Address multiple vulnerabilities found during security review:
- Remove unauthenticated POST /api/crypto/decrypt decryption oracle (route,
handler, dead frontend helper) + regression test. Transport encryption is
one-directional; the server never needs to decrypt arbitrary client payloads.
- Redact secrets in config-update logs: handler_ai_model/handler_exchange logged
%+v of decrypted requests, leaking API keys / secret keys / passphrases /
private keys. Use named types shared with the log sanitizer so the masking
can never drift again; extend masking to passphrase + lighter_api_key_private_key.
- crypto: require a valid timestamp in DecryptPayload (a missing ts previously
skipped replay protection entirely).
- crypto: EncryptedString.Value() now fails closed instead of silently
persisting plaintext secrets when encryption errors.
- auth: per-IP token-bucket rate limiting on /login and /register against online
brute-force; raise registration password minimum 6 -> 8; add dummy bcrypt
compare on unknown-email login to close the user-enumeration timing channel.
- IDOR: getTraderFromQuery no longer falls back to the global in-memory trader
map; trader access is strictly scoped to the authenticated caller.
- Bump Go 1.25.10 -> 1.25.11 to resolve reachable net/textproto and crypto/x509
stdlib advisories (govulncheck now reports 0 affecting vulnerabilities).
