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Replace Sharp image backend with Photon (#86437)

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* refactor: replace sharp image backend with photon

* refactor: remove whatsapp jimp dependency

* chore: remove stale sharp install workarounds

* test: keep image fixtures off photon

* test: use valid prompt image fixtures

* test: account for optimized PNG fixtures

* test: use valid minimax image fixtures
This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-05-25 15:04:44 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent 32ddfc22f5
commit b9f975b64e
48 changed files with 1424 additions and 3000 deletions
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SECURITY.md
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@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ These are frequently reported but are typically closed with no code change:
- Reports that treat `POST /tools/invoke` under shared-secret bearer auth (`gateway.auth.mode="token"` or `"password"`) as a narrower per-request/per-scope authorization surface. That endpoint is designed as the same trusted-operator HTTP boundary: shared-secret bearer auth is full operator access there, narrower `x-openclaw-scopes` values do not reduce that path, and owner-only tool policy follows the shared-secret operator contract.
- Reports that only show differences in heuristic detection/parity (for example obfuscation-pattern detection on one exec path but not another, such as `node.invoke -> system.run` parity gaps) without demonstrating bypass of auth, approvals, allowlist enforcement, sandboxing, or other documented trust boundaries.
- Reports that only show an ACP tool can indirectly execute, mutate, orchestrate sessions, or reach another tool/runtime without demonstrating bypass of ACP prompt/approval, allowlist enforcement, sandboxing, or another documented trust boundary. ACP silent approval is intentionally limited to narrow readonly classes; parity-only indirect-command findings are hardening, not vulnerabilities.
- Reports that only show untrusted media bytes reaching a maintained native decoder dependency (for example Sharp/libvips/libheif) without proving the shipped dependency version is vulnerable and demonstrating crash, memory corruption, data exposure, or a boundary bypass through OpenClaw. JavaScript header sniffing and image dimension fast-paths are preflight/UX checks, not the security boundary for native decoder correctness.
- Reports that only show untrusted media bytes reaching a maintained native decoder dependency (for example image codec libraries such as libheif) without proving the shipped dependency version is vulnerable and demonstrating crash, memory corruption, data exposure, or a boundary bypass through OpenClaw. JavaScript header sniffing and image dimension fast-paths are preflight/UX checks, not the security boundary for native decoder correctness.
- Reports whose only impact is transient extra memory, CPU, or allocation work from decoding, base64 expansion, media transcoding, serialization, or other format conversion after the input was already accepted under OpenClaw's configured size/trust limits, including base64 decode-before-size-estimate findings. These are performance issues, not vulnerabilities, unless the report demonstrates unauthenticated amplification, bypass of configured limits, crash/process termination, persistent resource exhaustion, data exposure, or another documented boundary bypass.
- ReDoS/DoS claims that require trusted operator configuration input (for example catastrophic regex in `sessionFilter` or `logging.redactPatterns`) without a trust-boundary bypass.
- Archive/install extraction claims that require pre-existing local filesystem priming in trusted state (for example planting symlink/hardlink aliases under destination directories such as skills/tools paths) without showing an untrusted path that can create/control that primitive.