbackFormat)
+        let result: StreamingPlaybackResult
+        if let sampleRate {
+            self.lastPlaybackWasPCM = true
+            var playback = await self.pcmPlayer.play(stream: stream, sampleRate: sampleRate)
+            if !playback.finished, playback.interruptedAt == nil {
+                self.logger.warning("pcm playback failed; retrying mp3")
+                self.lastPlaybackWasPCM = false
+                let mp3Format = ElevenLabsTTSClient.validatedOutputFormat("mp3_44100")
+                let mp3Stream = client.streamSynthesize(
+                    voiceId: voiceId,
+                    request: self.makeIncrementalTTSRequest(
+                        text: text,
+                        context: context,
+                        outputFormat: mp3Format))
+                playback = await self.mp3Player.play(stream: mp3Stream)
+            }
+            result = playback
+        } else {
+            self.lastPlaybackWasPCM = false
+            result = await self.mp3Player.play(stream: stream)
+        }
+        if !result.finished, let interruptedAt = result.interruptedAt {
+            self.lastInterruptedAtSeconds = interruptedAt
         }
     }
 
@@ -1733,6 +1925,10 @@ extension TalkModeManager {
             } else {
                 self.apiKey = (localApiKey?.isEmpty == false) ? localApiKey : configApiKey
             }
+            self.gatewayTalkDefaultVoiceId = self.defaultVoiceId
+            self.gatewayTalkDefaultModelId = self.defaultModelId
+            self.gatewayTalkApiKeyConfigured = (self.apiKey?.isEmpty == false)
+            self.gatewayTalkConfigLoaded = true
             if let interrupt = talk?["interruptOnSpeech"] as? Bool {
                 self.interruptOnSpeech = interrupt
             }
@@ -1741,6 +1937,10 @@ extension TalkModeManager {
             if !self.modelOverrideActive {
                 self.currentModelId = self.defaultModelId
             }
+            self.gatewayTalkDefaultVoiceId = nil
+            self.gatewayTalkDefaultModelId = nil
+            self.gatewayTalkApiKeyConfigured = false
+            self.gatewayTalkConfigLoaded = false
         }
     }
 
@@ -1862,7 +2062,7 @@ extension TalkModeManager {
 }
 #endif
 
-private struct IncrementalSpeechContext {
+private struct IncrementalSpeechContext: Equatable {
     let apiKey: String?
     let voiceId: String?
     let modelId: String?
@@ -1872,4 +2072,18 @@ private struct IncrementalSpeechContext {
     let canUseElevenLabs: Bool
 }
 
+private struct IncrementalSpeechPrefetchState {
+    let id: UUID
+    let segment: String
+    let context: IncrementalSpeechContext
+    let outputFormat: String?
+    var chunks: [Data]?
+    let task: Task<Void, Never>
+}
+
+private struct IncrementalPrefetchedAudio {
+    let chunks: [Data]
+    let outputFormat: String?
+}
+
 // swiftlint:enable type_body_length

apps/ios/Tests/Info.plist

@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
 	<key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
 			<string>BNDL</string>
 			<key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
-			<string>2026.2.20</string>
+			<string>2026.2.23</string>
 			<key>CFBundleVersion</key>
-			<string>20260220</string>
+			<string>20260223</string>
 		</dict>
 	</plist>

apps/ios/WatchApp/Info.plist

@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@
 	<key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
 	<string>APPL</string>
 	<key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
-	<string>2026.2.20</string>
+	<string>2026.2.23</string>
 	<key>CFBundleVersion</key>
-	<string>20260220</string>
+	<string>20260223</string>
 	<key>WKCompanionAppBundleIdentifier</key>
 	<string>$(OPENCLAW_APP_BUNDLE_ID)</string>
 	<key>WKWatchKitApp</key>

apps/ios/WatchExtension/Info.plist

@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@
 	<key>CFBundleName</key>
 	<string>$(PRODUCT_NAME)</string>
 	<key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
-	<string>2026.2.20</string>
+	<string>2026.2.23</string>
 	<key>CFBundleVersion</key>
-	<string>20260220</string>
+	<string>20260223</string>
 	<key>NSExtension</key>
 	<dict>
 		<key>NSExtensionAttributes</key>

apps/ios/project.yml

@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ targets:
           - CFBundleURLName: ai.openclaw.ios
             CFBundleURLSchemes:
               - openclaw
-        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.20"
-        CFBundleVersion: "20260220"
+        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.23"
+        CFBundleVersion: "20260223"
         UILaunchScreen: {}
         UIApplicationSceneManifest:
           UIApplicationSupportsMultipleScenes: false
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ targets:
       path: ShareExtension/Info.plist
       properties:
         CFBundleDisplayName: OpenClaw Share
-        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.20"
-        CFBundleVersion: "20260220"
+        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.23"
+        CFBundleVersion: "20260223"
         NSExtension:
           NSExtensionPointIdentifier: com.apple.share-services
           NSExtensionPrincipalClass: "$(PRODUCT_MODULE_NAME).ShareViewController"
@@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ targets:
       path: WatchApp/Info.plist
       properties:
         CFBundleDisplayName: OpenClaw
-        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.20"
-        CFBundleVersion: "20260220"
+        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.23"
+        CFBundleVersion: "20260223"
         WKCompanionAppBundleIdentifier: "$(OPENCLAW_APP_BUNDLE_ID)"
         WKWatchKitApp: true
 
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ targets:
       path: WatchExtension/Info.plist
       properties:
         CFBundleDisplayName: OpenClaw
-        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.20"
-        CFBundleVersion: "20260220"
+        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.23"
+        CFBundleVersion: "20260223"
         NSExtension:
           NSExtensionAttributes:
             WKAppBundleIdentifier: "$(OPENCLAW_WATCH_APP_BUNDLE_ID)"
@@ -228,5 +228,5 @@ targets:
       path: Tests/Info.plist
       properties:
         CFBundleDisplayName: OpenClawTests
-        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.20"
-        CFBundleVersion: "20260220"
+        CFBundleShortVersionString: "2026.2.23"
+        CFBundleVersion: "20260223"

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/AppState.swift

@@ -480,8 +480,7 @@ final class AppState {
                             remote.removeValue(forKey: "url")
                             remoteChanged = true
                         }
-                    } else {
-                        let normalizedUrl = GatewayRemoteConfig.normalizeGatewayUrlString(trimmedUrl) ?? trimmedUrl
+                    } else if let normalizedUrl = GatewayRemoteConfig.normalizeGatewayUrlString(trimmedUrl) {
                         if (remote["url"] as? String) != normalizedUrl {
                             remote["url"] = normalizedUrl
                             remoteChanged = true

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/CameraCaptureService.swift

@@ -357,8 +357,8 @@ private final class PhotoCaptureDelegate: NSObject, AVCapturePhotoCaptureDelegat
     func photoOutput(
         _ output: AVCapturePhotoOutput,
         didFinishProcessingPhoto photo: AVCapturePhoto,
-        error: Error?
-    ) {
+        error: Error?)
+    {
         guard !self.didResume, let cont else { return }
         self.didResume = true
         self.cont = nil
@@ -380,8 +380,8 @@ private final class PhotoCaptureDelegate: NSObject, AVCapturePhotoCaptureDelegat
     func photoOutput(
         _ output: AVCapturePhotoOutput,
         didFinishCaptureFor resolvedSettings: AVCaptureResolvedPhotoSettings,
-        error: Error?
-    ) {
+        error: Error?)
+    {
         guard let error else { return }
         guard !self.didResume, let cont else { return }
         self.didResume = true

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/CoalescingFSEventsWatcher.swift

@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ final class CoalescingFSEventsWatcher: @unchecked Sendable {
         queueLabel: String,
         coalesceDelay: TimeInterval = 0.12,
         shouldNotify: @escaping (Int, UnsafeMutableRawPointer?) -> Bool = { _, _ in true },
-        onChange: @escaping () -> Void
-    ) {
+        onChange: @escaping () -> Void)
+    {
         self.paths = paths
         self.queue = DispatchQueue(label: queueLabel)
         self.coalesceDelay = coalesceDelay
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ extension CoalescingFSEventsWatcher {
     private func handleEvents(
         numEvents: Int,
         eventPaths: UnsafeMutableRawPointer?,
-        eventFlags: UnsafePointer<FSEventStreamEventFlags>?
-    ) {
+        eventFlags: UnsafePointer<FSEventStreamEventFlags>?)
+    {
         guard numEvents > 0 else { return }
         guard eventFlags != nil else { return }
         guard self.shouldNotify(numEvents, eventPaths) else { return }
@@ -108,4 +108,3 @@ extension CoalescingFSEventsWatcher {
         }
     }
 }
-

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/ExecAllowlistMatcher.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+import Foundation
+
+enum ExecAllowlistMatcher {
+    static func match(entries: [ExecAllowlistEntry], resolution: ExecCommandResolution?) -> ExecAllowlistEntry? {
+        guard let resolution, !entries.isEmpty else { return nil }
+        let rawExecutable = resolution.rawExecutable
+        let resolvedPath = resolution.resolvedPath
+
+        for entry in entries {
+            switch ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern(entry.pattern) {
+            case .valid(let pattern):
+                let target = resolvedPath ?? rawExecutable
+                if self.matches(pattern: pattern, target: target) { return entry }
+            case .invalid:
+                continue
+            }
+        }
+        return nil
+    }
+
+    static func matchAll(
+        entries: [ExecAllowlistEntry],
+        resolutions: [ExecCommandResolution]) -> [ExecAllowlistEntry]
+    {
+        guard !entries.isEmpty, !resolutions.isEmpty else { return [] }
+        var matches: [ExecAllowlistEntry] = []
+        matches.reserveCapacity(resolutions.count)
+        for resolution in resolutions {
+            guard let match = self.match(entries: entries, resolution: resolution) else {
+                return []
+            }
+            matches.append(match)
+        }
+        return matches
+    }
+
+    private static func matches(pattern: String, target: String) -> Bool {
+        let trimmed = pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return false }
+        let expanded = trimmed.hasPrefix("~") ? (trimmed as NSString).expandingTildeInPath : trimmed
+        let normalizedPattern = self.normalizeMatchTarget(expanded)
+        let normalizedTarget = self.normalizeMatchTarget(target)
+        guard let regex = self.regex(for: normalizedPattern) else { return false }
+        let range = NSRange(location: 0, length: normalizedTarget.utf16.count)
+        return regex.firstMatch(in: normalizedTarget, options: [], range: range) != nil
+    }
+
+    private static func normalizeMatchTarget(_ value: String) -> String {
+        value.replacingOccurrences(of: "\\\\", with: "/").lowercased()
+    }
+
+    private static func regex(for pattern: String) -> NSRegularExpression? {
+        var regex = "^"
+        var idx = pattern.startIndex
+        while idx < pattern.endIndex {
+            let ch = pattern[idx]
+            if ch == "*" {
+                let next = pattern.index(after: idx)
+                if next < pattern.endIndex, pattern[next] == "*" {
+                    regex += ".*"
+                    idx = pattern.index(after: next)
+                } else {
+                    regex += "[^/]*"
+                    idx = next
+                }
+                continue
+            }
+            if ch == "?" {
+                regex += "."
+                idx = pattern.index(after: idx)
+                continue
+            }
+            regex += NSRegularExpression.escapedPattern(for: String(ch))
+            idx = pattern.index(after: idx)
+        }
+        regex += "$"
+        return try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: regex, options: [.caseInsensitive])
+    }
+}

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/ExecApprovalEvaluation.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+import Foundation
+
+struct ExecApprovalEvaluation {
+    let command: [String]
+    let displayCommand: String
+    let agentId: String?
+    let security: ExecSecurity
+    let ask: ExecAsk
+    let env: [String: String]
+    let resolution: ExecCommandResolution?
+    let allowlistResolutions: [ExecCommandResolution]
+    let allowlistMatches: [ExecAllowlistEntry]
+    let allowlistSatisfied: Bool
+    let allowlistMatch: ExecAllowlistEntry?
+    let skillAllow: Bool
+}
+
+enum ExecApprovalEvaluator {
+    static func evaluate(
+        command: [String],
+        rawCommand: String?,
+        cwd: String?,
+        envOverrides: [String: String]?,
+        agentId: String?) async -> ExecApprovalEvaluation
+    {
+        let trimmedAgent = agentId?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+        let normalizedAgentId = (trimmedAgent?.isEmpty == false) ? trimmedAgent : nil
+        let approvals = ExecApprovalsStore.resolve(agentId: normalizedAgentId)
+        let security = approvals.agent.security
+        let ask = approvals.agent.ask
+        let shellWrapper = ExecShellWrapperParser.extract(command: command, rawCommand: rawCommand).isWrapper
+        let env = HostEnvSanitizer.sanitize(overrides: envOverrides, shellWrapper: shellWrapper)
+        let displayCommand = ExecCommandFormatter.displayString(for: command, rawCommand: rawCommand)
+        let allowlistResolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: rawCommand,
+            cwd: cwd,
+            env: env)
+        let allowlistMatches = security == .allowlist
+            ? ExecAllowlistMatcher.matchAll(entries: approvals.allowlist, resolutions: allowlistResolutions)
+            : []
+        let allowlistSatisfied = security == .allowlist &&
+            !allowlistResolutions.isEmpty &&
+            allowlistMatches.count == allowlistResolutions.count
+
+        let skillAllow: Bool
+        if approvals.agent.autoAllowSkills, !allowlistResolutions.isEmpty {
+            let bins = await SkillBinsCache.shared.currentBins()
+            skillAllow = allowlistResolutions.allSatisfy { bins.contains($0.executableName) }
+        } else {
+            skillAllow = false
+        }
+
+        return ExecApprovalEvaluation(
+            command: command,
+            displayCommand: displayCommand,
+            agentId: normalizedAgentId,
+            security: security,
+            ask: ask,
+            env: env,
+            resolution: allowlistResolutions.first,
+            allowlistResolutions: allowlistResolutions,
+            allowlistMatches: allowlistMatches,
+            allowlistSatisfied: allowlistSatisfied,
+            allowlistMatch: allowlistSatisfied ? allowlistMatches.first : nil,
+            skillAllow: skillAllow)
+    }
+}

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/ExecApprovals.swift

@@ -90,6 +90,31 @@ enum ExecApprovalDecision: String, Codable, Sendable {
     case deny
 }
 
+enum ExecAllowlistPatternValidationReason: String, Codable, Sendable, Equatable {
+    case empty
+    case missingPathComponent
+
+    var message: String {
+        switch self {
+        case .empty:
+            "Pattern cannot be empty."
+        case .missingPathComponent:
+            "Path patterns only. Include '/', '~', or '\\\\'."
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+enum ExecAllowlistPatternValidation: Sendable, Equatable {
+    case valid(String)
+    case invalid(ExecAllowlistPatternValidationReason)
+}
+
+struct ExecAllowlistRejectedEntry: Sendable, Equatable {
+    let id: UUID
+    let pattern: String
+    let reason: ExecAllowlistPatternValidationReason
+}
+
 struct ExecAllowlistEntry: Codable, Hashable, Identifiable {
     var id: UUID
     var pattern: String
@@ -222,13 +247,25 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
             }
             agents.removeValue(forKey: "default")
         }
+        if !agents.isEmpty {
+            var normalizedAgents: [String: ExecApprovalsAgent] = [:]
+            normalizedAgents.reserveCapacity(agents.count)
+            for (key, var agent) in agents {
+                if let allowlist = agent.allowlist {
+                    let normalized = self.normalizeAllowlistEntries(allowlist, dropInvalid: false).entries
+                    agent.allowlist = normalized.isEmpty ? nil : normalized
+                }
+                normalizedAgents[key] = agent
+            }
+            agents = normalizedAgents
+        }
         return ExecApprovalsFile(
             version: 1,
             socket: ExecApprovalsSocketConfig(
                 path: socketPath.isEmpty ? nil : socketPath,
                 token: token.isEmpty ? nil : token),
             defaults: file.defaults,
-            agents: agents)
+            agents: agents.isEmpty ? nil : agents)
     }
 
     static func readSnapshot() -> ExecApprovalsSnapshot {
@@ -306,7 +343,12 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
     }
 
     static func ensureFile() -> ExecApprovalsFile {
-        var file = self.loadFile()
+        let url = self.fileURL()
+        let existed = FileManager().fileExists(atPath: url.path)
+        let loaded = self.loadFile()
+        let loadedHash = self.hashFile(loaded)
+
+        var file = self.normalizeIncoming(loaded)
         if file.socket == nil { file.socket = ExecApprovalsSocketConfig(path: nil, token: nil) }
         let path = file.socket?.path?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
         if path.isEmpty {
@@ -317,7 +359,9 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
             file.socket?.token = self.generateToken()
         }
         if file.agents == nil { file.agents = [:] }
-        self.saveFile(file)
+        if !existed || loadedHash != self.hashFile(file) {
+            self.saveFile(file)
+        }
         return file
     }
 
@@ -339,16 +383,9 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
                 ?? resolvedDefaults.askFallback,
             autoAllowSkills: agentEntry.autoAllowSkills ?? wildcardEntry.autoAllowSkills
                 ?? resolvedDefaults.autoAllowSkills)
-        let allowlist = ((wildcardEntry.allowlist ?? []) + (agentEntry.allowlist ?? []))
-            .map { entry in
-                ExecAllowlistEntry(
-                    id: entry.id,
-                    pattern: entry.pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines),
-                    lastUsedAt: entry.lastUsedAt,
-                    lastUsedCommand: entry.lastUsedCommand,
-                    lastResolvedPath: entry.lastResolvedPath)
-            }
-            .filter { !$0.pattern.isEmpty }
+        let allowlist = self.normalizeAllowlistEntries(
+            (wildcardEntry.allowlist ?? []) + (agentEntry.allowlist ?? []),
+            dropInvalid: true).entries
         let socketPath = self.expandPath(file.socket?.path ?? self.socketPath())
         let token = file.socket?.token ?? ""
         return ExecApprovalsResolved(
@@ -398,20 +435,30 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
         }
     }
 
-    static func addAllowlistEntry(agentId: String?, pattern: String) {
-        let trimmed = pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return }
+    @discardableResult
+    static func addAllowlistEntry(agentId: String?, pattern: String) -> ExecAllowlistPatternValidationReason? {
+        let normalizedPattern: String
+        switch ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern(pattern) {
+        case .valid(let validPattern):
+            normalizedPattern = validPattern
+        case .invalid(let reason):
+            return reason
+        }
+
         self.updateFile { file in
             let key = self.agentKey(agentId)
             var agents = file.agents ?? [:]
             var entry = agents[key] ?? ExecApprovalsAgent()
             var allowlist = entry.allowlist ?? []
-            if allowlist.contains(where: { $0.pattern == trimmed }) { return }
-            allowlist.append(ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: trimmed, lastUsedAt: Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000))
+            if allowlist.contains(where: { $0.pattern == normalizedPattern }) { return }
+            allowlist.append(ExecAllowlistEntry(
+                pattern: normalizedPattern,
+                lastUsedAt: Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000))
             entry.allowlist = allowlist
             agents[key] = entry
             file.agents = agents
         }
+        return nil
     }
 
     static func recordAllowlistUse(
@@ -439,25 +486,21 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
         }
     }
 
-    static func updateAllowlist(agentId: String?, allowlist: [ExecAllowlistEntry]) {
+    @discardableResult
+    static func updateAllowlist(agentId: String?, allowlist: [ExecAllowlistEntry]) -> [ExecAllowlistRejectedEntry] {
+        var rejected: [ExecAllowlistRejectedEntry] = []
         self.updateFile { file in
             let key = self.agentKey(agentId)
             var agents = file.agents ?? [:]
             var entry = agents[key] ?? ExecApprovalsAgent()
-            let cleaned = allowlist
-                .map { item in
-                    ExecAllowlistEntry(
-                        id: item.id,
-                        pattern: item.pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines),
-                        lastUsedAt: item.lastUsedAt,
-                        lastUsedCommand: item.lastUsedCommand,
-                        lastResolvedPath: item.lastResolvedPath)
-                }
-                .filter { !$0.pattern.isEmpty }
+            let normalized = self.normalizeAllowlistEntries(allowlist, dropInvalid: true)
+            rejected = normalized.rejected
+            let cleaned = normalized.entries
             entry.allowlist = cleaned
             agents[key] = entry
             file.agents = agents
         }
+        return rejected
     }
 
     static func updateAgentSettings(agentId: String?, mutate: (inout ExecApprovalsAgent) -> Void) {
@@ -500,6 +543,14 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
         return digest.map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
     }
 
+    private static func hashFile(_ file: ExecApprovalsFile) -> String {
+        let encoder = JSONEncoder()
+        encoder.outputFormatting = [.sortedKeys]
+        let data = (try? encoder.encode(file)) ?? Data()
+        let digest = SHA256.hash(data: data)
+        return digest.map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
+    }
+
     private static func expandPath(_ raw: String) -> String {
         let trimmed = raw.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
         if trimmed == "~" {
@@ -519,14 +570,101 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
     }
 
     private static func normalizedPattern(_ pattern: String?) -> String? {
-        let trimmed = pattern?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
-        return trimmed.isEmpty ? nil : trimmed.lowercased()
+        switch ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern(pattern) {
+        case .valid(let normalized):
+            return normalized.lowercased()
+        case .invalid(.empty):
+            return nil
+        case .invalid:
+            let trimmed = pattern?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
+            return trimmed.isEmpty ? nil : trimmed.lowercased()
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static func migrateLegacyPattern(_ entry: ExecAllowlistEntry) -> ExecAllowlistEntry {
+        let trimmedPattern = entry.pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+        let trimmedResolved = entry.lastResolvedPath?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
+        let normalizedResolved = trimmedResolved.isEmpty ? nil : trimmedResolved
+
+        switch ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern(trimmedPattern) {
+        case .valid(let pattern):
+            return ExecAllowlistEntry(
+                id: entry.id,
+                pattern: pattern,
+                lastUsedAt: entry.lastUsedAt,
+                lastUsedCommand: entry.lastUsedCommand,
+                lastResolvedPath: normalizedResolved)
+        case .invalid:
+            switch ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern(trimmedResolved) {
+            case .valid(let migratedPattern):
+                return ExecAllowlistEntry(
+                    id: entry.id,
+                    pattern: migratedPattern,
+                    lastUsedAt: entry.lastUsedAt,
+                    lastUsedCommand: entry.lastUsedCommand,
+                    lastResolvedPath: normalizedResolved)
+            case .invalid:
+                return ExecAllowlistEntry(
+                    id: entry.id,
+                    pattern: trimmedPattern,
+                    lastUsedAt: entry.lastUsedAt,
+                    lastUsedCommand: entry.lastUsedCommand,
+                    lastResolvedPath: normalizedResolved)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static func normalizeAllowlistEntries(
+        _ entries: [ExecAllowlistEntry],
+        dropInvalid: Bool) -> (entries: [ExecAllowlistEntry], rejected: [ExecAllowlistRejectedEntry])
+    {
+        var normalized: [ExecAllowlistEntry] = []
+        normalized.reserveCapacity(entries.count)
+        var rejected: [ExecAllowlistRejectedEntry] = []
+
+        for entry in entries {
+            let migrated = self.migrateLegacyPattern(entry)
+            let trimmedPattern = migrated.pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+            let trimmedResolvedPath = migrated.lastResolvedPath?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
+            let normalizedResolvedPath = trimmedResolvedPath.isEmpty ? nil : trimmedResolvedPath
+
+            switch ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern(trimmedPattern) {
+            case .valid(let pattern):
+                normalized.append(
+                    ExecAllowlistEntry(
+                        id: migrated.id,
+                        pattern: pattern,
+                        lastUsedAt: migrated.lastUsedAt,
+                        lastUsedCommand: migrated.lastUsedCommand,
+                        lastResolvedPath: normalizedResolvedPath))
+            case .invalid(let reason):
+                if dropInvalid {
+                    rejected.append(
+                        ExecAllowlistRejectedEntry(
+                            id: migrated.id,
+                            pattern: trimmedPattern,
+                            reason: reason))
+                } else if reason != .empty {
+                    normalized.append(
+                        ExecAllowlistEntry(
+                            id: migrated.id,
+                            pattern: trimmedPattern,
+                            lastUsedAt: migrated.lastUsedAt,
+                            lastUsedCommand: migrated.lastUsedCommand,
+                            lastResolvedPath: normalizedResolvedPath))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        return (normalized, rejected)
     }
 
     private static func mergeAgents(
         current: ExecApprovalsAgent,
         legacy: ExecApprovalsAgent) -> ExecApprovalsAgent
     {
+        let currentAllowlist = self.normalizeAllowlistEntries(current.allowlist ?? [], dropInvalid: false).entries
+        let legacyAllowlist = self.normalizeAllowlistEntries(legacy.allowlist ?? [], dropInvalid: false).entries
         var seen = Set<String>()
         var allowlist: [ExecAllowlistEntry] = []
         func append(_ entry: ExecAllowlistEntry) {
@@ -536,10 +674,10 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
             seen.insert(key)
             allowlist.append(entry)
         }
-        for entry in current.allowlist ?? [] {
+        for entry in currentAllowlist {
             append(entry)
         }
-        for entry in legacy.allowlist ?? [] {
+        for entry in legacyAllowlist {
             append(entry)
         }
 
@@ -552,102 +690,23 @@ enum ExecApprovalsStore {
     }
 }
 
-struct ExecCommandResolution: Sendable {
-    let rawExecutable: String
-    let resolvedPath: String?
-    let executableName: String
-    let cwd: String?
-
-    static func resolve(
-        command: [String],
-        rawCommand: String?,
-        cwd: String?,
-        env: [String: String]?) -> ExecCommandResolution?
-    {
-        let trimmedRaw = rawCommand?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
-        if !trimmedRaw.isEmpty, let token = self.parseFirstToken(trimmedRaw) {
-            return self.resolveExecutable(rawExecutable: token, cwd: cwd, env: env)
-        }
-        return self.resolve(command: command, cwd: cwd, env: env)
-    }
-
-    static func resolve(command: [String], cwd: String?, env: [String: String]?) -> ExecCommandResolution? {
-        guard let raw = command.first?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines), !raw.isEmpty else {
-            return nil
-        }
-        return self.resolveExecutable(rawExecutable: raw, cwd: cwd, env: env)
-    }
-
-    private static func resolveExecutable(
-        rawExecutable: String,
-        cwd: String?,
-        env: [String: String]?) -> ExecCommandResolution?
-    {
-        let expanded = rawExecutable.hasPrefix("~") ? (rawExecutable as NSString).expandingTildeInPath : rawExecutable
-        let hasPathSeparator = expanded.contains("/") || expanded.contains("\\")
-        let resolvedPath: String? = {
-            if hasPathSeparator {
-                if expanded.hasPrefix("/") {
-                    return expanded
-                }
-                let base = cwd?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-                let root = (base?.isEmpty == false) ? base! : FileManager().currentDirectoryPath
-                return URL(fileURLWithPath: root).appendingPathComponent(expanded).path
-            }
-            let searchPaths = self.searchPaths(from: env)
-            return CommandResolver.findExecutable(named: expanded, searchPaths: searchPaths)
-        }()
-        let name = resolvedPath.map { URL(fileURLWithPath: $0).lastPathComponent } ?? expanded
-        return ExecCommandResolution(
-            rawExecutable: expanded,
-            resolvedPath: resolvedPath,
-            executableName: name,
-            cwd: cwd)
-    }
-
-    private static func parseFirstToken(_ command: String) -> String? {
-        let trimmed = command.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return nil }
-        guard let first = trimmed.first else { return nil }
-        if first == "\"" || first == "'" {
-            let rest = trimmed.dropFirst()
-            if let end = rest.firstIndex(of: first) {
-                return String(rest[..<end])
-            }
-            return String(rest)
-        }
-        return trimmed.split(whereSeparator: { $0.isWhitespace }).first.map(String.init)
-    }
-
-    private static func searchPaths(from env: [String: String]?) -> [String] {
-        let raw = env?["PATH"]
-        if let raw, !raw.isEmpty {
-            return raw.split(separator: ":").map(String.init)
-        }
-        return CommandResolver.preferredPaths()
-    }
-}
-
-enum ExecCommandFormatter {
-    static func displayString(for argv: [String]) -> String {
-        argv.map { arg in
-            let trimmed = arg.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-            guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return "\"\"" }
-            let needsQuotes = trimmed.contains { $0.isWhitespace || $0 == "\"" }
-            if !needsQuotes { return trimmed }
-            let escaped = trimmed.replacingOccurrences(of: "\"", with: "\\\"")
-            return "\"\(escaped)\""
-        }.joined(separator: " ")
-    }
-
-    static func displayString(for argv: [String], rawCommand: String?) -> String {
-        let trimmed = rawCommand?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
-        if !trimmed.isEmpty { return trimmed }
-        return self.displayString(for: argv)
-    }
-}
-
 enum ExecApprovalHelpers {
+    static func validateAllowlistPattern(_ pattern: String?) -> ExecAllowlistPatternValidation {
+        let trimmed = pattern?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
+        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return .invalid(.empty) }
+        guard self.containsPathComponent(trimmed) else { return .invalid(.missingPathComponent) }
+        return .valid(trimmed)
+    }
+
+    static func isPathPattern(_ pattern: String?) -> Bool {
+        switch self.validateAllowlistPattern(pattern) {
+        case .valid:
+            true
+        case .invalid:
+            false
+        }
+    }
+
     static func parseDecision(_ raw: String?) -> ExecApprovalDecision? {
         let trimmed = raw?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
         guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return nil }
@@ -669,70 +728,9 @@ enum ExecApprovalHelpers {
         let pattern = resolution?.resolvedPath ?? resolution?.rawExecutable ?? command.first ?? ""
         return pattern.isEmpty ? nil : pattern
     }
-}
 
-enum ExecAllowlistMatcher {
-    static func match(entries: [ExecAllowlistEntry], resolution: ExecCommandResolution?) -> ExecAllowlistEntry? {
-        guard let resolution, !entries.isEmpty else { return nil }
-        let rawExecutable = resolution.rawExecutable
-        let resolvedPath = resolution.resolvedPath
-        let executableName = resolution.executableName
-
-        for entry in entries {
-            let pattern = entry.pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-            if pattern.isEmpty { continue }
-            let hasPath = pattern.contains("/") || pattern.contains("~") || pattern.contains("\\")
-            if hasPath {
-                let target = resolvedPath ?? rawExecutable
-                if self.matches(pattern: pattern, target: target) { return entry }
-            } else if self.matches(pattern: pattern, target: executableName) {
-                return entry
-            }
-        }
-        return nil
-    }
-
-    private static func matches(pattern: String, target: String) -> Bool {
-        let trimmed = pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return false }
-        let expanded = trimmed.hasPrefix("~") ? (trimmed as NSString).expandingTildeInPath : trimmed
-        let normalizedPattern = self.normalizeMatchTarget(expanded)
-        let normalizedTarget = self.normalizeMatchTarget(target)
-        guard let regex = self.regex(for: normalizedPattern) else { return false }
-        let range = NSRange(location: 0, length: normalizedTarget.utf16.count)
-        return regex.firstMatch(in: normalizedTarget, options: [], range: range) != nil
-    }
-
-    private static func normalizeMatchTarget(_ value: String) -> String {
-        value.replacingOccurrences(of: "\\\\", with: "/").lowercased()
-    }
-
-    private static func regex(for pattern: String) -> NSRegularExpression? {
-        var regex = "^"
-        var idx = pattern.startIndex
-        while idx < pattern.endIndex {
-            let ch = pattern[idx]
-            if ch == "*" {
-                let next = pattern.index(after: idx)
-                if next < pattern.endIndex, pattern[next] == "*" {
-                    regex += ".*"
-                    idx = pattern.index(after: next)
-                } else {
-                    regex += "[^/]*"
-                    idx = next
-                }
-                continue
-            }
-            if ch == "?" {
-                regex += "."
-                idx = pattern.index(after: idx)
-                continue
-            }
-            regex += NSRegularExpression.escapedPattern(for: String(ch))
-            idx = pattern.index(after: idx)
-        }
-        regex += "$"
-        return try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: regex, options: [.caseInsensitive])
+    private static func containsPathComponent(_ pattern: String) -> Bool {
+        pattern.contains("/") || pattern.contains("~") || pattern.contains("\\")
     }
 }
 

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/ExecApprovalsSocket.swift

@@ -350,34 +350,7 @@ enum ExecApprovalsPromptPresenter {
 
 @MainActor
 private enum ExecHostExecutor {
-    private struct ExecApprovalContext {
-        let command: [String]
-        let displayCommand: String
-        let trimmedAgent: String?
-        let approvals: ExecApprovalsResolved
-        let security: ExecSecurity
-        let ask: ExecAsk
-        let autoAllowSkills: Bool
-        let env: [String: String]?
-        let resolution: ExecCommandResolution?
-        let allowlistMatch: ExecAllowlistEntry?
-        let skillAllow: Bool
-    }
-
-    private static let blockedEnvKeys: Set<String> = [
-        "PATH",
-        "NODE_OPTIONS",
-        "PYTHONHOME",
-        "PYTHONPATH",
-        "PERL5LIB",
-        "PERL5OPT",
-        "RUBYOPT",
-    ]
-
-    private static let blockedEnvPrefixes: [String] = [
-        "DYLD_",
-        "LD_",
-    ]
+    private typealias ExecApprovalContext = ExecApprovalEvaluation
 
     static func handle(_ request: ExecHostRequest) async -> ExecHostResponse {
         let command = request.command.map { $0.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) }
@@ -419,7 +392,7 @@ private enum ExecHostExecutor {
                     host: "node",
                     security: context.security.rawValue,
                     ask: context.ask.rawValue,
-                    agentId: context.trimmedAgent,
+                    agentId: context.agentId,
                     resolvedPath: context.resolution?.resolvedPath,
                     sessionKey: request.sessionKey))
 
@@ -440,7 +413,7 @@ private enum ExecHostExecutor {
         self.persistAllowlistEntry(decision: approvalDecision, context: context)
 
         if context.security == .allowlist,
-           context.allowlistMatch == nil,
+           !context.allowlistSatisfied,
            !context.skillAllow,
            !approvedByAsk
         {
@@ -450,12 +423,21 @@ private enum ExecHostExecutor {
                 reason: "allowlist-miss")
         }
 
-        if let match = context.allowlistMatch {
-            ExecApprovalsStore.recordAllowlistUse(
-                agentId: context.trimmedAgent,
-                pattern: match.pattern,
-                command: context.displayCommand,
-                resolvedPath: context.resolution?.resolvedPath)
+        if context.allowlistSatisfied {
+            var seenPatterns = Set<String>()
+            for (idx, match) in context.allowlistMatches.enumerated() {
+                if !seenPatterns.insert(match.pattern).inserted {
+                    continue
+                }
+                let resolvedPath = idx < context.allowlistResolutions.count
+                    ? context.allowlistResolutions[idx].resolvedPath
+                    : nil
+                ExecApprovalsStore.recordAllowlistUse(
+                    agentId: context.agentId,
+                    pattern: match.pattern,
+                    command: context.displayCommand,
+                    resolvedPath: resolvedPath)
+            }
         }
 
         if let errorResponse = await self.ensureScreenRecordingAccess(request.needsScreenRecording) {
@@ -470,43 +452,12 @@ private enum ExecHostExecutor {
     }
 
     private static func buildContext(request: ExecHostRequest, command: [String]) async -> ExecApprovalContext {
-        let displayCommand = ExecCommandFormatter.displayString(
-            for: command,
-            rawCommand: request.rawCommand)
-        let agentId = request.agentId?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-        let trimmedAgent = (agentId?.isEmpty == false) ? agentId : nil
-        let approvals = ExecApprovalsStore.resolve(agentId: trimmedAgent)
-        let security = approvals.agent.security
-        let ask = approvals.agent.ask
-        let autoAllowSkills = approvals.agent.autoAllowSkills
-        let env = self.sanitizedEnv(request.env)
-        let resolution = ExecCommandResolution.resolve(
+        await ExecApprovalEvaluator.evaluate(
             command: command,
             rawCommand: request.rawCommand,
             cwd: request.cwd,
-            env: env)
-        let allowlistMatch = security == .allowlist
-            ? ExecAllowlistMatcher.match(entries: approvals.allowlist, resolution: resolution)
-            : nil
-        let skillAllow: Bool
-        if autoAllowSkills, let name = resolution?.executableName {
-            let bins = await SkillBinsCache.shared.currentBins()
-            skillAllow = bins.contains(name)
-        } else {
-            skillAllow = false
-        }
-        return ExecApprovalContext(
-            command: command,
-            displayCommand: displayCommand,
-            trimmedAgent: trimmedAgent,
-            approvals: approvals,
-            security: security,
-            ask: ask,
-            autoAllowSkills: autoAllowSkills,
-            env: env,
-            resolution: resolution,
-            allowlistMatch: allowlistMatch,
-            skillAllow: skillAllow)
+            envOverrides: request.env,
+            agentId: request.agentId)
     }
 
     private static func persistAllowlistEntry(
@@ -514,13 +465,18 @@ private enum ExecHostExecutor {
         context: ExecApprovalContext)
     {
         guard decision == .allowAlways, context.security == .allowlist else { return }
-        guard let pattern = ExecApprovalHelpers.allowlistPattern(
-            command: context.command,
-            resolution: context.resolution)
-        else {
-            return
+        var seenPatterns = Set<String>()
+        for candidate in context.allowlistResolutions {
+            guard let pattern = ExecApprovalHelpers.allowlistPattern(
+                command: context.command,
+                resolution: candidate)
+            else {
+                continue
+            }
+            if seenPatterns.insert(pattern).inserted {
+                ExecApprovalsStore.addAllowlistEntry(agentId: context.agentId, pattern: pattern)
+            }
         }
-        ExecApprovalsStore.addAllowlistEntry(agentId: context.trimmedAgent, pattern: pattern)
     }
 
     private static func ensureScreenRecordingAccess(_ needsScreenRecording: Bool?) async -> ExecHostResponse? {
@@ -579,20 +535,6 @@ private enum ExecHostExecutor {
             payload: payload,
             error: nil)
     }
-
-    private static func sanitizedEnv(_ overrides: [String: String]?) -> [String: String]? {
-        guard let overrides else { return nil }
-        var merged = ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment
-        for (rawKey, value) in overrides {
-            let key = rawKey.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-            guard !key.isEmpty else { continue }
-            let upper = key.uppercased()
-            if self.blockedEnvKeys.contains(upper) { continue }
-            if self.blockedEnvPrefixes.contains(where: { upper.hasPrefix($0) }) { continue }
-            merged[key] = value
-        }
-        return merged
-    }
 }
 
 private final class ExecApprovalsSocketServer: @unchecked Sendable {

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/ExecCommandResolution.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+import Foundation
+
+struct ExecCommandResolution: Sendable {
+    let rawExecutable: String
+    let resolvedPath: String?
+    let executableName: String
+    let cwd: String?
+
+    static func resolve(
+        command: [String],
+        rawCommand: String?,
+        cwd: String?,
+        env: [String: String]?) -> ExecCommandResolution?
+    {
+        let trimmedRaw = rawCommand?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
+        if !trimmedRaw.isEmpty, let token = self.parseFirstToken(trimmedRaw) {
+            return self.resolveExecutable(rawExecutable: token, cwd: cwd, env: env)
+        }
+        return self.resolve(command: command, cwd: cwd, env: env)
+    }
+
+    static func resolveForAllowlist(
+        command: [String],
+        rawCommand: String?,
+        cwd: String?,
+        env: [String: String]?) -> [ExecCommandResolution]
+    {
+        let shell = ExecShellWrapperParser.extract(command: command, rawCommand: rawCommand)
+        if shell.isWrapper {
+            guard let shellCommand = shell.command,
+                  let segments = self.splitShellCommandChain(shellCommand)
+            else {
+                // Fail closed: if we cannot safely parse a shell wrapper payload,
+                // treat this as an allowlist miss and require approval.
+                return []
+            }
+            var resolutions: [ExecCommandResolution] = []
+            resolutions.reserveCapacity(segments.count)
+            for segment in segments {
+                guard let token = self.parseFirstToken(segment),
+                      let resolution = self.resolveExecutable(rawExecutable: token, cwd: cwd, env: env)
+                else {
+                    return []
+                }
+                resolutions.append(resolution)
+            }
+            return resolutions
+        }
+
+        guard let resolution = self.resolve(command: command, rawCommand: rawCommand, cwd: cwd, env: env) else {
+            return []
+        }
+        return [resolution]
+    }
+
+    static func resolve(command: [String], cwd: String?, env: [String: String]?) -> ExecCommandResolution? {
+        let effective = ExecEnvInvocationUnwrapper.unwrapDispatchWrappersForResolution(command)
+        guard let raw = effective.first?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines), !raw.isEmpty else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return self.resolveExecutable(rawExecutable: raw, cwd: cwd, env: env)
+    }
+
+    private static func resolveExecutable(
+        rawExecutable: String,
+        cwd: String?,
+        env: [String: String]?) -> ExecCommandResolution?
+    {
+        let expanded = rawExecutable.hasPrefix("~") ? (rawExecutable as NSString).expandingTildeInPath : rawExecutable
+        let hasPathSeparator = expanded.contains("/") || expanded.contains("\\")
+        let resolvedPath: String? = {
+            if hasPathSeparator {
+                if expanded.hasPrefix("/") {
+                    return expanded
+                }
+                let base = cwd?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+                let root = (base?.isEmpty == false) ? base! : FileManager().currentDirectoryPath
+                return URL(fileURLWithPath: root).appendingPathComponent(expanded).path
+            }
+            let searchPaths = self.searchPaths(from: env)
+            return CommandResolver.findExecutable(named: expanded, searchPaths: searchPaths)
+        }()
+        let name = resolvedPath.map { URL(fileURLWithPath: $0).lastPathComponent } ?? expanded
+        return ExecCommandResolution(
+            rawExecutable: expanded,
+            resolvedPath: resolvedPath,
+            executableName: name,
+            cwd: cwd)
+    }
+
+    private static func parseFirstToken(_ command: String) -> String? {
+        let trimmed = command.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return nil }
+        guard let first = trimmed.first else { return nil }
+        if first == "\"" || first == "'" {
+            let rest = trimmed.dropFirst()
+            if let end = rest.firstIndex(of: first) {
+                return String(rest[..<end])
+            }
+            return String(rest)
+        }
+        return trimmed.split(whereSeparator: { $0.isWhitespace }).first.map(String.init)
+    }
+
+    private enum ShellTokenContext {
+        case unquoted
+        case doubleQuoted
+    }
+
+    private struct ShellFailClosedRule {
+        let token: Character
+        let next: Character?
+    }
+
+    private static let shellFailClosedRules: [ShellTokenContext: [ShellFailClosedRule]] = [
+        .unquoted: [
+            ShellFailClosedRule(token: "`", next: nil),
+            ShellFailClosedRule(token: "$", next: "("),
+            ShellFailClosedRule(token: "<", next: "("),
+            ShellFailClosedRule(token: ">", next: "("),
+        ],
+        .doubleQuoted: [
+            ShellFailClosedRule(token: "`", next: nil),
+            ShellFailClosedRule(token: "$", next: "("),
+        ],
+    ]
+
+    private static func splitShellCommandChain(_ command: String) -> [String]? {
+        let trimmed = command.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return nil }
+
+        var segments: [String] = []
+        var current = ""
+        var inSingle = false
+        var inDouble = false
+        var escaped = false
+        let chars = Array(trimmed)
+        var idx = 0
+
+        func appendCurrent() -> Bool {
+            let segment = current.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+            guard !segment.isEmpty else { return false }
+            segments.append(segment)
+            current.removeAll(keepingCapacity: true)
+            return true
+        }
+
+        while idx < chars.count {
+            let ch = chars[idx]
+            let next: Character? = idx + 1 < chars.count ? chars[idx + 1] : nil
+
+            if escaped {
+                current.append(ch)
+                escaped = false
+                idx += 1
+                continue
+            }
+
+            if ch == "\\", !inSingle {
+                current.append(ch)
+                escaped = true
+                idx += 1
+                continue
+            }
+
+            if ch == "'", !inDouble {
+                inSingle.toggle()
+                current.append(ch)
+                idx += 1
+                continue
+            }
+
+            if ch == "\"", !inSingle {
+                inDouble.toggle()
+                current.append(ch)
+                idx += 1
+                continue
+            }
+
+            if !inSingle, self.shouldFailClosedForShell(ch: ch, next: next, inDouble: inDouble) {
+                // Fail closed on command/process substitution in allowlist mode,
+                // including command substitution inside double-quoted shell strings.
+                return nil
+            }
+
+            if !inSingle, !inDouble {
+                let prev: Character? = idx > 0 ? chars[idx - 1] : nil
+                if let delimiterStep = self.chainDelimiterStep(ch: ch, prev: prev, next: next) {
+                    guard appendCurrent() else { return nil }
+                    idx += delimiterStep
+                    continue
+                }
+            }
+
+            current.append(ch)
+            idx += 1
+        }
+
+        if escaped || inSingle || inDouble { return nil }
+        guard appendCurrent() else { return nil }
+        return segments
+    }
+
+    private static func shouldFailClosedForShell(ch: Character, next: Character?, inDouble: Bool) -> Bool {
+        let context: ShellTokenContext = inDouble ? .doubleQuoted : .unquoted
+        guard let rules = self.shellFailClosedRules[context] else {
+            return false
+        }
+        for rule in rules {
+            if ch == rule.token, rule.next == nil || next == rule.next {
+                return true
+            }
+        }
+        return false
+    }
+
+    private static func chainDelimiterStep(ch: Character, prev: Character?, next: Character?) -> Int? {
+        if ch == ";" || ch == "\n" {
+            return 1
+        }
+        if ch == "&" {
+            if next == "&" {
+                return 2
+            }
+            // Keep fd redirections like 2>&1 or &>file intact.
+            let prevIsRedirect = prev == ">"
+            let nextIsRedirect = next == ">"
+            return (!prevIsRedirect && !nextIsRedirect) ? 1 : nil
+        }
+        if ch == "|" {
+            if next == "|" || next == "&" {
+                return 2
+            }
+            return 1
+        }
+        return nil
+    }
+
+    private static func searchPaths(from env: [String: String]?) -> [String] {
+        let raw = env?["PATH"]
+        if let raw, !raw.isEmpty {
+            return raw.split(separator: ":").map(String.init)
+        }
+        return CommandResolver.preferredPaths()
+    }
+}
+
+enum ExecCommandFormatter {
+    static func displayString(for argv: [String]) -> String {
+        argv.map { arg in
+            let trimmed = arg.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+            guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return "\"\"" }
+            let needsQuotes = trimmed.contains { $0.isWhitespace || $0 == "\"" }
+            if !needsQuotes { return trimmed }
+            let escaped = trimmed.replacingOccurrences(of: "\"", with: "\\\"")
+            return "\"\(escaped)\""
+        }.joined(separator: " ")
+    }
+
+    static func displayString(for argv: [String], rawCommand: String?) -> String {
+        let trimmed = rawCommand?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
+        if !trimmed.isEmpty { return trimmed }
+        return self.displayString(for: argv)
+    }
+}

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/ExecEnvInvocationUnwrapper.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import Foundation
+
+enum ExecCommandToken {
+    static func basenameLower(_ token: String) -> String {
+        let trimmed = token.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return "" }
+        let normalized = trimmed.replacingOccurrences(of: "\\", with: "/")
+        return normalized.split(separator: "/").last.map { String($0).lowercased() } ?? normalized.lowercased()
+    }
+}
+
+enum ExecEnvInvocationUnwrapper {
+    static let maxWrapperDepth = 4
+
+    private static let optionsWithValue = Set([
+        "-u",
+        "--unset",
+        "-c",
+        "--chdir",
+        "-s",
+        "--split-string",
+        "--default-signal",
+        "--ignore-signal",
+        "--block-signal",
+    ])
+    private static let flagOptions = Set(["-i", "--ignore-environment", "-0", "--null"])
+
+    private static func isEnvAssignment(_ token: String) -> Bool {
+        let pattern = #"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=.*"#
+        return token.range(of: pattern, options: .regularExpression) != nil
+    }
+
+    static func unwrap(_ command: [String]) -> [String]? {
+        var idx = 1
+        var expectsOptionValue = false
+        while idx < command.count {
+            let token = command[idx].trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+            if token.isEmpty {
+                idx += 1
+                continue
+            }
+            if expectsOptionValue {
+                expectsOptionValue = false
+                idx += 1
+                continue
+            }
+            if token == "--" || token == "-" {
+                idx += 1
+                break
+            }
+            if self.isEnvAssignment(token) {
+                idx += 1
+                continue
+            }
+            if token.hasPrefix("-"), token != "-" {
+                let lower = token.lowercased()
+                let flag = lower.split(separator: "=", maxSplits: 1).first.map(String.init) ?? lower
+                if self.flagOptions.contains(flag) {
+                    idx += 1
+                    continue
+                }
+                if self.optionsWithValue.contains(flag) {
+                    if !lower.contains("=") {
+                        expectsOptionValue = true
+                    }
+                    idx += 1
+                    continue
+                }
+                if lower.hasPrefix("-u") ||
+                    lower.hasPrefix("-c") ||
+                    lower.hasPrefix("-s") ||
+                    lower.hasPrefix("--unset=") ||
+                    lower.hasPrefix("--chdir=") ||
+                    lower.hasPrefix("--split-string=") ||
+                    lower.hasPrefix("--default-signal=") ||
+                    lower.hasPrefix("--ignore-signal=") ||
+                    lower.hasPrefix("--block-signal=")
+                {
+                    idx += 1
+                    continue
+                }
+                return nil
+            }
+            break
+        }
+        guard idx < command.count else { return nil }
+        return Array(command[idx...])
+    }
+
+    static func unwrapDispatchWrappersForResolution(_ command: [String]) -> [String] {
+        var current = command
+        var depth = 0
+        while depth < self.maxWrapperDepth {
+            guard let token = current.first?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines), !token.isEmpty else {
+                break
+            }
+            guard ExecCommandToken.basenameLower(token) == "env" else {
+                break
+            }
+            guard let unwrapped = self.unwrap(current), !unwrapped.isEmpty else {
+                break
+            }
+            current = unwrapped
+            depth += 1
+        }
+        return current
+    }
+}

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/ExecShellWrapperParser.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+import Foundation
+
+enum ExecShellWrapperParser {
+    struct ParsedShellWrapper {
+        let isWrapper: Bool
+        let command: String?
+
+        static let notWrapper = ParsedShellWrapper(isWrapper: false, command: nil)
+    }
+
+    private enum Kind {
+        case posix
+        case cmd
+        case powershell
+    }
+
+    private struct WrapperSpec {
+        let kind: Kind
+        let names: Set<String>
+    }
+
+    private static let posixInlineFlags = Set(["-lc", "-c", "--command"])
+    private static let powershellInlineFlags = Set(["-c", "-command", "--command"])
+
+    private static let wrapperSpecs: [WrapperSpec] = [
+        WrapperSpec(kind: .posix, names: ["ash", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "dash", "ksh", "fish"]),
+        WrapperSpec(kind: .cmd, names: ["cmd.exe", "cmd"]),
+        WrapperSpec(kind: .powershell, names: ["powershell", "powershell.exe", "pwsh", "pwsh.exe"]),
+    ]
+
+    static func extract(command: [String], rawCommand: String?) -> ParsedShellWrapper {
+        let trimmedRaw = rawCommand?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
+        let preferredRaw = trimmedRaw.isEmpty ? nil : trimmedRaw
+        return self.extract(command: command, preferredRaw: preferredRaw, depth: 0)
+    }
+
+    private static func extract(command: [String], preferredRaw: String?, depth: Int) -> ParsedShellWrapper {
+        guard depth < ExecEnvInvocationUnwrapper.maxWrapperDepth else {
+            return .notWrapper
+        }
+        guard let token0 = command.first?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines), !token0.isEmpty else {
+            return .notWrapper
+        }
+
+        let base0 = ExecCommandToken.basenameLower(token0)
+        if base0 == "env" {
+            guard let unwrapped = ExecEnvInvocationUnwrapper.unwrap(command) else {
+                return .notWrapper
+            }
+            return self.extract(command: unwrapped, preferredRaw: preferredRaw, depth: depth + 1)
+        }
+
+        guard let spec = self.wrapperSpecs.first(where: { $0.names.contains(base0) }) else {
+            return .notWrapper
+        }
+        guard let payload = self.extractPayload(command: command, spec: spec) else {
+            return .notWrapper
+        }
+        let normalized = preferredRaw ?? payload
+        return ParsedShellWrapper(isWrapper: true, command: normalized)
+    }
+
+    private static func extractPayload(command: [String], spec: WrapperSpec) -> String? {
+        switch spec.kind {
+        case .posix:
+            return self.extractPosixInlineCommand(command)
+        case .cmd:
+            return self.extractCmdInlineCommand(command)
+        case .powershell:
+            return self.extractPowerShellInlineCommand(command)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static func extractPosixInlineCommand(_ command: [String]) -> String? {
+        let flag = command.count > 1 ? command[1].trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) : ""
+        guard self.posixInlineFlags.contains(flag.lowercased()) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        let payload = command.count > 2 ? command[2].trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) : ""
+        return payload.isEmpty ? nil : payload
+    }
+
+    private static func extractCmdInlineCommand(_ command: [String]) -> String? {
+        guard let idx = command.firstIndex(where: { $0.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).lowercased() == "/c" }) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        let tail = command.suffix(from: command.index(after: idx)).joined(separator: " ")
+        let payload = tail.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+        return payload.isEmpty ? nil : payload
+    }
+
+    private static func extractPowerShellInlineCommand(_ command: [String]) -> String? {
+        for idx in 1..<command.count {
+            let token = command[idx].trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).lowercased()
+            if token.isEmpty { continue }
+            if token == "--" { break }
+            if self.powershellInlineFlags.contains(token) {
+                let payload = idx + 1 < command.count
+                    ? command[idx + 1].trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+                    : ""
+                return payload.isEmpty ? nil : payload
+            }
+        }
+        return nil
+    }
+}

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.swift

@@ -2,9 +2,34 @@ import Foundation
 import OpenClawDiscovery
 
 enum GatewayDiscoveryHelpers {
-    static func sshTarget(for gateway: GatewayDiscoveryModel.DiscoveredGateway) -> String? {
-        let host = self.sanitizedTailnetHost(gateway.tailnetDns) ?? gateway.lanHost
+    static func resolvedServiceHost(
+        for gateway: GatewayDiscoveryModel.DiscoveredGateway) -> String?
+    {
+        self.resolvedServiceHost(gateway.serviceHost)
+    }
+
+    static func resolvedServiceHost(_ host: String?) -> String? {
         guard let host = self.trimmed(host), !host.isEmpty else { return nil }
+        return host
+    }
+
+    static func serviceEndpoint(
+        for gateway: GatewayDiscoveryModel.DiscoveredGateway) -> (host: String, port: Int)?
+    {
+        self.serviceEndpoint(serviceHost: gateway.serviceHost, servicePort: gateway.servicePort)
+    }
+
+    static func serviceEndpoint(
+        serviceHost: String?,
+        servicePort: Int?) -> (host: String, port: Int)?
+    {
+        guard let host = self.resolvedServiceHost(serviceHost) else { return nil }
+        guard let port = servicePort, port > 0, port <= 65535 else { return nil }
+        return (host, port)
+    }
+
+    static func sshTarget(for gateway: GatewayDiscoveryModel.DiscoveredGateway) -> String? {
+        guard let host = self.resolvedServiceHost(for: gateway) else { return nil }
         let user = NSUserName()
         var target = "\(user)@\(host)"
         if gateway.sshPort != 22 {
@@ -16,42 +41,37 @@ enum GatewayDiscoveryHelpers {
     static func directUrl(for gateway: GatewayDiscoveryModel.DiscoveredGateway) -> String? {
         self.directGatewayUrl(
             serviceHost: gateway.serviceHost,
-            servicePort: gateway.servicePort,
-            lanHost: gateway.lanHost,
-            gatewayPort: gateway.gatewayPort)
+            servicePort: gateway.servicePort)
     }
 
     static func directGatewayUrl(
         serviceHost: String?,
-        servicePort: Int?,
-        lanHost: String?,
-        gatewayPort: Int?) -> String?
+        servicePort: Int?) -> String?
     {
         // Security: do not route using unauthenticated TXT hints (tailnetDns/lanHost/gatewayPort).
         // Prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA).
-        if let host = self.trimmed(serviceHost), !host.isEmpty,
-           let port = servicePort, port > 0
-        {
-            let scheme = port == 443 ? "wss" : "ws"
-            let portSuffix = port == 443 ? "" : ":\(port)"
-            return "\(scheme)://\(host)\(portSuffix)"
-        }
-
-        // Legacy fallback (best-effort): keep existing behavior when we couldn't resolve SRV.
-        guard let lanHost = self.trimmed(lanHost), !lanHost.isEmpty else { return nil }
-        let port = gatewayPort ?? 18789
-        return "ws://\(lanHost):\(port)"
-    }
-
-    static func sanitizedTailnetHost(_ host: String?) -> String? {
-        guard let host = self.trimmed(host), !host.isEmpty else { return nil }
-        if host.hasSuffix(".internal.") || host.hasSuffix(".internal") {
+        guard let endpoint = self.serviceEndpoint(serviceHost: serviceHost, servicePort: servicePort) else {
             return nil
         }
-        return host
+        // Security: for non-loopback hosts, force TLS to avoid plaintext credential/session leakage.
+        let scheme = self.isLoopbackHost(endpoint.host) ? "ws" : "wss"
+        let portSuffix = endpoint.port == 443 ? "" : ":\(endpoint.port)"
+        return "\(scheme)://\(endpoint.host)\(portSuffix)"
     }
 
     private static func trimmed(_ value: String?) -> String? {
         value?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
     }
+
+    private static func isLoopbackHost(_ rawHost: String) -> Bool {
+        let host = rawHost.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).lowercased()
+        guard !host.isEmpty else { return false }
+        if host == "localhost" || host == "::1" || host == "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1" {
+            return true
+        }
+        if host.hasPrefix("::ffff:127.") {
+            return true
+        }
+        return host.hasPrefix("127.")
+    }
 }

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/GeneralSettings.swift

@@ -303,7 +303,9 @@ struct GeneralSettings: View {
                 .disabled(self.remoteStatus == .checking || self.state.remoteUrl
                     .trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).isEmpty)
             }
-            Text("Direct mode requires a ws:// or wss:// URL (Tailscale Serve uses wss://<magicdns>).")
+            Text(
+                "Direct mode requires wss:// for remote hosts. ws:// is only allowed for localhost/127.0.0.1."
+            )
                 .font(.caption)
                 .foregroundStyle(.secondary)
                 .padding(.leading, self.remoteLabelWidth + 10)
@@ -546,7 +548,9 @@ extension GeneralSettings {
                 return
             }
             guard Self.isValidWsUrl(trimmedUrl) else {
-                self.remoteStatus = .failed("Gateway URL must start with ws:// or wss://")
+                self.remoteStatus = .failed(
+                    "Gateway URL must use wss:// for remote hosts (ws:// only for localhost)"
+                )
                 return
             }
         } else {
@@ -603,11 +607,7 @@ extension GeneralSettings {
     }
 
     private static func isValidWsUrl(_ raw: String) -> Bool {
-        guard let url = URL(string: raw.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)) else { return false }
-        let scheme = url.scheme?.lowercased() ?? ""
-        guard scheme == "ws" || scheme == "wss" else { return false }
-        let host = url.host?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
-        return !host.isEmpty
+        GatewayRemoteConfig.normalizeGatewayUrl(raw) != nil
     }
 
     private static func sshCheckCommand(target: String, identity: String) -> [String]? {
@@ -675,22 +675,17 @@ extension GeneralSettings {
     private func applyDiscoveredGateway(_ gateway: GatewayDiscoveryModel.DiscoveredGateway) {
         MacNodeModeCoordinator.shared.setPreferredGatewayStableID(gateway.stableID)
 
-        let host = gateway.tailnetDns ?? gateway.lanHost
-        guard let host else { return }
-        let user = NSUserName()
         if self.state.remoteTransport == .direct {
-            if let url = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.directUrl(for: gateway) {
-                self.state.remoteUrl = url
-            }
+            self.state.remoteUrl = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.directUrl(for: gateway) ?? ""
         } else {
-            self.state.remoteTarget = GatewayDiscoveryModel.buildSSHTarget(
-                user: user,
-                host: host,
-                port: gateway.sshPort)
-            self.state.remoteCliPath = gateway.cliPath ?? ""
+            self.state.remoteTarget = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.sshTarget(for: gateway) ?? ""
+        }
+        if let endpoint = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.serviceEndpoint(for: gateway) {
             OpenClawConfigFile.setRemoteGatewayUrl(
-                host: gateway.serviceHost ?? host,
-                port: gateway.servicePort ?? gateway.gatewayPort)
+                host: endpoint.host,
+                port: endpoint.port)
+        } else {
+            OpenClawConfigFile.clearRemoteGatewayUrl()
         }
     }
 }

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/HostEnvSanitizer.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+import Foundation
+
+enum HostEnvSanitizer {
+    /// Keep in sync with src/infra/host-env-security-policy.json.
+    /// Parity is validated by src/infra/host-env-security.policy-parity.test.ts.
+    private static let blockedKeys: Set<String> = [
+        "NODE_OPTIONS",
+        "NODE_PATH",
+        "PYTHONHOME",
+        "PYTHONPATH",
+        "PERL5LIB",
+        "PERL5OPT",
+        "RUBYLIB",
+        "RUBYOPT",
+        "BASH_ENV",
+        "ENV",
+        "SHELL",
+        "SHELLOPTS",
+        "PS4",
+        "GCONV_PATH",
+        "IFS",
+        "SSLKEYLOGFILE",
+    ]
+
+    private static let blockedPrefixes: [String] = [
+        "DYLD_",
+        "LD_",
+        "BASH_FUNC_",
+    ]
+    private static let blockedOverrideKeys: Set<String> = [
+        "HOME",
+        "ZDOTDIR",
+    ]
+    private static let shellWrapperAllowedOverrideKeys: Set<String> = [
+        "TERM",
+        "LANG",
+        "LC_ALL",
+        "LC_CTYPE",
+        "LC_MESSAGES",
+        "COLORTERM",
+        "NO_COLOR",
+        "FORCE_COLOR",
+    ]
+
+    private static func isBlocked(_ upperKey: String) -> Bool {
+        if self.blockedKeys.contains(upperKey) { return true }
+        return self.blockedPrefixes.contains(where: { upperKey.hasPrefix($0) })
+    }
+
+    private static func filterOverridesForShellWrapper(_ overrides: [String: String]?) -> [String: String]? {
+        guard let overrides else { return nil }
+        var filtered: [String: String] = [:]
+        for (rawKey, value) in overrides {
+            let key = rawKey.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+            guard !key.isEmpty else { continue }
+            if self.shellWrapperAllowedOverrideKeys.contains(key.uppercased()) {
+                filtered[key] = value
+            }
+        }
+        return filtered.isEmpty ? nil : filtered
+    }
+
+    static func sanitize(overrides: [String: String]?, shellWrapper: Bool = false) -> [String: String] {
+        var merged: [String: String] = [:]
+        for (rawKey, value) in ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment {
+            let key = rawKey.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+            guard !key.isEmpty else { continue }
+            let upper = key.uppercased()
+            if self.isBlocked(upper) { continue }
+            merged[key] = value
+        }
+
+        let effectiveOverrides = shellWrapper
+            ? self.filterOverridesForShellWrapper(overrides)
+            : overrides
+
+        guard let effectiveOverrides else { return merged }
+        for (rawKey, value) in effectiveOverrides {
+            let key = rawKey.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+            guard !key.isEmpty else { continue }
+            let upper = key.uppercased()
+            // PATH is part of the security boundary (command resolution + safe-bin checks). Never
+            // allow request-scoped PATH overrides from agents/gateways.
+            if upper == "PATH" { continue }
+            if self.blockedOverrideKeys.contains(upper) { continue }
+            if self.isBlocked(upper) { continue }
+            merged[key] = value
+        }
+        return merged
+    }
+}

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/NodeMode/MacNodeRuntime.swift

@@ -441,43 +441,25 @@ actor MacNodeRuntime {
         guard !command.isEmpty else {
             return Self.errorResponse(req, code: .invalidRequest, message: "INVALID_REQUEST: command required")
         }
-        let displayCommand = ExecCommandFormatter.displayString(for: command, rawCommand: params.rawCommand)
-
-        let trimmedAgent = params.agentId?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? ""
-        let agentId = trimmedAgent.isEmpty ? nil : trimmedAgent
-        let approvals = ExecApprovalsStore.resolve(agentId: agentId)
-        let security = approvals.agent.security
-        let ask = approvals.agent.ask
-        let autoAllowSkills = approvals.agent.autoAllowSkills
         let sessionKey = (params.sessionKey?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).isEmpty == false)
             ? params.sessionKey!.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
             : self.mainSessionKey
         let runId = UUID().uuidString
-        let env = Self.sanitizedEnv(params.env)
-        let resolution = ExecCommandResolution.resolve(
+        let evaluation = await ExecApprovalEvaluator.evaluate(
             command: command,
             rawCommand: params.rawCommand,
             cwd: params.cwd,
-            env: env)
-        let allowlistMatch = security == .allowlist
-            ? ExecAllowlistMatcher.match(entries: approvals.allowlist, resolution: resolution)
-            : nil
-        let skillAllow: Bool
-        if autoAllowSkills, let name = resolution?.executableName {
-            let bins = await SkillBinsCache.shared.currentBins()
-            skillAllow = bins.contains(name)
-        } else {
-            skillAllow = false
-        }
+            envOverrides: params.env,
+            agentId: params.agentId)
 
-        if security == .deny {
+        if evaluation.security == .deny {
             await self.emitExecEvent(
                 "exec.denied",
                 payload: ExecEventPayload(
                     sessionKey: sessionKey,
                     runId: runId,
                     host: "node",
-                    command: displayCommand,
+                    command: evaluation.displayCommand,
                     reason: "security=deny"))
             return Self.errorResponse(
                 req,
@@ -489,32 +471,33 @@ actor MacNodeRuntime {
             req: req,
             params: params,
             context: ExecRunContext(
-                displayCommand: displayCommand,
-                security: security,
-                ask: ask,
-                agentId: agentId,
-                resolution: resolution,
-                allowlistMatch: allowlistMatch,
-                skillAllow: skillAllow,
+                displayCommand: evaluation.displayCommand,
+                security: evaluation.security,
+                ask: evaluation.ask,
+                agentId: evaluation.agentId,
+                resolution: evaluation.resolution,
+                allowlistMatch: evaluation.allowlistMatch,
+                skillAllow: evaluation.skillAllow,
                 sessionKey: sessionKey,
                 runId: runId))
         if let response = approval.response { return response }
         let approvedByAsk = approval.approvedByAsk
         let persistAllowlist = approval.persistAllowlist
-        if persistAllowlist, security == .allowlist,
-           let pattern = ExecApprovalHelpers.allowlistPattern(command: command, resolution: resolution)
-        {
-            ExecApprovalsStore.addAllowlistEntry(agentId: agentId, pattern: pattern)
-        }
+        self.persistAllowlistPatterns(
+            persistAllowlist: persistAllowlist,
+            security: evaluation.security,
+            agentId: evaluation.agentId,
+            command: command,
+            allowlistResolutions: evaluation.allowlistResolutions)
 
-        if security == .allowlist, allowlistMatch == nil, !skillAllow, !approvedByAsk {
+        if evaluation.security == .allowlist, !evaluation.allowlistSatisfied, !evaluation.skillAllow, !approvedByAsk {
             await self.emitExecEvent(
                 "exec.denied",
                 payload: ExecEventPayload(
                     sessionKey: sessionKey,
                     runId: runId,
                     host: "node",
-                    command: displayCommand,
+                    command: evaluation.displayCommand,
                     reason: "allowlist-miss"))
             return Self.errorResponse(
                 req,
@@ -522,79 +505,32 @@ actor MacNodeRuntime {
                 message: "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: allowlist miss")
         }
 
-        if let match = allowlistMatch {
-            ExecApprovalsStore.recordAllowlistUse(
-                agentId: agentId,
-                pattern: match.pattern,
-                command: displayCommand,
-                resolvedPath: resolution?.resolvedPath)
+        self.recordAllowlistMatches(
+            security: evaluation.security,
+            allowlistSatisfied: evaluation.allowlistSatisfied,
+            agentId: evaluation.agentId,
+            allowlistMatches: evaluation.allowlistMatches,
+            allowlistResolutions: evaluation.allowlistResolutions,
+            displayCommand: evaluation.displayCommand)
+
+        if let permissionResponse = await self.validateScreenRecordingIfNeeded(
+            req: req,
+            needsScreenRecording: params.needsScreenRecording,
+            sessionKey: sessionKey,
+            runId: runId,
+            displayCommand: evaluation.displayCommand)
+        {
+            return permissionResponse
         }
 
-        if params.needsScreenRecording == true {
-            let authorized = await PermissionManager
-                .status([.screenRecording])[.screenRecording] ?? false
-            if !authorized {
-                await self.emitExecEvent(
-                    "exec.denied",
-                    payload: ExecEventPayload(
-                        sessionKey: sessionKey,
-                        runId: runId,
-                        host: "node",
-                        command: displayCommand,
-                        reason: "permission:screenRecording"))
-                return Self.errorResponse(
-                    req,
-                    code: .unavailable,
-                    message: "PERMISSION_MISSING: screenRecording")
-            }
-        }
-
-        let timeoutSec = params.timeoutMs.flatMap { Double($0) / 1000.0 }
-        await self.emitExecEvent(
-            "exec.started",
-            payload: ExecEventPayload(
-                sessionKey: sessionKey,
-                runId: runId,
-                host: "node",
-                command: displayCommand))
-        let result = await ShellExecutor.runDetailed(
+        return try await self.executeSystemRun(
+            req: req,
+            params: params,
             command: command,
-            cwd: params.cwd,
-            env: env,
-            timeout: timeoutSec)
-        let combined = [result.stdout, result.stderr, result.errorMessage]
-            .compactMap(\.self)
-            .filter { !$0.isEmpty }
-            .joined(separator: "\n")
-        await self.emitExecEvent(
-            "exec.finished",
-            payload: ExecEventPayload(
-                sessionKey: sessionKey,
-                runId: runId,
-                host: "node",
-                command: displayCommand,
-                exitCode: result.exitCode,
-                timedOut: result.timedOut,
-                success: result.success,
-                output: ExecEventPayload.truncateOutput(combined)))
-
-        struct RunPayload: Encodable {
-            var exitCode: Int?
-            var timedOut: Bool
-            var success: Bool
-            var stdout: String
-            var stderr: String
-            var error: String?
-        }
-
-        let payload = try Self.encodePayload(RunPayload(
-            exitCode: result.exitCode,
-            timedOut: result.timedOut,
-            success: result.success,
-            stdout: result.stdout,
-            stderr: result.stderr,
-            error: result.errorMessage))
-        return BridgeInvokeResponse(id: req.id, ok: true, payloadJSON: payload)
+            env: evaluation.env,
+            sessionKey: sessionKey,
+            runId: runId,
+            displayCommand: evaluation.displayCommand)
     }
 
     private func handleSystemWhich(_ req: BridgeInvokeRequest) async throws -> BridgeInvokeResponse {
@@ -835,6 +771,132 @@ actor MacNodeRuntime {
 }
 
 extension MacNodeRuntime {
+    private func persistAllowlistPatterns(
+        persistAllowlist: Bool,
+        security: ExecSecurity,
+        agentId: String?,
+        command: [String],
+        allowlistResolutions: [ExecCommandResolution])
+    {
+        guard persistAllowlist, security == .allowlist else { return }
+        var seenPatterns = Set<String>()
+        for candidate in allowlistResolutions {
+            guard let pattern = ExecApprovalHelpers.allowlistPattern(command: command, resolution: candidate) else {
+                continue
+            }
+            if seenPatterns.insert(pattern).inserted {
+                ExecApprovalsStore.addAllowlistEntry(agentId: agentId, pattern: pattern)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func recordAllowlistMatches(
+        security: ExecSecurity,
+        allowlistSatisfied: Bool,
+        agentId: String?,
+        allowlistMatches: [ExecAllowlistEntry],
+        allowlistResolutions: [ExecCommandResolution],
+        displayCommand: String)
+    {
+        guard security == .allowlist, allowlistSatisfied else { return }
+        var seenPatterns = Set<String>()
+        for (idx, match) in allowlistMatches.enumerated() {
+            if !seenPatterns.insert(match.pattern).inserted {
+                continue
+            }
+            let resolvedPath = idx < allowlistResolutions.count ? allowlistResolutions[idx].resolvedPath : nil
+            ExecApprovalsStore.recordAllowlistUse(
+                agentId: agentId,
+                pattern: match.pattern,
+                command: displayCommand,
+                resolvedPath: resolvedPath)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func validateScreenRecordingIfNeeded(
+        req: BridgeInvokeRequest,
+        needsScreenRecording: Bool?,
+        sessionKey: String,
+        runId: String,
+        displayCommand: String) async -> BridgeInvokeResponse?
+    {
+        guard needsScreenRecording == true else { return nil }
+        let authorized = await PermissionManager
+            .status([.screenRecording])[.screenRecording] ?? false
+        if authorized {
+            return nil
+        }
+        await self.emitExecEvent(
+            "exec.denied",
+            payload: ExecEventPayload(
+                sessionKey: sessionKey,
+                runId: runId,
+                host: "node",
+                command: displayCommand,
+                reason: "permission:screenRecording"))
+        return Self.errorResponse(
+            req,
+            code: .unavailable,
+            message: "PERMISSION_MISSING: screenRecording")
+    }
+
+    private func executeSystemRun(
+        req: BridgeInvokeRequest,
+        params: OpenClawSystemRunParams,
+        command: [String],
+        env: [String: String],
+        sessionKey: String,
+        runId: String,
+        displayCommand: String) async throws -> BridgeInvokeResponse
+    {
+        let timeoutSec = params.timeoutMs.flatMap { Double($0) / 1000.0 }
+        await self.emitExecEvent(
+            "exec.started",
+            payload: ExecEventPayload(
+                sessionKey: sessionKey,
+                runId: runId,
+                host: "node",
+                command: displayCommand))
+        let result = await ShellExecutor.runDetailed(
+            command: command,
+            cwd: params.cwd,
+            env: env,
+            timeout: timeoutSec)
+        let combined = [result.stdout, result.stderr, result.errorMessage]
+            .compactMap(\.self)
+            .filter { !$0.isEmpty }
+            .joined(separator: "\n")
+        await self.emitExecEvent(
+            "exec.finished",
+            payload: ExecEventPayload(
+                sessionKey: sessionKey,
+                runId: runId,
+                host: "node",
+                command: displayCommand,
+                exitCode: result.exitCode,
+                timedOut: result.timedOut,
+                success: result.success,
+                output: ExecEventPayload.truncateOutput(combined)))
+
+        struct RunPayload: Encodable {
+            var exitCode: Int?
+            var timedOut: Bool
+            var success: Bool
+            var stdout: String
+            var stderr: String
+            var error: String?
+        }
+        let runPayload = RunPayload(
+            exitCode: result.exitCode,
+            timedOut: result.timedOut,
+            success: result.success,
+            stdout: result.stdout,
+            stderr: result.stderr,
+            error: result.errorMessage)
+        let payload = try Self.encodePayload(runPayload)
+        return BridgeInvokeResponse(id: req.id, ok: true, payloadJSON: payload)
+    }
+
     private static func decodeParams<T: Decodable>(_ type: T.Type, from json: String?) throws -> T {
         guard let json, let data = json.data(using: .utf8) else {
             throw NSError(domain: "Gateway", code: 20, userInfo: [
@@ -862,35 +924,6 @@ extension MacNodeRuntime {
         UserDefaults.standard.object(forKey: cameraEnabledKey) as? Bool ?? false
     }
 
-    private static let blockedEnvKeys: Set<String> = [
-        "PATH",
-        "NODE_OPTIONS",
-        "PYTHONHOME",
-        "PYTHONPATH",
-        "PERL5LIB",
-        "PERL5OPT",
-        "RUBYOPT",
-    ]
-
-    private static let blockedEnvPrefixes: [String] = [
-        "DYLD_",
-        "LD_",
-    ]
-
-    private static func sanitizedEnv(_ overrides: [String: String]?) -> [String: String]? {
-        guard let overrides else { return nil }
-        var merged = ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment
-        for (rawKey, value) in overrides {
-            let key = rawKey.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-            guard !key.isEmpty else { continue }
-            let upper = key.uppercased()
-            if self.blockedEnvKeys.contains(upper) { continue }
-            if self.blockedEnvPrefixes.contains(where: { upper.hasPrefix($0) }) { continue }
-            merged[key] = value
-        }
-        return merged
-    }
-
     private nonisolated static func locationMode() -> OpenClawLocationMode {
         let raw = UserDefaults.standard.string(forKey: locationModeKey) ?? "off"
         return OpenClawLocationMode(rawValue: raw) ?? .off

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/NodePairingApprovalPrompter.swift

@@ -520,11 +520,12 @@ final class NodePairingApprovalPrompter {
         let preferred = GatewayDiscoveryPreferences.preferredStableID()
         let gateway = model.gateways.first { $0.stableID == preferred } ?? model.gateways.first
         guard let gateway else { return nil }
-        let host = (gateway.tailnetDns?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).nonEmpty ??
-            gateway.lanHost?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).nonEmpty)
-        guard let host, !host.isEmpty else { return nil }
-        let port = gateway.sshPort > 0 ? gateway.sshPort : 22
-        return SSHTarget(host: host, port: port)
+        guard let target = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.sshTarget(for: gateway),
+              let parsed = CommandResolver.parseSSHTarget(target)
+        else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return SSHTarget(host: parsed.host, port: parsed.port)
     }
 
     private static func probeSSH(user: String, host: String, port: Int) async -> Bool {

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/OnboardingView+Actions.swift

@@ -26,20 +26,17 @@ extension OnboardingView {
         GatewayDiscoveryPreferences.setPreferredStableID(gateway.stableID)
 
         if self.state.remoteTransport == .direct {
-            if let url = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.directUrl(for: gateway) {
-                self.state.remoteUrl = url
-            }
-        } else if let host = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.sanitizedTailnetHost(gateway.tailnetDns) ?? gateway.lanHost {
-            let user = NSUserName()
-            self.state.remoteTarget = GatewayDiscoveryModel.buildSSHTarget(
-                user: user,
-                host: host,
-                port: gateway.sshPort)
-            OpenClawConfigFile.setRemoteGatewayUrl(
-                host: gateway.serviceHost ?? host,
-                port: gateway.servicePort ?? gateway.gatewayPort)
+            self.state.remoteUrl = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.directUrl(for: gateway) ?? ""
+        } else {
+            self.state.remoteTarget = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.sshTarget(for: gateway) ?? ""
+        }
+        if let endpoint = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.serviceEndpoint(for: gateway) {
+            OpenClawConfigFile.setRemoteGatewayUrl(
+                host: endpoint.host,
+                port: endpoint.port)
+        } else {
+            OpenClawConfigFile.clearRemoteGatewayUrl()
         }
-        self.state.remoteCliPath = gateway.cliPath ?? ""
 
         self.state.connectionMode = .remote
         MacNodeModeCoordinator.shared.setPreferredGatewayStableID(gateway.stableID)

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/OnboardingView+Pages.swift

@@ -265,9 +265,11 @@ extension OnboardingView {
         if self.state.remoteTransport == .direct {
             return GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.directUrl(for: gateway) ?? "Gateway pairing only"
         }
-        if let host = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.sanitizedTailnetHost(gateway.tailnetDns) ?? gateway.lanHost {
-            let portSuffix = gateway.sshPort != 22 ? " · ssh \(gateway.sshPort)" : ""
-            return "\(host)\(portSuffix)"
+        if let target = GatewayDiscoveryHelpers.sshTarget(for: gateway),
+           let parsed = CommandResolver.parseSSHTarget(target)
+        {
+            let portSuffix = parsed.port != 22 ? " · ssh \(parsed.port)" : ""
+            return "\(parsed.host)\(portSuffix)"
         }
         return "Gateway pairing only"
     }

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/OpenClawConfigFile.swift

@@ -223,6 +223,19 @@ enum OpenClawConfigFile {
         }
     }
 
+    static func clearRemoteGatewayUrl() {
+        self.updateGatewayDict { gateway in
+            guard var remote = gateway["remote"] as? [String: Any] else { return }
+            guard remote["url"] != nil else { return }
+            remote.removeValue(forKey: "url")
+            if remote.isEmpty {
+                gateway.removeValue(forKey: "remote")
+            } else {
+                gateway["remote"] = remote
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     private static func remoteGatewayUrl() -> URL? {
         let root = self.loadDict()
         guard let gateway = root["gateway"] as? [String: Any],

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/Resources/Info.plist

@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@
     <key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
     <string>APPL</string>
     <key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
-    <string>2026.2.20</string>
+    <string>2026.2.23</string>
     <key>CFBundleVersion</key>
-    <string>202602200</string>
+    <string>202602230</string>
     <key>CFBundleIconFile</key>
     <string>OpenClaw</string>
     <key>CFBundleURLTypes</key>

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/SystemRunSettingsView.swift

@@ -105,16 +105,24 @@ struct SystemRunSettingsView: View {
                     .foregroundStyle(.secondary)
             } else {
                 HStack(spacing: 8) {
-                    TextField("Add allowlist pattern (case-insensitive globs)", text: self.$newPattern)
+                    TextField("Add allowlist path pattern (case-insensitive globs)", text: self.$newPattern)
                         .textFieldStyle(.roundedBorder)
                     Button("Add") {
-                        let pattern = self.newPattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-                        guard !pattern.isEmpty else { return }
-                        self.model.addEntry(pattern)
-                        self.newPattern = ""
+                        if self.model.addEntry(self.newPattern) == nil {
+                            self.newPattern = ""
+                        }
                     }
                     .buttonStyle(.bordered)
-                    .disabled(self.newPattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).isEmpty)
+                    .disabled(!self.model.isPathPattern(self.newPattern))
+                }
+
+                Text("Path patterns only. Basename entries like \"echo\" are ignored.")
+                    .font(.footnote)
+                    .foregroundStyle(.secondary)
+                if let validationMessage = self.model.allowlistValidationMessage {
+                    Text(validationMessage)
+                        .font(.footnote)
+                        .foregroundStyle(.orange)
                 }
 
                 if self.model.entries.isEmpty {
@@ -234,6 +242,7 @@ final class ExecApprovalsSettingsModel {
     var autoAllowSkills = false
     var entries: [ExecAllowlistEntry] = []
     var skillBins: [String] = []
+    var allowlistValidationMessage: String?
 
     var agentPickerIds: [String] {
         [Self.defaultsScopeId] + self.agentIds
@@ -289,6 +298,7 @@ final class ExecApprovalsSettingsModel {
 
     func selectAgent(_ id: String) {
         self.selectedAgentId = id
+        self.allowlistValidationMessage = nil
         self.loadSettings(for: id)
         Task { await self.refreshSkillBins() }
     }
@@ -301,6 +311,7 @@ final class ExecApprovalsSettingsModel {
             self.askFallback = defaults.askFallback
             self.autoAllowSkills = defaults.autoAllowSkills
             self.entries = []
+            self.allowlistValidationMessage = nil
             return
         }
         let resolved = ExecApprovalsStore.resolve(agentId: agentId)
@@ -310,6 +321,7 @@ final class ExecApprovalsSettingsModel {
         self.autoAllowSkills = resolved.agent.autoAllowSkills
         self.entries = resolved.allowlist
             .sorted { $0.pattern.localizedCaseInsensitiveCompare($1.pattern) == .orderedAscending }
+        self.allowlistValidationMessage = nil
     }
 
     func setSecurity(_ security: ExecSecurity) {
@@ -367,32 +379,55 @@ final class ExecApprovalsSettingsModel {
         Task { await self.refreshSkillBins(force: enabled) }
     }
 
-    func addEntry(_ pattern: String) {
-        guard !self.isDefaultsScope else { return }
-        let trimmed = pattern.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
-        guard !trimmed.isEmpty else { return }
-        self.entries.append(ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: trimmed, lastUsedAt: nil))
-        ExecApprovalsStore.updateAllowlist(agentId: self.selectedAgentId, allowlist: self.entries)
+    @discardableResult
+    func addEntry(_ pattern: String) -> ExecAllowlistPatternValidationReason? {
+        guard !self.isDefaultsScope else { return nil }
+        switch ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern(pattern) {
+        case .valid(let normalizedPattern):
+            self.entries.append(ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: normalizedPattern, lastUsedAt: nil))
+            let rejected = ExecApprovalsStore.updateAllowlist(agentId: self.selectedAgentId, allowlist: self.entries)
+            self.allowlistValidationMessage = rejected.first?.reason.message
+            return rejected.first?.reason
+        case .invalid(let reason):
+            self.allowlistValidationMessage = reason.message
+            return reason
+        }
     }
 
-    func updateEntry(_ entry: ExecAllowlistEntry, id: UUID) {
-        guard !self.isDefaultsScope else { return }
-        guard let index = self.entries.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == id }) else { return }
-        self.entries[index] = entry
-        ExecApprovalsStore.updateAllowlist(agentId: self.selectedAgentId, allowlist: self.entries)
+    @discardableResult
+    func updateEntry(_ entry: ExecAllowlistEntry, id: UUID) -> ExecAllowlistPatternValidationReason? {
+        guard !self.isDefaultsScope else { return nil }
+        guard let index = self.entries.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == id }) else { return nil }
+        var next = entry
+        switch ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern(next.pattern) {
+        case .valid(let normalizedPattern):
+            next.pattern = normalizedPattern
+        case .invalid(let reason):
+            self.allowlistValidationMessage = reason.message
+            return reason
+        }
+        self.entries[index] = next
+        let rejected = ExecApprovalsStore.updateAllowlist(agentId: self.selectedAgentId, allowlist: self.entries)
+        self.allowlistValidationMessage = rejected.first?.reason.message
+        return rejected.first?.reason
     }
 
     func removeEntry(id: UUID) {
         guard !self.isDefaultsScope else { return }
         guard let index = self.entries.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == id }) else { return }
         self.entries.remove(at: index)
-        ExecApprovalsStore.updateAllowlist(agentId: self.selectedAgentId, allowlist: self.entries)
+        let rejected = ExecApprovalsStore.updateAllowlist(agentId: self.selectedAgentId, allowlist: self.entries)
+        self.allowlistValidationMessage = rejected.first?.reason.message
     }
 
     func entry(for id: UUID) -> ExecAllowlistEntry? {
         self.entries.first(where: { $0.id == id })
     }
 
+    func isPathPattern(_ pattern: String) -> Bool {
+        ExecApprovalHelpers.isPathPattern(pattern)
+    }
+
     func refreshSkillBins(force: Bool = false) async {
         guard self.autoAllowSkills else {
             self.skillBins = []

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClawDiscovery/TailscaleNetwork.swift

@@ -44,4 +44,3 @@ public enum TailscaleNetwork {
         return nil
     }
 }
-

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClawMacCLI/ConnectCommand.swift

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ struct ConnectOptions {
     var clientMode: String = "ui"
     var displayName: String?
     var role: String = "operator"
-    var scopes: [String] = ["operator.admin", "operator.approvals", "operator.pairing"]
+    var scopes: [String] = defaultOperatorConnectScopes
     var help: Bool = false
 
     static func parse(_ args: [String]) -> ConnectOptions {

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClawMacCLI/GatewayScopes.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+let defaultOperatorConnectScopes: [String] = [
+    "operator.admin",
+    "operator.read",
+    "operator.write",
+    "operator.approvals",
+    "operator.pairing",
+]

apps/macos/Sources/OpenClawMacCLI/WizardCommand.swift

@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ actor GatewayWizardClient {
         let clientMode = "ui"
         let role = "operator"
         // Explicit scopes; gateway no longer defaults empty scopes to admin.
-        let scopes: [String] = ["operator.admin", "operator.approvals", "operator.pairing"]
+        let scopes = defaultOperatorConnectScopes
         let client: [String: ProtoAnyCodable] = [
             "id": ProtoAnyCodable(clientId),
             "displayName": ProtoAnyCodable(Host.current().localizedName ?? "OpenClaw macOS Wizard CLI"),
@@ -281,8 +281,8 @@ actor GatewayWizardClient {
         let identity = DeviceIdentityStore.loadOrCreate()
         let signedAtMs = Int(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
         let scopesValue = scopes.joined(separator: ",")
-        var payloadParts = [
-            connectNonce == nil ? "v1" : "v2",
+        let payloadParts = [
+            "v2",
             identity.deviceId,
             clientId,
             clientMode,
@@ -290,23 +290,19 @@ actor GatewayWizardClient {
             scopesValue,
             String(signedAtMs),
             self.token ?? "",
+            connectNonce,
         ]
-        if let connectNonce {
-            payloadParts.append(connectNonce)
-        }
         let payload = payloadParts.joined(separator: "|")
         if let signature = DeviceIdentityStore.signPayload(payload, identity: identity),
            let publicKey = DeviceIdentityStore.publicKeyBase64Url(identity)
         {
-            var device: [String: ProtoAnyCodable] = [
+            let device: [String: ProtoAnyCodable] = [
                 "id": ProtoAnyCodable(identity.deviceId),
                 "publicKey": ProtoAnyCodable(publicKey),
                 "signature": ProtoAnyCodable(signature),
                 "signedAt": ProtoAnyCodable(signedAtMs),
+                "nonce": ProtoAnyCodable(connectNonce),
             ]
-            if let connectNonce {
-                device["nonce"] = ProtoAnyCodable(connectNonce)
-            }
             params["device"] = ProtoAnyCodable(device)
         }
 
@@ -333,29 +329,24 @@ actor GatewayWizardClient {
         }
     }
 
-    private func waitForConnectChallenge() async throws -> String? {
-        guard let task = self.task else { return nil }
-        do {
-            return try await AsyncTimeout.withTimeout(
-                seconds: self.connectChallengeTimeoutSeconds,
-                onTimeout: { ConnectChallengeError.timeout },
-                operation: {
-                    while true {
-                        let message = try await task.receive()
-                        let frame = try await self.decodeFrame(message)
-                        if case let .event(evt) = frame, evt.event == "connect.challenge" {
-                            if let payload = evt.payload?.value as? [String: ProtoAnyCodable],
-                               let nonce = payload["nonce"]?.value as? String
-                            {
-                                return nonce
-                            }
-                        }
+    private func waitForConnectChallenge() async throws -> String {
+        guard let task = self.task else { throw ConnectChallengeError.timeout }
+        return try await AsyncTimeout.withTimeout(
+            seconds: self.connectChallengeTimeoutSeconds,
+            onTimeout: { ConnectChallengeError.timeout },
+            operation: {
+                while true {
+                    let message = try await task.receive()
+                    let frame = try await self.decodeFrame(message)
+                    if case let .event(evt) = frame, evt.event == "connect.challenge",
+                       let payload = evt.payload?.value as? [String: ProtoAnyCodable],
+                       let nonce = payload["nonce"]?.value as? String,
+                       nonce.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).isEmpty == false
+                    {
+                        return nonce
                     }
-                })
-        } catch {
-            if error is ConnectChallengeError { return nil }
-            throw error
-        }
+                }
+            })
     }
 }
 

apps/macos/Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/ExecAllowlistTests.swift

@@ -2,7 +2,55 @@ import Foundation
 import Testing
 @testable import OpenClaw
 
+/// These cases cover optional `security=allowlist` behavior.
+/// Default install posture remains deny-by-default for exec on macOS node-host.
 struct ExecAllowlistTests {
+    private struct ShellParserParityFixture: Decodable {
+        struct Case: Decodable {
+            let id: String
+            let command: String
+            let ok: Bool
+            let executables: [String]
+        }
+
+        let cases: [Case]
+    }
+
+    private struct WrapperResolutionParityFixture: Decodable {
+        struct Case: Decodable {
+            let id: String
+            let argv: [String]
+            let expectedRawExecutable: String?
+        }
+
+        let cases: [Case]
+    }
+
+    private static func loadShellParserParityCases() throws -> [ShellParserParityFixture.Case] {
+        let fixtureURL = self.fixtureURL(filename: "exec-allowlist-shell-parser-parity.json")
+        let data = try Data(contentsOf: fixtureURL)
+        let fixture = try JSONDecoder().decode(ShellParserParityFixture.self, from: data)
+        return fixture.cases
+    }
+
+    private static func loadWrapperResolutionParityCases() throws -> [WrapperResolutionParityFixture.Case] {
+        let fixtureURL = self.fixtureURL(filename: "exec-wrapper-resolution-parity.json")
+        let data = try Data(contentsOf: fixtureURL)
+        let fixture = try JSONDecoder().decode(WrapperResolutionParityFixture.self, from: data)
+        return fixture.cases
+    }
+
+    private static func fixtureURL(filename: String) -> URL {
+        var repoRoot = URL(fileURLWithPath: #filePath)
+        for _ in 0..<5 {
+            repoRoot.deleteLastPathComponent()
+        }
+        return repoRoot
+            .appendingPathComponent("test")
+            .appendingPathComponent("fixtures")
+            .appendingPathComponent(filename)
+    }
+
     @Test func matchUsesResolvedPath() {
         let entry = ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "/opt/homebrew/bin/rg")
         let resolution = ExecCommandResolution(
@@ -14,7 +62,7 @@ struct ExecAllowlistTests {
         #expect(match?.pattern == entry.pattern)
     }
 
-    @Test func matchUsesBasenameForSimplePattern() {
+    @Test func matchIgnoresBasenamePattern() {
         let entry = ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "rg")
         let resolution = ExecCommandResolution(
             rawExecutable: "rg",
@@ -22,11 +70,22 @@ struct ExecAllowlistTests {
             executableName: "rg",
             cwd: nil)
         let match = ExecAllowlistMatcher.match(entries: [entry], resolution: resolution)
-        #expect(match?.pattern == entry.pattern)
+        #expect(match == nil)
+    }
+
+    @Test func matchIgnoresBasenameForRelativeExecutable() {
+        let entry = ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "echo")
+        let resolution = ExecCommandResolution(
+            rawExecutable: "./echo",
+            resolvedPath: "/tmp/oc-basename/echo",
+            executableName: "echo",
+            cwd: "/tmp/oc-basename")
+        let match = ExecAllowlistMatcher.match(entries: [entry], resolution: resolution)
+        #expect(match == nil)
     }
 
     @Test func matchIsCaseInsensitive() {
-        let entry = ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "RG")
+        let entry = ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "/OPT/HOMEBREW/BIN/RG")
         let resolution = ExecCommandResolution(
             rawExecutable: "rg",
             resolvedPath: "/opt/homebrew/bin/rg",
@@ -46,4 +105,145 @@ struct ExecAllowlistTests {
         let match = ExecAllowlistMatcher.match(entries: [entry], resolution: resolution)
         #expect(match?.pattern == entry.pattern)
     }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistSplitsShellChains() {
+        let command = ["/bin/sh", "-lc", "echo allowlisted && /usr/bin/touch /tmp/openclaw-allowlist-test"]
+        let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: "echo allowlisted && /usr/bin/touch /tmp/openclaw-allowlist-test",
+            cwd: nil,
+            env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+        #expect(resolutions.count == 2)
+        #expect(resolutions[0].executableName == "echo")
+        #expect(resolutions[1].executableName == "touch")
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistKeepsQuotedOperatorsInSingleSegment() {
+        let command = ["/bin/sh", "-lc", "echo \"a && b\""]
+        let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: "echo \"a && b\"",
+            cwd: nil,
+            env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+        #expect(resolutions.count == 1)
+        #expect(resolutions[0].executableName == "echo")
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistFailsClosedOnCommandSubstitution() {
+        let command = ["/bin/sh", "-lc", "echo $(/usr/bin/touch /tmp/openclaw-allowlist-test-subst)"]
+        let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: "echo $(/usr/bin/touch /tmp/openclaw-allowlist-test-subst)",
+            cwd: nil,
+            env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+        #expect(resolutions.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistFailsClosedOnQuotedCommandSubstitution() {
+        let command = ["/bin/sh", "-lc", "echo \"ok $(/usr/bin/touch /tmp/openclaw-allowlist-test-quoted-subst)\""]
+        let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: "echo \"ok $(/usr/bin/touch /tmp/openclaw-allowlist-test-quoted-subst)\"",
+            cwd: nil,
+            env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+        #expect(resolutions.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistFailsClosedOnQuotedBackticks() {
+        let command = ["/bin/sh", "-lc", "echo \"ok `/usr/bin/id`\""]
+        let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: "echo \"ok `/usr/bin/id`\"",
+            cwd: nil,
+            env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+        #expect(resolutions.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistMatchesSharedShellParserFixture() throws {
+        let fixtures = try Self.loadShellParserParityCases()
+        for fixture in fixtures {
+            let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+                command: ["/bin/sh", "-lc", fixture.command],
+                rawCommand: fixture.command,
+                cwd: nil,
+                env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+
+            #expect(!resolutions.isEmpty == fixture.ok)
+            if fixture.ok {
+                let executables = resolutions.map { $0.executableName.lowercased() }
+                let expected = fixture.executables.map { $0.lowercased() }
+                #expect(executables == expected)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveMatchesSharedWrapperResolutionFixture() throws {
+        let fixtures = try Self.loadWrapperResolutionParityCases()
+        for fixture in fixtures {
+            let resolution = ExecCommandResolution.resolve(
+                command: fixture.argv,
+                cwd: nil,
+                env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+            #expect(resolution?.rawExecutable == fixture.expectedRawExecutable)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistTreatsPlainShInvocationAsDirectExec() {
+        let command = ["/bin/sh", "./script.sh"]
+        let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: nil,
+            cwd: "/tmp",
+            env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+        #expect(resolutions.count == 1)
+        #expect(resolutions[0].executableName == "sh")
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistUnwrapsEnvShellWrapperChains() {
+        let command = ["/usr/bin/env", "/bin/sh", "-lc", "echo allowlisted && /usr/bin/touch /tmp/openclaw-allowlist-test"]
+        let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: nil,
+            cwd: nil,
+            env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+        #expect(resolutions.count == 2)
+        #expect(resolutions[0].executableName == "echo")
+        #expect(resolutions[1].executableName == "touch")
+    }
+
+    @Test func resolveForAllowlistUnwrapsEnvToEffectiveDirectExecutable() {
+        let command = ["/usr/bin/env", "FOO=bar", "/usr/bin/printf", "ok"]
+        let resolutions = ExecCommandResolution.resolveForAllowlist(
+            command: command,
+            rawCommand: nil,
+            cwd: nil,
+            env: ["PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"])
+        #expect(resolutions.count == 1)
+        #expect(resolutions[0].resolvedPath == "/usr/bin/printf")
+        #expect(resolutions[0].executableName == "printf")
+    }
+
+    @Test func matchAllRequiresEverySegmentToMatch() {
+        let first = ExecCommandResolution(
+            rawExecutable: "echo",
+            resolvedPath: "/usr/bin/echo",
+            executableName: "echo",
+            cwd: nil)
+        let second = ExecCommandResolution(
+            rawExecutable: "/usr/bin/touch",
+            resolvedPath: "/usr/bin/touch",
+            executableName: "touch",
+            cwd: nil)
+        let resolutions = [first, second]
+
+        let partial = ExecAllowlistMatcher.matchAll(
+            entries: [ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "/usr/bin/echo")],
+            resolutions: resolutions)
+        #expect(partial.isEmpty)
+
+        let full = ExecAllowlistMatcher.matchAll(
+            entries: [ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "/USR/BIN/ECHO"), ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "/usr/bin/touch")],
+            resolutions: resolutions)
+        #expect(full.count == 2)
+    }
 }

apps/macos/Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/ExecApprovalHelpersTests.swift

@@ -29,6 +29,24 @@ import Testing
         #expect(ExecApprovalHelpers.allowlistPattern(command: [], resolution: nil) == nil)
     }
 
+    @Test func validateAllowlistPatternReturnsReasons() {
+        #expect(ExecApprovalHelpers.isPathPattern("/usr/bin/rg"))
+        #expect(ExecApprovalHelpers.isPathPattern(" ~/bin/rg "))
+        #expect(!ExecApprovalHelpers.isPathPattern("rg"))
+
+        if case .invalid(let reason) = ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern("  ") {
+            #expect(reason == .empty)
+        } else {
+            Issue.record("Expected empty pattern rejection")
+        }
+
+        if case .invalid(let reason) = ExecApprovalHelpers.validateAllowlistPattern("echo") {
+            #expect(reason == .missingPathComponent)
+        } else {
+            Issue.record("Expected basename pattern rejection")
+        }
+    }
+
     @Test func requiresAskMatchesPolicy() {
         let entry = ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "/bin/ls", lastUsedAt: nil, lastUsedCommand: nil, lastResolvedPath: nil)
         #expect(ExecApprovalHelpers.requiresAsk(

apps/macos/Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/ExecApprovalsStoreRefactorTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+import Foundation
+import Testing
+@testable import OpenClaw
+
+@Suite(.serialized)
+struct ExecApprovalsStoreRefactorTests {
+    @Test
+    func ensureFileSkipsRewriteWhenUnchanged() async throws {
+        let stateDir = FileManager().temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent("openclaw-state-\(UUID().uuidString)", isDirectory: true)
+        defer { try? FileManager().removeItem(at: stateDir) }
+
+        try await TestIsolation.withEnvValues(["OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR": stateDir.path]) {
+            _ = ExecApprovalsStore.ensureFile()
+            let url = ExecApprovalsStore.fileURL()
+            let firstWriteDate = try Self.modificationDate(at: url)
+
+            try await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_100_000_000)
+            _ = ExecApprovalsStore.ensureFile()
+            let secondWriteDate = try Self.modificationDate(at: url)
+
+            #expect(firstWriteDate == secondWriteDate)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func updateAllowlistReportsRejectedBasenamePattern() async throws {
+        let stateDir = FileManager().temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent("openclaw-state-\(UUID().uuidString)", isDirectory: true)
+        defer { try? FileManager().removeItem(at: stateDir) }
+
+        await TestIsolation.withEnvValues(["OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR": stateDir.path]) {
+            let rejected = ExecApprovalsStore.updateAllowlist(
+                agentId: "main",
+                allowlist: [
+                    ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "echo"),
+                    ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "/bin/echo"),
+                ])
+            #expect(rejected.count == 1)
+            #expect(rejected.first?.reason == .missingPathComponent)
+            #expect(rejected.first?.pattern == "echo")
+
+            let resolved = ExecApprovalsStore.resolve(agentId: "main")
+            #expect(resolved.allowlist.map(\.pattern) == ["/bin/echo"])
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func updateAllowlistMigratesLegacyPatternFromResolvedPath() async throws {
+        let stateDir = FileManager().temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent("openclaw-state-\(UUID().uuidString)", isDirectory: true)
+        defer { try? FileManager().removeItem(at: stateDir) }
+
+        await TestIsolation.withEnvValues(["OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR": stateDir.path]) {
+            let rejected = ExecApprovalsStore.updateAllowlist(
+                agentId: "main",
+                allowlist: [
+                    ExecAllowlistEntry(pattern: "echo", lastUsedAt: nil, lastUsedCommand: nil, lastResolvedPath: " /usr/bin/echo "),
+                ])
+            #expect(rejected.isEmpty)
+
+            let resolved = ExecApprovalsStore.resolve(agentId: "main")
+            #expect(resolved.allowlist.map(\.pattern) == ["/usr/bin/echo"])
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static func modificationDate(at url: URL) throws -> Date {
+        let attributes = try FileManager().attributesOfItem(atPath: url.path)
+        guard let date = attributes[.modificationDate] as? Date else {
+            struct MissingDateError: Error {}
+            throw MissingDateError()
+        }
+        return date
+    }
+}

apps/macos/Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/GatewayChannelConfigureTests.swift

@@ -45,12 +45,7 @@ import Testing
 
             // First send is the connect handshake request. Subsequent sends are request frames.
             if currentSendCount == 0 {
-                guard case let .data(data) = message else { return }
-                if let obj = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: Any],
-                   (obj["type"] as? String) == "req",
-                   (obj["method"] as? String) == "connect",
-                   let id = obj["id"] as? String
-                {
+                if let id = GatewayWebSocketTestSupport.connectRequestID(from: message) {
                     self.connectRequestID.withLock { $0 = id }
                 }
                 return
@@ -65,7 +60,7 @@ import Testing
                 return
             }
 
-            let response = Self.responseData(id: id)
+            let response = GatewayWebSocketTestSupport.okResponseData(id: id)
             let handler = self.pendingReceiveHandler.withLock { $0 }
             handler?(Result<URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message, Error>.success(.data(response)))
         }
@@ -75,7 +70,7 @@ import Testing
                 try await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(self.helloDelayMs) * 1_000_000)
             }
             let id = self.connectRequestID.withLock { $0 } ?? "connect"
-            return .data(Self.connectOkData(id: id))
+            return .data(GatewayWebSocketTestSupport.connectOkData(id: id))
         }
 
         func receive(
@@ -89,41 +84,6 @@ import Testing
             handler?(Result<URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message, Error>.success(.data(data)))
         }
 
-        private static func connectOkData(id: String) -> Data {
-            let json = """
-            {
-              "type": "res",
-              "id": "\(id)",
-              "ok": true,
-              "payload": {
-                "type": "hello-ok",
-                "protocol": 2,
-                "server": { "version": "test", "connId": "test" },
-                "features": { "methods": [], "events": [] },
-                "snapshot": {
-                  "presence": [ { "ts": 1 } ],
-                  "health": {},
-                  "stateVersion": { "presence": 0, "health": 0 },
-                  "uptimeMs": 0
-                },
-                "policy": { "maxPayload": 1, "maxBufferedBytes": 1, "tickIntervalMs": 30000 }
-              }
-            }
-            """
-            return Data(json.utf8)
-        }
-
-        private static func responseData(id: String) -> Data {
-            let json = """
-            {
-              "type": "res",
-              "id": "\(id)",
-              "ok": true,
-              "payload": { "ok": true }
-            }
-            """
-            return Data(json.utf8)
-        }
     }
 
     private final class FakeWebSocketSession: WebSocketSessioning, @unchecked Sendable {

apps/macos/Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/GatewayChannelConnectTests.swift

@@ -38,17 +38,7 @@ import Testing
         }
 
         func send(_ message: URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message) async throws {
-            let data: Data? = switch message {
-            case let .data(d): d
-            case let .string(s): s.data(using: .utf8)
-            @unknown default: nil
-            }
-            guard let data else { return }
-            if let obj = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: Any],
-               obj["type"] as? String == "req",
-               obj["method"] as? String == "connect",
-               let id = obj["id"] as? String
-            {
+            if let id = GatewayWebSocketTestSupport.connectRequestID(from: message) {
                 self.connectRequestID.withLock { $0 = id }
             }
         }
@@ -60,7 +50,7 @@ import Testing
             case let .helloOk(ms):
                 delayMs = ms
                 let id = self.connectRequestID.withLock { $0 } ?? "connect"
-                msg = .data(Self.connectOkData(id: id))
+                msg = .data(GatewayWebSocketTestSupport.connectOkData(id: id))
             case let .invalid(ms):
                 delayMs = ms
                 msg = .string("not json")
@@ -77,29 +67,6 @@ import Testing
             self.pendingReceiveHandler.withLock { $0 = completionHandler }
         }
 
-        private static func connectOkData(id: String) -> Data {
-            let json = """
-            {
-              "type": "res",
-              "id": "\(id)",
-              "ok": true,
-              "payload": {
-                "type": "hello-ok",
-                "protocol": 2,
-                "server": { "version": "test", "connId": "test" },
-                "features": { "methods": [], "events": [] },
-                "snapshot": {
-                  "presence": [ { "ts": 1 } ],
-                  "health": {},
-                  "stateVersion": { "presence": 0, "health": 0 },
-                  "uptimeMs": 0
-                },
-                "policy": { "maxPayload": 1, "maxBufferedBytes": 1, "tickIntervalMs": 30000 }
-              }
-            }
-            """
-            return Data(json.utf8)
-        }
     }
 
     private final class FakeWebSocketSession: WebSocketSessioning, @unchecked Sendable {

apps/macos/Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/GatewayChannelRequestTests.swift

@@ -42,17 +42,7 @@ import Testing
 
             // First send is the connect handshake. Second send is the request frame.
             if currentSendCount == 0 {
-                let data: Data? = switch message {
-                case let .data(d): d
-                case let .string(s): s.data(using: .utf8)
-                @unknown default: nil
-                }
-                guard let data else { return }
-                if let obj = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: Any],
-                   obj["type"] as? String == "req",
-                   obj["method"] as? String == "connect",
-                   let id = obj["id"] as? String
-                {
+                if let id = GatewayWebSocketTestSupport.connectRequestID(from: message) {
                     self.connectRequestID.withLock { $0 = id }
                 }
             }
@@ -64,7 +54,7 @@ import Testing
 
         func receive() async throws -> URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message {
             let id = self.connectRequestID.withLock { $0 } ?? "connect"
-            return .data(Self.connectOkData(id: id))
+            return .data(GatewayWebSocketTestSupport.connectOkData(id: id))
         }
 
         func receive(
@@ -73,29 +63,6 @@ import Testing
             self.pendingReceiveHandler.withLock { $0 = completionHandler }
         }
 
-        private static func connectOkData(id: String) -> Data {
-            let json = """
-            {
-              "type": "res",
-              "id": "\(id)",
-              "ok": true,
-              "payload": {
-                "type": "hello-ok",
-                "protocol": 2,
-                "server": { "version": "test", "connId": "test" },
-                "features": { "methods": [], "events": [] },
-                "snapshot": {
-                  "presence": [ { "ts": 1 } ],
-                  "health": {},
-                  "stateVersion": { "presence": 0, "health": 0 },
-                  "uptimeMs": 0
-                },
-                "policy": { "maxPayload": 1, "maxBufferedBytes": 1, "tickIntervalMs": 30000 }
-              }
-            }
-            """
-            return Data(json.utf8)
-        }
     }
 
     private final class FakeWebSocketSession: WebSocketSessioning, @unchecked Sendable {